What were the social results of this policy? This question is one of no less interest to the community itself than to the student of sociology. It is perhaps too early for adequate examination and comparison with the policy which formerly held sway. While still a vital question there are observers who have grown dubious, if not of restitution certainly of the lump-sum method of restoration.[127] They assert that for many it proved simply a lesson in extravagance and did not safeguard the economic future of the recipients. Unused to carrying all their worldly goods in their vest pockets, these same pockets became empty again with uncommon rapidity. Victrolas, silk shirts and furbelows multiplied. Merchants' trade grew brisk with “explosion money.” There seemed to be a temporary exchange of positions by the social classes. The following statement made by one closely associated with social conditions in Halifax and written over two years after the disaster, shows only too well the danger involved in the application of such a principle. After referring to “the spirit of passive criticism directed chiefly against the few who have borne the burden of restoration” the statement continues:
The individuals who after all make up a community have been blinded to the bigger interests by their own individual material losses, and the idea of material compensation on a dollar for dollar basis. As some of us earlier foresaw, the disaster wrought much moral damage, for which no “claims” were even presented, even by those to whom we might look for special moral teaching in such an experience. In the course of our work we come daily upon evidences of this condition lingering in our midst.
Upon the whole disaster-study inclines to the unwisdom of “the disposition to proceed as though the relief committee were a compensation board or an insurance society, and to indemnify for loss.” But as already said it is early to appraise. What in ordinary times might be condemned might conceivably under the abnormal conditions of war be less morally dangerous. The system may have been at fault and not the principle.[128] Partly for reasons connected with the war it was desired to conclude the business with dispatch, and not to set up a banking house or a training school in thrift. There remains also the final test, the residuum of relief, the number of those who will remain permanently upon the charity list of the community. Will it be said of Halifax as formerly of Johnstown, that “probably so large a sum never passed into a community of equal size with so little danger to the personal character of the citizens and so complete an absence of any pauperizing or demoralizing influences?”
The lessons which come out of this experience at Halifax may easily be summarized.
1. The socialization of all communities should be promoted if for no other reason than for protection.
2. More technical methods of coördination are desirable.
3. To display the machinery of organization is unwise.
4. The supervision of voluntary services should be in the hands of one vocationally trained for the purpose.
5. Further consideration is required as to the policy of restitution and its administration.
6. The wisdom should be considered of establishing a secret relief distribution service, such as fraternal societies conduct for those who though in need will not publicly accept assistance.