"My friends had particularly wished that I should not publish my letter of declension until after my name had been presented by the State convention; they wished this as a matter of delicacy, and also as a matter of feeling. My letter had been written with that view. Mr. Manning stated that Mr. Cleveland thought it would do him good to have my letter published in advance. I had no personal interest in the nomination, but a desire for the success of the Democratic party and for Mr. Cleveland's administration; that his success would be of real value to the country, and that the local chieftains who had reorganized the Democratic party on a reform basis, and renovated its moral power before the country, should be cherished and continued as instruments of public good. I acceded to Mr. Cleveland's wish, sacrificed the preference and pride of my friends, and gave my letter to the press immediately. I also aided what I could at so late a period, in selecting delegates to the State convention.
"Mr. Manning came again to me prior to the national convention, and asked for authority to communicate my judgment and wishes to friends from other States. It is well known that most of the delegates had been elected either with express instructions, or with the understanding that they were to vote for my nomination, and it was not doubted that if I did nothing, the nomination would have been conferred on me without dissent.
"The circumstances lent weight to my advice as to who should be nominated. I authorized Mr. Manning to communicate to my friends from other States that, while I could not assume to dictate to the Democratic party, my judgment was in favor of nominating Mr. Cleveland. Mr. Manning said this intimation would be sufficient.
"He communicated it to many of my friends among the delegates from other States. In addition to this, he gave assurances, in behalf of Mr. Cleveland to the delegates from several States, that the administration should be made up from those who had been my supporters, and who transferred their adhesion to Mr. Cleveland.
"If now the cabinet should be made up largely, and almost exclusively, from men who were hostile to Mr. Cleveland's nomination, and unfriendly to the veterans in all the localities who had created a new success for the Democratic party a cabinet of rivals of Mr. Cleveland, self-seekers who would be devoted to their own schemes instead of building up Mr. Cleveland's administration, it would not only weaken the administration, but chill the masses with a sense that their leaders had turned their back upon their followers to whom they were indebted for everything.
"Mr. Manning cannot afford, by any act of omission or commission, to be responsible for such a result. Unless he accepts the Treasury, I am not mistaken in the belief that the veterans will have no true and reliable friend among the advisers of Mr. Cleveland.
"On public ground, also, the Secretary of the Treasury ought to be taken from the State of New York. He ought to be in communication with the most intelligent and experienced men in the centre of finance and commerce. He ought to be a man who can command ready access to, and have confidential relations not with speculators and gamblers, but with the solid men of property and business.
"Next to Mr. Manning, if he should refuse—which, I think, he has no right to do—Mr. Bigelow is the best substitute. He is an accomplished man, accustomed to deal with great public questions, utterly unselfish and unambitious, without any tendency to inferior associations, and would command the confidence and support of the financial classes.
"But I still adhere to the opinion that Mr. Manning cannot avoid accepting the trust which sacrifice, duty, and honor toward the Democratic masses demands at his hands.