Letters and Literary Memorials of Samuel J. Tilden, v. 2

by Samuel J. Tilden

"Mr. Tilden further said, if an arbitration were to be adopted, the tribunal ought to be fixed in the bill itself and not left to chance or intrigue.

"He said, also, that if an arbitration were to be adopted, the duty of the arbitrators to investigate and decide the case on its merits should be made mandatory and not left as a question of construction.

"With both the vital points, the choice of men to compose the tribunal and a function to be performed by the tribunal, left at loose ends, he treated the whole thing as a sort of gamble.

"In the course of the discussion Mr. Tilden said: 'If you go into a conference with your adversary and can't break off because you feel you must agree to something you cannot negotiate—you are not fit to negotiate. You will be beaten upon every detail.'

"Replying to the apprehensions of a collision of force with the executive, Mr. Tilden thought them exaggerated, but said: 'Why surrender now? You can always surrender. Why surrender before the battle, for fear you may have to surrender after the battle is over?'

"Mr. Tilden was pressed to say that if the bill could be modified so as to fix the five judges by a position provision, he would give it his approval, and it was urged that a modification could not succeed unless it was stated that that would make the bill acceptable. He firmly declined.

"Mr. Hewitt stated that the committees of the two Houses were to meet that evening at the house of Senator Bayard, and that he was expected to telegraph them the result of his interview.

"It was perfectly evident that what was sought was not Mr. Tilden's advice, but Mr. Tilden's adhesion. His refusal to give it caused the meeting for that evening to fall through.

"Mr. Tilden condemned the proposed action as precipitate. It was a month before the time for the count, and he saw no reason why there should not be an opportunity afforded for consideration and consultation by the representatives of the people. He treated it as a panic in which they were liable to act in haste and repent at leisure. He did not ask any time for himself or time to decide what he would do in respect to the proposed means. He never for a moment evinced the slightest hesitation or doubt about that; he was clear and inflexible, but he advised more deliberation upon the part of those who were to act in Washington. He believed in publicity and discussion and a wider consultation. He had an inherent and incurable distrust of the scheme, and has frequently said since that so great a stake as the government of forty millions of people with immense civil expenditures and a hundred thousand office-holders to be disposed of by a small body sitting in the Capitol would become the sport of intrigue or fraud.

"Mr. Tilden also disapproved of the secrecy with which the proceedings were shrouded. He thought it unwise to compromise the rights of the members of the two Houses without consulting them, by taking a hasty step which left no different policy practicable than the one thus imposed. Two days later, in a telegram to Mr. Hewitt, he expressed himself again and decidedly on this subject.