That great evils are felt, my lords, no Briton, I am certain, who converses promiscuously with his countrymen, will attempt to dispute, and until some other cause more proportioned to the effect shall be assigned, I shall join the publick in their opinion, and while I think this man the author of our miseries, shall conclude it necessary to comply with the motion.
Lord HARDWICK spoke next, to the following effect:—My lords, though I very readily admit that crimes ought to be punished, that a treacherous administration of publick affairs is, in a very high degree, criminal, that even ignorance, where it is the consequence of neglect, deserves the severest animadversion, and that it is the privilege and duty of this house to watch over the state of the nation, and inform his majesty of any errours committed by his ministers; yet I am far from being convinced either of the justice or necessity of the motion now under consideration.
The most flagrant and invidious part of the charge against the right honourable gentleman appears to consist in this, that he has engrossed an exorbitant degree of power, and usurped an unlimited influence over the whole system of government, that he disposes of all honours and preferments, and that he is not only first but sole minister.
But of this boundless usurpation, my lords, what proof has been laid before you? What beyond loud exaggerations, pompous rhetorick, and specious appeals to common fame; common fame, which, at least, may sometimes err, and which, though it may afford sufficient ground for suspicion and inquiry, was never yet admitted as conclusive evidence, where the immediate necessities of the publick did not preclude the common forms of examination, where the power of the offender did not make it dangerous to attack him by a legal prosecution, or where the conduct of the accusers did not plainly discover that they were more eager of blood than of justice, and more solicitous to destroy than to convict.
I hope none of these circumstances, my lords, can at present obstruct a candid and deliberate inquiry: with regard to the publick, I am not able to discover any pressing exigencies that demand a more compendious method of proceeding, than the established laws of the land, and the wisdom of our ancestors have prescribed. I know not any calamity that will be aggravated, nor any danger that will become move formidable, by suffering this question to be legally tried.
Nor is there, my lords, in the circumstances of the person accused, any thing that can incite us to a hasty process; for, if what is alleged by the noble lords is not exaggerated beyond the truth, if he is universally detested by the whole nation, and loaded with execrations by the publick voice; if he is considered as the author of all our miseries, and the source of all our corruptions; if he has ruined our trade, and depressed our power, impoverished the people, and attempted to enslave them, there is, at least, no danger of an insurrection in his favour, or any probability that his party will grow stronger by delays. For, my lords, to find friends in adversity, and assertors in distress, is only the prerogative of innocence and virtue.
The gentleman against whom this formidable charge is drawn up, is, I think, not suspected of any intention to have recourse either to force or flight; he has always appeared willing to be tried by the laws of his country, and to stand an impartial examination; he neither opposes nor eludes inquiry, neither flies from justice, nor defies it.
And yet less, my lords, can I suspect, that those by whom he is accused, act from any motive that may influence them to desire a sentence not supported by evidence, or conformable to truth; or that they can wish the ruin of any man whose crimes are not notorious and flagrant, that they persecute from private malice, or endeavour to exalt themselves by the fall of another.
Let us, therefore, my lords, inquire before we determine, and suffer evidence to precede our sentence. The charge, if it is just, must be, by its own nature, easily proved, and that no proof is brought may, perhaps, be sufficient to make us suspect that it is not just.
For, my lords, what is the evidence of common fame, which has been so much exalted, and so confidently produced? Does not every man see that, on such occasions, two questions may be asked, of which, perhaps, neither can easily be answered, and which, yet, must both be resolved before common fame can be admitted as a proof of facts.