I have, hitherto, sir, regarded it as a principle equally true in politicks as in philosophy, that nothing can act when it does not exist; and I did not suspect that a position so evident would ever stand in need of a proof or illustration.
We live, indeed, in an age of paradoxes, and have heard several notions seriously defended, of which some would, not many years ago, have condemned their abetter to a prison or a madhouse, and would have been heard by the wisest of our ancestors with laughter or detestation; but I did not expect that the most hardy innovator would have shocked my understanding with a position like this, or have asserted that a law may operate before it is made, or before it is projected.
That where there is no law there is no transgression, is a maxim not only established by universal consent, but in itself evident and undeniable; and it is, sir, surely no less certain, that where there is no transgression there can be no punishment.
If a man may be punished, sir, by a law made after the fact, how can any man conclude himself secure from the jail or the gibbet? A man may easily find means of being certain that he has offended no law in being, but that will afford no great satisfaction to a mind naturally timorous; since a law hereafter to be made, may, if this motion be supposed reasonable, take cognizance of his actions, and how he can know whether he has been equally scrupulous to observe the future statutes of future senates, he will find it very difficult to determine.
Mr. PELHAM rose, and spoke thus:—Sir, notwithstanding the absurdity which the honourable gentleman imagines himself to have discovered in this proposal, and which he must be confessed to have placed in a very strong light, I am of opinion, that it may, with very little consideration, be reconciled to reason and to justice, and that the wit and satire that have been so liberally employed, will appear to have been lost in the air, without use and without injury.
The operation of the law may, very properly, commence from the day on which the embargo was laid by his majesty's proclamation, which surely was not issued to no purpose, and which ought not to be disobeyed without punishment.
Sir John BARNARD spoke next, to this effect:—Sir, I cannot but be somewhat surprised, that a gentleman so long conversant in national affairs, should not yet have heard or known the difference between a proclamation and a penal law.
By a proclamation, his majesty may prevent, in some cases, what he cannot punish; he may hinder the exportation of our corn by ordering ships to be stationed at the entrance of our harbours; but if any should escape with prohibited cargoes, he can inflict no penalties upon them at their return.
To enforce this prohibition by the sanction of punishments is the intention of the present bill, but a proclamation can make nothing criminal, and it is unjust and absurd to punish an action which was legal when it was done.
The law ought, sir, in my opinion, not to commence till time is allowed for dispersing it to the utmost limits of this island; for as it is unreasonable to punish without law, it is not more equitable to punish by a law, of which, they who have unhappily broken it, could have no intelligence.