But, perhaps, my lords, we have had no opportunity of exerting our force; perhaps the situation both of our enemies and ally was such, that neither the one could be protected, nor the other opposed, by a naval power; and, therefore, our inactivity was the effect not of want of courage, but want of opportunity.
Though our ministers, my lords, have hitherto given no eminent proofs of geographical knowledge, or of very accurate acquaintance with the state of foreign countries, yet there is reason to believe that they must at some time have heard or read, that the house of Austria had territories in Italy; they must have been informed, unless their disbursements for secret service are bestowed with very little judgment, that against these dominions an army has been raised by the Spaniards; and they must have discovered, partly by the information of their correspondents, partly by the inspection of a map, and partly by the sagacity which distinguishes them from all past and present ministers, that this army was to be transported by sea from the coast of Spain to that of Italy.
This knowledge, my lords, however attained, might have furnished minds, which have always been found so fruitful of expedients, with a method of hindering the descent of the Spanish troops, for which nothing more was necessary than that they should have ordered admiral Haddock, instead of retiring before the Spanish fleet of war, and watching them only that they might escape, to lie still before Barcelona, where the transports were stationed, with a convoy of only three men of war, and hinder their departure.
I hope it will be observed by your lordships, that though the road of Barcelona is open and indefensible, though the fleet was unprotected by ships of force, and though they lay, as I am informed, beyond the reach of the guns on the fortifications upon the shore, I do not require that Haddock should have destroyed the army and the ships.
I am too well acquainted, my lords, with the lenity of our ministers to the enemies of their country, and am too well convinced of the prudence and tenderness of the restrictions by which the power of our admirals is limited, to expect that our guns should be ever used but in salutations of respect, or exultations on the conclusion of a peace. I am convinced, that our ministers would shudder at the name of bloodshed and destruction, and that they had rather hear that a thousand merchants were made bankrupts by privateers, or all our allies deprived of their dominions, than that one Spanish ship was sunk or burnt by the navies of Britain.
But, my lords, though they are willing to spare the blood of their enemies, yet surely they might have obstructed their enterprises; they might have withheld those whom they were unwilling to strike, and have endeavoured to fright those whom they determined never to hurt.
To speak in terms more adapted to the subject before us: that the fleet of Spain, a fleet of transports with such a convoy, should lie three weeks in an open road, professedly fitted out against an ally united to us by every tie of nature, and of policy, by the solemnity of treaties, and conformity of interest; that it should lie undisturbed almost within sight of a British navy; that it should lie there not only without danger, but without apprehension of danger, has raised the astonishment of every nation in Europe, has blasted the reputation of our arms, impaired the influence of our counsels, and weakened the credit of our publick faith.
There may be some, my lords, that will impute this absurdity of our conduct, this disregard of our interest, this desertion of our alliances, and this neglect of the most apparent opportunities of success, not to cowardice, but treachery; a cause more detestable, as more atrociously criminal.
This opinion, my lords, I think it not necessary to oppose, both because it cannot be charged with improbability, and because I think it may be easily reconciled with my own assertions; for cowardice abroad produces treachery at home, and they become traitors to their country who are hindered by cowardice from the prosecution of her interest, and the opposition of her enemies.
It may however be proper to declare, my lords, that I do not impute this fatal cowardice to those who are intrusted with the command of our navies, but to those from whom they are obliged to receive their instructions, and upon whom they unhappily depend for the advancement of their fortunes.