The Works of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. Volume 10 / Parlimentary Debates I

by Samuel Johnson

But as great stress ought, doubtless, to be laid upon intelligence which the nation is believed to purchase at a very high price, let it be inquired, what proofs those have who dare to suspect the sagacity of our ministers, to put in the balance against their intelligence, and it will be discovered, my lords, that they have a testimony no less than that of the German emperour himself, who could not be mistaken with regard to the meaning of the treaty concluded at his own court, and to whom it will not be very decent to deny such a degree of veracity as may set him at least on the level with a traitor and a hireling.

If the treaty of Vienna was an imposture, most of our misfortunes are evidently produced by the weakness of the minister; but even supposing it real, as it was only a formidable mockery, an idle threat, that could never be executed, it was not necessary, that in order to obviate it, we should give ourselves implicitly into the hands of France.

It was not necessary, my lords, that we should suffer them first to elude the treaty of Utrecht, by making a port at Mardyke, and then directly and openly to violate it by repairing Dunkirk. That this latter is a port contrary to treaty, the bills of entry at the custom-house daily show; and as the customs are particularly under the inspection of the commissioners of the treasury, this man cannot plead ignorance of this infraction, were no information given him by other means. If it should now be asked, my lords, what, in my opinion, ought to be done, I cannot advise that we should attempt to demolish it by force, or draw upon ourselves the whole power of France by a declaration of war, but what it may be difficult now to remedy, it was once easy to obviate.

Had we shown the same contempt of the French power with our ancestors, and the same steadiness in our councils, the same firmness in our alliances, and the same spirit in our treaties, that court would never have ventured to break a known solemn stipulation, to have exasperated a brave and determined adversary by flagrant injustice, and to have exposed themselves to the hazard of a war, in which it would have been the interest of every prince of Europe who regarded justice or posterity to wish their defeat.

Now they see us engaged in a war, my lords, they may be animated to a more daring contempt of the faith of treaties, and insult us with yet greater confidence of success, as they cannot but remark the cowardice or the ignorance with which we have hitherto carried on this war. They cannot but observe that either our minister means in reality to make war rather upon the Britons than the Spaniards, or that he is totally unacquainted with military affairs, and too vain to ask the opinion of others who have greater knowledge than himself.

Nothing, my lords, is more apparent than that the minister was forced, by the continual clamours of the nation, to declare war, contrary to his own inclination, and that he always affected to charge it upon others, and to exempt himself from the imputation of it. It is, therefore, probable that he has not acted on this occasion so wisely as even his own experience and penetration might, if they were honestly employed, enable him to act, and that he has suffered our counsels to be embarrassed; that he sees with great tranquillity those suffering by the war, at whose request it was begun, and imagines it a proof of the excellence of his own scheme, that those who forced him to break it, may in time repent of their importunities.

For that in the management of the war, my lords, no regard has been had either to the advantages which the course of our trade inevitably gives to our enemies, or to the weakness to which the extent of their dominions necessarily subjects them, that neither the interest of the merchant has been consulted, nor the ease of the nation in general regarded, that the treasure of the publick has been squandered, and that our military preparations have intimidated no nation but our own, is evident beyond contradiction.

It is well known, my lords, to every man but the minister, that we have nothing to fear from either the fleets or armies of the Spaniards, that they cannot invade us except in America, and that they can only molest us by intercepting our traders. This they can only effect by means of their privateers, whose vessels, being light and active, may be easily fitted out, nimbly seize their prey, and speedily retire.

The experience of the last French war, my lords, might have taught us how much we have to fear from the activity of men incited by prospects of private gain, and equipped with that care and vigilance, which, however omitted in national affairs, the interest of particular men never fails to dictate. It is well known, my lords, how much we lost amidst our victories and triumphs, and how small security the merchants received from our magnificent navies, and celebrated commanders. It was, therefore, surely the part of wise men, not to miscarry twice by the same omission, when they had an opportunity to supply it.

I need not inform your lordships of what every reader of newspapers can tell, and which common sense must easily discover, that privateers are only to be suppressed by ships of the same kind with their own, which may scour the seas with rapidity, pursue them into shallow water, where great ships cannot attack them, seize them as they leave the harbours, or destroy them upon their own coasts.