It can scarcely be expected, that the French will treat us only as auxiliaries, and satisfy themselves with attacking us only where they find themselves opposed by us: they will undoubtedly, my lords, consider us as principals, since they can suffer little more by declaring war against us.
These, my lords, are the dangers to be feared from the measures which we are now persuaded to pursue; but persuaded by arguments which, in my opinion, ought to have very little influence upon us, and which have not yet been able, however artfully or zealously enforced, to prevail upon the Dutch to unite with us.
It has, indeed, been asserted, that the Dutch appear inclined to assist us: but of that inclination stronger proofs ought surely to be produced, before we take auxiliaries into pay, and transport troops into another country, which has been so often represented to have been raised for the defence of their own, or collect money from the publick by the propagation of wickedness.
Of this favourable inclination in the Dutch I am the more doubtful, because it is contrary to the expectations of all mankind, and to the maxims by which they have generally regulated their conduct. There have been many late instances of their patient submission to the invasion of privileges to which they have thought themselves entitled, and of their preference of peace, though sometimes purchased with the loss of honour; or, what may be supposed to touch a Dutchman much more nearly, of profit, to the devastation and expense and hazards of war; and it can hardly be supposed by any who know their character, that they will be more zealous for the rights of others than for their own; or that they will, for the support of the queen of Hungary, sacrifice that security and tranquillity which they have preferred at the expense of their commerce at one time, and by passive submission to insults at another.
That a nation like this, my lords, will in the quarrel of another engage in any but moderate measures, is not to be expected: it is not improbable, that they may endeavour by embassies and negotiations to adjust the present disputes, or offer their mediation to the contending powers; but I am very far from imagining, that they will find in themselves any disposition to raise armies, or equip fleets, that they will endanger the barrier which has been so dearly purchased, or expose themselves to the hazards and terrours of a French war; and am, therefore, inclined to believe, that if any tendency towards such measures now appears, it is only the effect of the present heat of some vehement declaimers, or the secret machination of some artful projectors among them, who have formed chimerical plans of a new system of Europe, and have, in their imaginations, regulated the distribution of dominion and power, or who, perhaps, have diminished their patrimonies by negligence and extravagance, and hope to repair them in times of confusion, and to glean part of that harvest of treasure which the publick must be obliged to yield in time of war. I am still inclined to believe, that the true interest of the republick will be consulted, that policy will prevail over intrigue, and that only moderate measures will be pursued by the general council of the states.
Moderate measures, my lords, if not always the most honourable in the opinion of minds vitiated by false notions of grandeur, are, at least, always the most safe; and are, therefore, eligible at least, till the scene of affairs begins to open, and the success of a more vigorous conduct may with some degree of certainty be foreknown; and it must at least be thought imprudent for those to hazard much who can gain nothing, and therefore it will not be easy to assign any reason that may justify our conduct on the present occasion.
It is not improbable, my lords, that those who have now obtained the direction of our affairs, may be influenced by the general disapprobation which the British people showed of the pacifick conduct of the late ministry, and may have resolved to endeavour after applause, by showing more spirit and activity. But, my lords, of two opposite schemes it is not impossible that both may be wrong, and that the middle way only may be safe; nor is it uncommon for those who are precipitately flying from one extreme, to rush blindly upon another.
But our ministry, my lords, have found out a method of complicating errours which none of their predecessors, however stigmatized for ignorance and absurdity, have hitherto been able to attain; they have been able to reconcile the extremes of folly, and to endanger the publick interest at the same time, by inactivity and romantick temerity.
No accusation against the late ministry was more general, more atrocious, or more adapted to incense the people, than that of neglecting the war against Spain: this was the subject of all the invectives which were vented against them in the senate, or dispersed among the people; for this they were charged with a secret confederacy against their country, with disregard of its commerce and its arms, and with a design to ruin the nation for no other end than to punish the merchants.
To this accusation, my lords, diligently propagated, willingly received, and, to confess the truth, confirmed by some appearances, do those owe their power, who now preside over the affairs of the nation; and it might, therefore, have been hoped, that by their promotion, one of our grievances would have been taken away, and that at least the war against Spain would have been vigorously prosecuted.