Lord BATH replied to the following effect:—My lords, as I am far from thinking, that my advice or opinion can be of any use in this illustrious assembly, I should have listened in silence to this debate, important as it is, had I not thought it my duty to defend here what I approved in the council; and considered it as an act of cowardice and meanness to fall passively down the stream of popularity, and to suffer my reason and my integrity to be overborne by the noise of vulgar clamours, which have been raised against the measures of the government by the low arts of exaggeration, fallacious reasonings, and partial representations. It is not without concern, my lords, that even in this house I observe some inclination to gratify the prejudices of the people, and to confirm them in their contempt of the foreign troops, by the poor artifice of contemptuous language. To dispute about words, is, indeed, seldom useful; and when questions so weighty as these are before us, may be justly censured as improper. I shall, therefore, only observe that the term mercenaries, which is in the motion applied to the forces of Hanover, seems designed rather to affect the passions than influence the reason, and intended only to express a partiality which cannot be justified.
But it is far more necessary, my lords, to consider upon what motives the troops of Hanover were hired, than by what denomination they may most properly be called; and therefore I shall endeavour to explain the reasons which induced the ministry to retain them, and which, I suppose, have prevailed upon the commons to provide for their support.
It has been asked, why the troops of Hanover were preferred to those of any other nation? And it has been insinuated, that our determination was influenced by motives very different from that regard which every Briton owes to the interest of his native country. But to this imputation, however specious, and however popular, it may be with great security replied, that there was no preference, because there was no choice; that there was a necessity for hiring troops, and that no other troops were to be obtained; and whoever shall endeavour to invalidate this defence, must engage in an undertaking of which I can boldly affirm, that he will find it very difficult. He must show what power would have been able or willing to have furnished us with troops on this occasion; and I am confident, that whoever shall, with this design, take a deliberate survey of the several kingdoms and states of Europe, will find, that there is no other prince to whom we could have applied on this occasion, without greater inconveniencies than can reasonably be feared from the present stipulation with Hanover.
The reasons, indeed, for which this stipulation was made, appeared so strong, when it was considered in the council, that it was unanimously determined necessary; nor was the conclusion hastily made in an assembly of particular persons, who might be suspected of favouring it from private views, and of being convened on purpose to put it in execution: it was debated by a great number with great solemnity; nor can any man say, that he only yielded to what he found it in vain to oppose; for the consent given was not a tacit acquiescence, but a verbal approbation. So far was this part of our measures from being the advice of any single man, or transacted with that solicitous secrecy which is the usual refuge of bad designs.
It has been asserted, likewise, my lords, and with much greater appearance of justice, that this whole design has been formed and conducted without the concurrence or approbation of the senate; and that, therefore, it can be considered only as a private scheme to be executed at the publick expense, as a plan formed by the ministry to aggrandize or ingratiate themselves at the hazard of the nation.
But even this, my lords, is a misrepresentation, though a misrepresentation more artful, and more difficult to defeat; because, in order to the justification of our measures, it is necessary to take a review of past transactions, and to consider what was necessarily implied by former determinations of the senate.
The period, my lords, to which this consideration will necessarily carry us back, is the time at which, after the late tedious war, a peace was, on whatever terms, concluded with France. It is well known, that the confederates demanded, among other advantages, a cession of that part of Flanders, which had been for many years in the possession of Spain, and which opened a way by which the ambition of the house of Bourbon might make inroads at pleasure into the dominions of either the Austrians or Dutch. This they were immediately interested in preventing; and as we knew the necessity of preserving the equipoise of power, we likewise were remotely engaged to promote any measures by which it might be secured. In this demand, therefore, all the confederate powers naturally united, and by their united influence enforced compliance. But though it was easy, with no great profundity of political knowledge, to discover from whom these provinces should be taken away, to whom they should be given, was a question of more difficulty; since they might add to the power that had opportunities of improving them, such an increase of commerce and wealth as might defeat the end for which they were demanded, and destroy the balance of power, by transferring too much weight into another scale. And mankind has learned, my lords, by experience, that exorbitant power will always produce exorbitant pride; that very few, when they can oppress with security, will be contained within the bounds of equity by the restraints of morality or of religion; and that, therefore, the only method of establishing a lasting peace is to divide power so equally, that no party may have any certain prospect of advantage by making war upon another.
For this reason, my lords, it was apparently contrary to our interest to grant those provinces to those to whom, by their situation, they might have been most useful. Such countries, and such manufactures in the hands of a people versed, perhaps, beyond all others, both in the science and the stratagems of trade, and always watchful to improve every opportunity of increasing their riches, would have enabled them in a short time to purchase an interest in the councils of all the monarchs of the world, to have maintained fleets that might have covered the ocean, and to have obtained that universal dominion to which the French have so long aspired, and which it is, perhaps, more for the interest of mankind, that if slavery cannot be prevented, they should obtain, as they would, perhaps, use their power with more generosity.
The same reason, my lords, naturally made the Dutch unwilling to put these provinces in the hands of Britain; for we, likewise, make a profession of trade, though we do not pursue it with the same ardour, or, to confess the truth, with the same success: it was not, however, to be imagined, that there would not be found among us some men of sagacity to discern, and of industry to improve the opportunities which the new dominions would have put into our hands of vending our manufactures in parts where, at present, they are very little known. Nor was this the only danger to be feared from such an increase of dominion: the Dutch have not yet forgotten, that though we at first rescued them from slavery, patronised the infancy of their state, and continued our guardianship till it was grown up to maturity, and enabled to support itself by its own strength, yet we afterwards made very vigorous attempts to reduce it to its original weakness, and to sink it into pupillage again; that we attempted to invade the most essential part of its rights, and to prescribe the number of ships that it should maintain. They know, likewise, my lords, that by the natural rotation of human affairs, the same counsels may in some future reign be again pursued, or that some unavoidable conflict of interest may produce a contest that can be decided only by the sword; and then it may easily be perceived how much they would be endangered, by the neighbourhood of British garrisons, and of countries, where we might maintain numerous armies at a very small expense. It is, therefore, no subject of wonder, that a nation much less subtile than the Dutch should find out how much it was their interest, that we should be confined within the limits of our own island; and that we should not have it in our power to attack them with armies as well as fleets, and at once to obstruct their commerce and invade their country.
There remained, therefore, my lords, no power but the emperour to whom these provinces could be consigned; and to him, therefore, they were given, but given only in trust for the joint advantage of the whole confederacy; he, indeed, enjoys their revenues on condition that he shall support the garrisons necessary to their defence; but he cannot transfer them to any other power, or alienate them to the detriment of those nations who concurred in acquiring them.