In order to the consideration of these objections, it is necessary to observe, my lords, that national alliances are not like leagues of friendship, the consequences of an agreement of disposition, opinions, and affections, but like associations of commerce, formed and continued by no similitude of any thing but interest. It is not, therefore, necessary to inquire what the house of Austria has deserved from us or from mankind; because interest, not gratitude, engages us to support it. It is useless to urge, that it is equally faithless and cruel with the house of Bourbon, because the question is not whether both shall be destroyed, but whether one should rage without control. It is sufficient for us that their interest is opposite, and that religion and liberty may be preserved by their mutual jealousy. And I confess, my lords, that were the Austrians about to attain unlimited power by the conquest or inheritance of France and Spain, it would be no less proper to form confederacies against them.
The testimony which has been produced of the convenience of a weak emperour, is to be considered, my lords, as the opinion of an author whose birth and employment had tainted him with an inveterate hatred of the house of Austria, and filled his imagination with an habitual dread of the imperial power. He was born, my lords, in Sweden, a country which had suffered much by a long war against the emperour; he was a minister to the electors of Brandenburgh, who naturally looked with envy on the superiority of Austria, and could not but wish to see a weaker prince upon the imperial throne, that their own influence might be greater; nor can we wonder, that a man thus born and thus supported should adopt an opinion by which the pride of his master would be flattered, and perhaps the interest of his own country promoted.
It is likewise, my lords, to be remarked, that there was then no such necessity for a powerful prince to stand at the head of the Germans, and to defend them with his own forces till they could unite for their own preservation. The power of France had not then arrived at its present height, nor had their monarchs openly threatened to enslave all the nations of Europe. The princes of the empire had then no oppression to fear, but from the emperour; and it was no wonder, that when he was their only enemy, they wished that his power was reduced.
How much the state of the continent is now changed, is not necessary to mention, nor what alteration that change has introduced into the politicks of all nations; those who formerly dreaded to be overwhelmed by the imperial greatness, can now only hope to be secured by it from the torrent of the power of France; and even those nations who have formerly endeavoured the destruction of Austria, may now rejoice, that they are sheltered by its interposition from tyrants more active and more oppressive.
But, my lords, though it should be granted that the house of Austria ought not to be supported, it will not, in my opinion, follow, that this motion deserves our approbation; because it will reduce us to a state of imbecility, and condemn us to stand as passive spectators of the disturbances of the world, without power and without influence, ready to admit the tyrant to whom chance shall allot us, and receive those laws which the prevailing power shall vouchsafe to transmit.
Whether we ought to support the house of Austria, to prevent its utter subversion, or restore it to its former greatness, whatever may be my private opinion, I think it not on this occasion necessary to assert; it is sufficient to induce us to reject this motion, that we ought to be at least in a condition that may enable us to improve those opportunities that may be offered, and to hinder the execution of any design that may threaten immediate danger to our commerce or our liberty.
Another popular topick, my lords, which has been echoed on the present occasion, is the happiness of peace, and the blessing of uninterrupted commerce and undisturbed security. We are perpetually told of the hazards of war, whatever may be the superiority of our skill or courage; of the certainty of the expenses, the bloodshed, and the hardships, and doubtfulness of the advantages which we may hope from them; and it is daily urged with great vehemence, that peace upon the hardest conditions is preferable to the honour of conquests, and the festivity of triumphs.
These maxims, my lords, which are generally true in the sense which their authors intended, may be very properly urged against the wild designs of ambition, and the romantick undertakings of wanton greatness; but have no place in the present inquiry, which relates to a war not made by caprice, but forced upon us by necessity; a war to which all the encomiums on peace, must in reality incite, because peace alone is the end intended to be obtained by it.
Of the necessity of peace to a trading nation it is not possible, my lords, to be ignorant; and therefore no man can be imagined to propose a state of war as eligible in itself. War, my lords, is, in my opinion, only to be chosen, when peace can be no longer enjoyed, and to be continued only till a peace secure and equitable can be attained. In the present state of the world, my lords, we fight not for laurels, nor conquests, but for existence. Should the arms of France prevail, and prevail they must, unless we oppose them, the Britons may, in a short time, no longer be a nation, our liberties will be taken away, our constitution destroyed, our religion persecuted, and perhaps our name abolished.
For the prevention of calamities like these, not for the preservation of the house of Austria, it is necessary, my lords, to collect an army; for by an army only can our liberties be preserved, and such a peace obtained, as may be enjoyed without the imputation of supineness and stupidity.