It has been said in vindication of this wise scheme, that no other troops could be obtained but those of Hanover; an assertion which I hope I may be allowed to examine, because it is yet a bare assertion without argument, and against probability; since it is generally known, how willingly the princes of Germany have on all former occasions sent out their subjects to destruction, that they might fill their coffers with their pay; nor do I doubt, but that there is now in the same country the usual superabundance of men, and the usual scarcity of money. I make no question, my lords, that many a German prince would gladly furnish us with men as a very cheap commodity, and think himself sufficiently rewarded by a small subsidy. There could be no objection to these troops from the constitution of the empire, which is not of equal force against the forces of Hanover; nor do I know why they should not rather have been employed, if they could have been obtained at a cheaper price.
The absurdity of paying levy-money for troops regularly kept up, and of hiring them at a higher rate than was ever paid for auxiliaries before, has been so strongly urged, and so fully explained, that no reply has been attempted by those who have hitherto opposed the motion; having rather endeavoured to divert our attention to foreign considerations, than to vindicate this part of the contract, which is, indeed, too shameful to be palliated, and too gross to be overlooked.
It is, however, proper to repeat, my lords, that though it cannot be confuted, it may be forgotten in the multitude of other objects, that this nation, after having exalted the elector of Hanover from a state of obscurity to the crown, is condemned to hire the troops of Hanover to fight their own cause, to hire them at a rate which was never demanded for them before, and to pay levy-money for them, though it is known to all Europe, that they were not raised on this occasion.
Nor is this the only hardship or folly of this contract; for we are to pay them a month before they march into our service; we are to pay those for doing nothing, of whom it might have been, without any unreasonable expectations, hoped, that they would have exerted their utmost force without pay.
For it is apparent, my lords, that if the designs of France be such as the noble lords who oppose the motion represent them, Hanover is much nearer to danger than Britain; and, therefore, they only fight for their own preservation; since, though they have for a single year been blessed with a neutrality, it cannot be imagined, that the same favour will be always granted them, or that the French, when they have overrun all the rest of Germany, will not annex Hanover to their other dominions.
Besides, my lords, it is well known, that Hanover is equally engaged by treaty with Britain to maintain the Pragmatick sanction, and that a certain proportion of troops are to be furnished. But, my lords, as to the march of that body of forces, I have yet heard no account. Will any lord say that they have marched? I, therefore, suppose, that the wisdom and justice of our ministers has comprehended them in the sixteen thousand who are to fatten upon British pay, and that Hanover will support the Pragmatick sanction at the cost of this inexhaustible nation.
The service which those troops have already done to the common cause, has been urged with great pomp of exaggeration, of which what effect it may have had upon others, I am not able to say; for my part, I am convinced, that the great happiness of this kingdom is the security of the established succession; and am, therefore, always of opinion, that no measures can serve the common cause, the cause of liberty, or of religion, or of general happiness, by which the royal family loses the affections of the people. And I can with great confidence affirm, that no attempt for many years has raised a greater heat of resentment, or excited louder clamours of indignation, than the hire of Hanoverian troops; nor is this discontent raised only by artful misrepresentations, formed to inflame the passions, and perplex the understanding; it is a settled and rational dislike, which every day contributes to confirm, which will make all the measures of the government suspected, and may in time, if not obviated, break out in sedition.
A jealousy of Hanover has, indeed, for a long time prevailed in the nation. The frequent visits of our kings to their electoral dominions, contrary to the original terms on which this crown was conferred upon them, have inclined the people of Britain to suspect, that they have only the second place in the affection of their sovereign; nor has this suspicion been made less by the large accessions made to those dominions by purchases, which the electors never appeared able to make before their exaltation to the throne of Britain, and by some measures which have been apparently taken only to aggrandize Hanover at the expense of Britain.
These measures, my lords, I am very far from imputing to our sovereign or his father; the wisdom of both is so well known, that they cannot be imagined to have incurred, either by contempt or negligence, the disaffection of their subjects. Those, my lords, are only to be blamed, who concealed from them the sentiments of the nation, and for the sake of promoting their own interest, betrayed them, by the most detestable and pernicious flattery, into measures which could produce no other effect than that of making their reign unquiet, and of exasperating those who had concurred with the warmest zeal in supporting them on the throne.
It is not without an uncommon degree of grief, that I hear it urged in defence of this contract, that it was approved by a very numerous council; for what can produce more sorrow in an honest and a loyal breast, than to find that our sovereign is surrounded by counsellors, who either do not know the desires and opinions of the people, or do not regard them; who are either so negligent as not to examine how the affections of the nation may be best preserved, or so rash as to pursue those schemes by which they hope to gratify the king at whatever hazard, and who for the sake of flattering him for a day, will risk the safety of his government, and the repose of his life.