In this state of the world, my lords, when all the powers of the continent appear benumbed by a lethargy, or shackled by a panick, to what purpose should we lavish, in hiring and transporting troops, that wealth which contests of nearer importance immediately require?
It is well known to our merchants, whose ships are every day seized by privateers, that we are at war with Spain, and that our commerce is every day impaired by the depredations of an enemy, whom only our own negligence enables to resist us; but I doubt, my lords, whether it is known in Spain, that their monarch is at war with Britain, otherwise than by the riches of our nation, which are distributed among their privateers, and the prisoners who in the towns on the coast are wandering in the streets. For I know no inconvenience which they can be supposed to feel from our hostilities, nor in what part of the world the war against them is carried on. Before the war was declared, it is well remembered by whom, and with how great vehemence, it was every day repeated, that to end the war with honour we ought to take and hold. What, my lords, do we hold, or what have we taken? What has the war produced in its whole course from one year to another, but defeats, losses, and ignominy? And how shall we regain our honour, or retrieve our wealth, by engaging in another war more dangerous but less necessary? We ought surely to humble Spain, before we presume to attack France; and we may attack France with better prospects of success, when we have no other enemy to divert our attention, or divide our forces.
That we ought, indeed, to make any attempt upon France, I am far from being convinced, because I do not now discover, that any of the motives subsist which engaged us in the last confederacy. The house of Austria, though overborne and distressed, was then powerful in itself, and possessed of the imperial crown. It is now reduced almost below the hopes of recovery, and we are therefore now to restore what we were then only to support. But what, my lords, is in my opinion much more to be considered, the nation was then unanimous in one general resolution to repress the insolence of France; no hardships were insupportable that conduced to this great end, nor any taxes grievous that were applied to the support of the war. The account of a victory was esteemed as an equivalent to excises and to publick debts; and the possessions of us and our posterity were cheerfully mortgaged to purchase a triumph over the common enemy. But, my lords, the disposition of the nation with regard to the present war is very different. They discover no danger threatening them, they are neither invaded in their possessions by the armies, nor interrupted in their commerce by the fleets of France; and therefore they are not able to find out why they must be sacrificed to an enemy, by whom they have been long pursued with the most implacable hatred, for the sake of attacking a power from which they have hitherto felt no injury, and which they believe cannot be provoked without danger, nor opposed without such a profusion of expense as the publick is at present not able to bear.
It is not to be supposed, my lords, that the bulk of the British people are affected with the distresses, or inflamed by the magnanimity of the queen of Hungary. This illustrious daughter of Austria, whose name has been so often echoed in these walls, and of whom I am far from denying, that she deserves our admiration, our compassion, and all the assistance which can be given her, consistently with the regard due to the safety of our own country, is to the greatest part of the people an imaginary princess, whose sufferings or whose virtues make no other impression upon them, than those which are recorded in fictitious narratives; nor can they easily be persuaded to give up for her relief the produce of their lands, or the profits of their commerce.
Some, indeed, there are, my lords, whose views are more extensive, and whose sentiments are more exalted; for it is not to be supposed, that either knowledge or generosity are confined to the senate or the court: but these, my lords, though they perhaps may more readily approve the end which the ministry pretends to pursue, are less satisfied with the means by which they endeavour to attain it. By these men it is easily discovered, that the hopes which some so confidently express of prevailing upon the Dutch to unite with us for the support of the Pragmatick sanction, are without foundation; they see that their consent to place garrisons in the frontier towns, however it may furnish a subject of exultation to those whose interest it is to represent them as ready to concur with us, is only a new proof of what was never doubted, their unvariable attention to their own interest, since they must for their own security preserve their own barrier from being seized by France. By this act they incur no new expense, they provoke no enemies, nor give any assistance to the queen of Hungary, by which they can raise either resentment in one part, or gratitude in the other; and therefore it is not hard to perceive that, whatever is pretended, the Dutch hitherto observe the most exact laws of neutrality; and it is too evident, that if they refuse their assistance, we have very little to hope from a war with France.
Nor is this the only objection against the present measures; for it is generally, and not without sufficient reason suspected, that the real assistance of the queen of Hungary is not intended, since the troops which have been hired under that pretence, are such as cannot march against the emperour. It is known, that the Hessians have absolutely refused to infringe the constitution of the German body, by attacking him who is by a legal grant acknowledged its head; nor is it easy to conceive, why there should be a different law for Hanover than for the other electorates.
The long stay of the troops in Flanders, a place where there is no enemy to encounter, nor ally to assist, is a sufficient proof that there is nothing more designed than that the troops of Hanover shall loiter on the verge of war, and receive their pay for feasting in their quarters, and showing their arms at a review; and that they in reality design nothing but to return home with full pockets, and enjoy the spoils of Britain.
There may, indeed, be another reason, my lords, which hinders the progress of the united forces, and by which the Britons and Hanoverians may be both affected, though not both in the same degree. It is by no means unlikely, that the king of Prussia has forbidden them to advance, and declared, that the king who was chosen by his suffrage shall be supported by his arms; if this be his resolution, he is well known to want neither spirit nor strength to avow and support it; and there are reasons sufficient to convince us, that he has declared it, and that our troops are now patiently waiting the event of a negotiation by which we are endeavouring to persuade him to alter his design, if, indeed, it be desired that he should alter it; for it is not certain, that the elector of Hanover can desire the restoration of the house of Austria to an hereditary enjoyment of the imperial dignity; nor can it easily be shown why the politicks of one house, should differ from those of all the other princes of the German empire.
The other princes, my lords, have long wished for a king with whom they might treat upon the level; a king who might owe his dignity only to their votes, and who, therefore, would be willing to favour them in gratitude for the benefit. They know, that the princes of the house of Austria considered their advancement to the empire as the consequence of their numerous forces and large dominions, and made use of their exaltation only to tyrannise under the appearance of legal right, and to oppress those as sovereigns, whom they would otherwise have harassed as conquerors.
Before we can, therefore, hope for the concurrence of the princes of the empire, we must inform them of our design, if any design has been yet laid out. Is it your intention to restore the house of Austria to the full enjoyment of its former greatness? This will certainly be openly opposed by all those powers who are strong enough to make head against it, and secretly obstructed by those, whose weakness makes them afraid of publick declarations. Do you intend to support the Pragmatick sanction? This can only be done by defeating the whole power of France; and for this you must necessarily provide troops who shall dare to act against the present king. So that it appears, my lords, that we are attempting nothing, or attempting impossibilities; that either we have no end in view, or that we have made use of an absurd choice of means by which it cannot be attained.