But, my lords, while I feel all these sentiments of compassion for the queen of Hungary, I have not yet been able to forget, that my own country claims a nearer regard; that I am obliged both by interest and duty to preserve myself and my posterity, and my fellow-subjects, from those miseries which I lament; when they happen to others, however distant, I cannot but remember, that I am not to save another from destruction by destroying myself, nor to rescue Austria by the ruin of Britain.
Though I am, therefore, my lords, not unwilling to assist the queen of Hungary, I think it necessary to fix the limits of our regard, to inquire how far we may proceed with safety, and what expenses the nation can bear, and how those expenses may be best employed. The danger of the queen of Hungary ought not to have an effect which would be reproachful, even if the danger was our own. It ought not so far to engross our faculties as to hinder us from attending to every other object. The man who runs into a greater evil to avoid a less, evidently shows that he is defective either in prudence or in courage; that either he wants the natural power of distinguishing, or that his dread of an approaching, or his impatience of a present evil, has taken it away.
Let us, therefore, examine, my lords, the measures with which those who are intrusted with the administration of publick affairs, would persuade us to concur, and inquire whether they are such as can be approved by us without danger to our country. Let us consider, my lords, yet more nearly, whether they are not such as we ourselves could not be prevailed upon even to regard as the object of deliberation, were we not dazzled on one part by glaring prospects of triumphs and honours, of the reduction of France, and the rescue of the world; of the propagation of liberty, and the defence of religion; and intimidated on the other by the view of approaching calamities, the cruelties of persecution, and the hardships of slavery.
All the arts of exaggeration, my lords, have been practised to reconcile us to the measures which are now proposed, and, indeed, all are necessary; for the expenses to which we are about to condemn this nation, are such as it is not able to bear, and to which no lord in this house would consent, were he calm enough to number the sums.
To prove the truth of this assertion, one question is necessary. Is any lord in this assembly willing to assist the queen of Hungary at the expense of sixteen hundred thousand a year? I think the universal silence of this assembly is a sufficient proof, that no one is willing; I will, however, repeat my question. Is any lord in this assembly willing that this nation should assist the queen of Hungary at the annual expense of sixteen hundred thousand pounds? The house is, as I expected, still silent, and, therefore, I may now safely proceed upon the supposition of an unanimous negative. Nor does any thing remain in order to evince the impropriety of the measures which we are about to pursue, but that every lord may reckon up the sum required for the support of those troops. Let him take a view of our military estimates, and he will quickly be convinced, how much we are condemned to suffer in this cause. He will find, that we are about not only to remit yearly into a foreign country more than a million and a half of money, but to hazard the lives of multitudes of our fellow-subjects, in a quarrel which at most affects us but remotely; that we are about to incur as auxiliaries an expense greater than that which the principals sustain.
The sum which I have mentioned, my lords, enormous as it may appear, is by no means exaggerated beyond the truth. Whoever shall examine the common military estimates, will easily be convinced, that the forces which we now maintain upon the continent cannot be supported at less expense; and that we are, therefore, about to exhaust our country in a distant quarrel, and to lavish our blood and treasure with useless profusion.
This profusion, my lords, is useless, at least useless to any other end, than an ostentatious display of our forces, and our riches; not because the balance of power is irrecoverably destroyed, not because it is contrary to the natural interest of an island to engage in wars on the continent, nor because we shall lose more by the diminution of our commerce, than we shall gain by an annual victory. It is useless, not because the power of France has by long negligence been suffered to swell beyond all opposition, nor because the queen of Hungary ought not to be assisted at the hazard of this kingdom, though all these reasons are of importance enough to claim our consideration. It is useless, my lords, because the queen of Hungary may be assisted more powerfully, at less charge; because a third part of this sum will enable her to raise, and to maintain, a greater body of men than have now been sent her.
Nor will the troops which she may be thus enabled to raise, my lords, be only more numerous, but more likely to prosecute the war with ardour; and to conclude it, therefore, with success. They will fight for the preservation of their own country, they will draw their swords to defend their houses and their estates, their wives and their children from the rage of tyrants and invaders; they will enter the field as men who cannot leave it to their enemies, without resigning all that makes life valuable; and who will, therefore, more willingly die than turn their backs.
It may reasonably be imagined, my lords, that the queen will place more confidence in such forces, than in troops which are to fight only for honour or for pay; and that she will expect from the affection of her own subjects, a degree of zeal and constancy which she cannot hope to excite in foreigners; and that she will think herself more secure in the protection of those whose fidelity she may secure by the solemnity of an oath, than those who have no particular regard for her person, nor any obligations to support her government.
It is no inconsiderable motive to this method of assisting our ally, that we shall entirely take away from France all pretences of hostilities or resentment, since we shall not attack her troops or invade her frontiers, but only furnish the queen of Hungary with money, without directing her how to apply it. I am far, my lords, from being so much intimidated by the late increase of the French greatness, as to imagine, that no limits can be set to their ambition. I am far from despairing, that the queen of Hungary alone, supported by us with pecuniary assistance, may be able to reduce them to solicitations for peace by driving them out of her dominions, and pursuing them into their own. But as the chance of war is always uncertain, it is surely most prudent to choose such a conduct as may exempt us from danger in all events; and since we are not certain of conquering the French, it is, in my opinion, most eligible not to provoke them, because we cannot be conquered without ruin.