Lord TALBOT then spoke in substance as follows:—My lords, if we consider the tendency of the argument used by the noble lord, the only argument on which he appears to lay any stress, it will prove, if it proves any thing, what cannot be admitted by your lordships, without bidding farewell to independency, and acknowledging that you are only the substitutes of a higher power.
It appears by the tenor of his reasoning, that he considers this house as only obliged, in questions relating to supplies, to ratify the determinations of the other; to submit implicitly to their dictates, and receive their sovereign commands, without daring either to refuse compliance, or delay it.
If we conjoin the reasoning of the noble lord who spoke last, with that of one who spoke before in favour of the bill, we shall be able to discover the full extent of our power on these occasions; the first was pleased to inform us, that though we were at liberty to examine the paragraphs of this bill, we had no right, at least no power to amend them; because in money bills, the commons left us no other choice than that of passing or rejecting them.
This, my lords, might have been thought a sufficient contraction of those privileges which your ancestors transmitted to you, and the commons needed to have desired no farther concessions from this assembly, since this was a publick confession of a subordinate state, and admitted either that part of our ancient rights had been given up, or that we were at present too much depressed to dare to assert them.
We might, however, still comfort ourselves with the peaceful and uncontested possession of the alternative; we might still believe that what we could not approve we might reject, without irritating the formidable commons. But now, my lords, a new doctrine has been vented among us; we are told not only that we must not amend a money bill, but that it will be to no purpose to reject it; for that the other house will send it again without altering any thing but the title, and force it upon us, when there is no time for any other expedient.
If this, my lords, should be done, I know not how the bill might, at its second appearance, be received by other lords; for my part, I should vote immediately for rejecting it, without any alleviating or mollifying expedients. I should reject it, my lords, even on the last day of the session, without any regard to the pretended necessity of raising supplies, and without suffering myself to be terrified into compliance by the danger of the house of Austria; for though I think the balance of power on the continent necessary to be preserved at the hazard of a fleet or an army, I cannot think it of equal importance to us with the equipoise of our own government; nor can I conceive it my duty to enslave myself to secure the freedom of another.
The danger, therefore, of disgusting the commons, at this or any other juncture, shall never influence me to a tame resignation of the privileges of our own house; nor shall I willingly allow any force to arguments which are intended only to operate upon our fear; and, therefore, unless there shall appear some better plea in favour of this bill, I shall think it my duty to oppose it.
The other plea is the difficulty, or, in the style of the noble lord who spoke last, the impossibility of raising supplies by any other method. That it is not easy to raise supplies by any new tax, in a nation where almost all the necessaries of life are loaded with imposts, must be readily allowed; but that it is impossible, the folly of the people, which is at least equal to their poverty, will not suffer me to grant.
One other expedient, at least, has been already discovered by the wonderful sagacity of our new ministers; an expedient which they cannot, indeed, claim the honour of inventing, but which appears so conformable to the rest of their conduct, and so agreeable to their principles, that I doubt not but they will very often practise it, if the continuance of their power be long enough to admit of a full display of their abilities.
Amidst their tenderness for our manufactures, and their regard for commerce, they have established a lottery for eight hundred thousand pounds, by which they not only take advantage of an inclination too predominant, an inclination to grow rich rather by a lucky hazard, than successful industry; but give up the people a prey to stockjobbers, usurers, and brokers of tickets, who will plunder them without mercy, by the encouragement of those by whom it might be hoped that they would be protected from plunderers.