It has been answered by a noble lord, that though there is not corpus delicti, there is corpus suspicionis. What may be the force of this argument, I cannot say, because I am not ashamed to own, that I do not understand the meaning of the words. I very well understand what is meant by corpus delicti, and so does every other lord; it is universally known to mean the body of an offence; but as to the words corpus suspicionis, I do not comprehend what they mean: it is an expression, indeed, which I never before heard, and can signify, in my apprehension, nothing more than the body of a shadow, the substance of something which is itself nothing.
Such, my lords, is the principle of this bill, by the confession of its warmest and ablest advocates; it is a bill for summoning a person to a trial, against whom no crime is alleged, and against whom no witness will appear without a bribe.
For that those who should appear in consequence of this bill to offer their evidence, ought to be considered as bribed, will, surely, need no proof to those who consider, that bribes are not confined to money, and that every man who promotes his own interest by his deposition, is swearing, not for truth and justice, but for himself.
It may be urged, and it is, in my opinion, all that the most fruitful imagination can suggest in favour of this bill, that they are not required to accuse the earl of ORFORD, but to give in their evidence concerning his conduct, whether in his favour, or against him.
But this argument, my lords, however specious it may seem, will vanish of itself, if the bill be diligently considered, which is only to confer indemnity on those, who in the course of their evidence shall discover any of their own crimes; on those whose testimony shall tend to fix some charge of wickedness on the earl of ORFORD; for it cannot easily be imagined how those who appear in his favour, should be under a necessity of revealing any actions that require an indemnity.
Thus, my lords, it appears that the bill can produce no other effect than that of multiplying accusations, since it offers rewards only to those who are supposed to have been engaged in unjustifiable practices; and to procure witnesses by this method, is equally unjust as to propose a publick prize to be obtained by swearing against any of your lordships.
If witnesses are to be purchased, we ought, at least, to offer an equal price on each side, that though they may be induced by the reward to offer their depositions, they may not be tempted to accuse rather than to justify.
Should any private man, my lords, offer a reward to any that would give evidence against another, without specifying the crime of which he is accused, doubtless he would be considered by the laws of this nation, as a violator of the rights of society, an open slanderer, and a disturber of mankind; and would immediately, by an indictment or information, be obliged to make satisfaction to the community which he had offended, or to the person whom he had injured.
It has, my lords, I own, been asserted by the noble duke, that the publick has a right to every man's evidence, a maxim which in its proper sense cannot be denied. For it is undoubtedly true, that the publick has a right to all the assistance of every individual; but it is, my lords, upon such terms as have been established for the general advantage of all; on such terms as the majority of each society has prescribed. But, my lords, the majority of a society, which is the true definition of the publick, are equally obliged with the smaller number, or with individuals, to the observation of justice, and cannot, therefore, prescribe to different individuals different conditions. They cannot decree that treatment to be just with regard to one which they allow to be cruel with respect to another. The claims of the publick are founded, first upon right, which is invariable; and next upon the law, which, though mutable in its own nature, is, however, to be so far fixed, as that every man may know his own condition, his own property, and his own privileges, or it ceases in effect to be law, it ceases to be the rule of government, or the measure of conduct.
In the present case, my lords, the publick has not a right to hire evidence, because the publick has hitherto subsisted upon this condition, among others, that no man shall swear in his own cause. The publick has not a right to require from any man that he should betray himself, because every man may plead that he is exempted from that demand by the publick faith.