The injuries, my lords, which the publick may suffer by the negligence of the commanders of the ships of war, are such as it is worthy of the legislature to obviate with the utmost caution; and, therefore, it is by no means improper to enact a punishment for those who shall, upon any false pretences, leave their station; for though such neglect of duty is, in the present state of our naval establishment, considered as disreputable and irregular, yet it does not appear that it has been censured with the detestation which it deserves, or punished with the severity necessary to its prevention.
It is observed, my lords, with relation to the following paragraph, that either house may, at present, require accounts of the conduct of the captains of the navy, and that, therefore, it is unnecessary to provide, by any new law, that they shall be laid before them; but if it be considered, my lords, how many inquiries, which we have a right to make, are year after year constantly omitted, and how many may be excited by curiosity to read accounts which lie before them, who yet will not move the house to demand the accounts, or engage in the debate which such a motion may produce, it will not be thought unnecessary to provide, that they shall be subject to examination without the formality of a regular vote.
As to the sixth clause, my lords, which regards the nomination of convoys at a certain time, I can discover no reasonable objection to such a provision, or none that can preponderate against the advantages which may arise from it. By the certain establishment of convoys, the value of insurance may be nearly fixed; merchants will know what confidence is to be reposed in the force of the ships, and, what they have, perhaps, had of late equal reason to examine, how much trust can be placed in the fidelity of the commanders.
The nomination of convoys, my lords, is, in my opinion, more likely to affright our enemies, and to deter their attempts, than to encourage them by the information which it will afford them; for nothing but our own negligence can conceal from us the naval strength of any power on earth; and we may always, while we are careful to preserve our maritime superiority, protect our merchants so powerfully, that none of our enemies shall be incited to attack them by the knowledge of the number and force of the ships appointed for their defence.
I come now, my lords, to the seventh clause; and surely to ascertain the duties of the captains to whose protection our trading vessels are intrusted, cannot appear superfluous to any of your lordships, who have read the lists of our losses, heard the complaints of our merchants, or made any inquiry into the conduct of our sea captains. There is, I fear, too much reason to believe, that some of them have, with premeditated design, deserted the traders in places where they have known them most exposed to the incursions of the enemy; and it is to the last degree evident, that others have manifested such contempt of the merchants, and such a disregard of their interest, as may most justly expose them to the suspicion of very criminal negligence, of negligence which no community can be too watchful against, or too severely punish.
It has been affirmed by the noble lord, that it is not equitable to subject the commanders of convoys to penalties for the loss of the trading vessels, which may, perhaps, either rashly or negligently quit their protection. That it is not reasonable to subject them to penalties, is undoubtedly true; but, my lords, it is far from being equally certain, that it is not just to expose them to a trial, in a case in which it must be almost impossible to determine falsely; in a case where the crews of, perhaps, twenty ships may be called as witnesses of their conduct, and where none, but those whose ship is lost, can be under the least temptation to offer a false testimony against them.
On this occasion, my lords, it may not be improper to obviate the objection produced by the seeming omission of penal sanctions, which is only another proof of implicit confidence in the officers of the admiralty, who have already the power, allowed to military courts, of proceeding against those who shall deviate from their orders. This power, which is in a great degree discretionary, it was thought improper to limit, by ascertaining the punishment of crimes, which so many circumstances may aggravate or diminish; and, therefore, in my opinion, this clause is far from being so defective as the noble lord represented it.
The last three clauses, by which the ships in America are prohibited to leave their station, by which it is required that accounts should be once in six months transmitted to the admiralty, and by which the captains are subjected to the command of the governours of our colonies, are, in my opinion, justly to be censured. The first is impossible to be observed, the second is unnecessary, and the third will probably produce more inconveniencies than benefits.
Thus, my lords, I have endeavoured to show, that this bill, though not perfect, is yet such as, with some emendations, may produce great advantages to the traders of this empire. For, though it is undoubtedly a just observation, that the success of military attempts cannot be promoted by rigid restrictions and minute regulations, yet it is equally certain that no nation has yet been so fortunate as to be served by men of integrity superiour to laws, or of wisdom superiour to instructions; and every government has found it necessary to direct the conduct of its officers by general rules, though they have been allowed to comply with particular circumstances, and to give way to sudden accidents.
I think it, therefore, my lords, necessary to propose, that this bill shall be more particularly examined in a committee, that, after having received the necessary explanations and amendments, it may be referred again to the other house.