In the first crush of her calamities, when she was driven by the torrent of invasion from fortress to fortress, and from kingdom to kingdom, it is not to be denied, that most of the guarantees of the Pragmatick sanction stood at gaze, without attempting that relief which she incessantly called upon them to afford her; and which, indeed, they could deny upon no other pretence, than that they were convinced it would be ineffectual, that her ruin was not to be prevented, and that she must be swallowed up by the deluge of war, which it appeared impossible to resist or to divert.
The queen, however, determined to assert her rights, and to defend her dominions; and, therefore, assembled her forces, and made such opposition, that some of her enemies finding the war, to which they were encouraged only by a belief of the certainty of success, likely to become more hazardous than they expected, soon desisted from their claims, and consented to peace upon moderate conditions; and the most formidable of her enemies, being alienated from the French by experience of their treachery, and, perhaps, intimidated by the bravery of his enemies, was at last willing to become neutral, and to be satisfied with the recovery of his own claims, without assisting the elector of Bavaria.
Thus far has this illustrious princess struggled in the tempest of the continent with very little assistance from her confederates; but it cannot be supposed, that these violent efforts have not exhausted her strength, or that she must not be, at length, overpowered by the armies which the French, enraged at the disappointment of their schemes, are sending against her. She has an incontestable claim to our assistance, promised by the most solemn stipulations, and, therefore, not to be withheld upon any views of present advantage. The prudence and magnanimity which she has discovered, prove, that she deserves to be supported upon the common principles of generosity, which would not suffer a brave man to look idly upon a heroine struggling with multitudes; and the opposition which she has been able to make alone, shows that assistance will not be vain.
These considerations, though, since the senate has determined to assist her, they are not immediately necessary in a question which relates only to the manner in which that assistance shall be given, are yet not entirely useless; since they may contribute to overbalance any prejudices that may obstruct the schemes which have been formed, and quicken the endeavours of men who might be inclined to reject those counsels to which any specious objections shall be raised, or to lose that time in deliberation, which ought to be employed in action.
As the assistance of this distressed princess has been already voted by the senate, it is now no longer to be inquired, what advantages can be gained to this nation by protecting her, or whether the benefits of victory will be equivalent to the hazards of war? These questions are already determined. It has already appeared necessary to this house, to restore the balance of power by preserving the house of Austria; and the only question, therefore, that remains is, by what means we shall endeavour to preserve it? and whether the means that have already been used, deserve our approbation?
Among the several schemes that were proposed for this end, it appeared most proper to the ministry to form an army in the low countries, whence they might be ready to march wherever their presence might be required, and where they might be easily supplied with necessaries. This army was to be raised with expedition; the affairs of the queen of Hungary could admit of no delay; auxiliary troops were, therefore, to be hired, and it appeared to them more proper to hire the troops of Hanover than of any other nation.
That the affairs of the queen of Hungary would admit of no delay, and that, therefore, the army in the low countries was very speedily to be formed, cannot be doubted by any one that compares her power with that of the nation against which she was contending; a nation incited by a long train of success to aspire to universal monarchy; a nation which has long been assembling armies, and accumulating treasures, in order to give law to the rest of the world; which had for many years stood against the united force of all the bordering powers, and to which the house of Austria is not equal in its full strength, much less when its treasures had been exhausted, and its troops destroyed in an unfortunate war before the death of the emperour; and when almost every part of its dominions was threatened by a particular power, and the troops of each province were employed in the defence of their own towns; so that no great armies could be collected, because no place could be left without defenders.
Such was the state of the Austrian dominions, when the troops of France broke in upon them; and in this state it must readily be acknowledged, that neither courage nor prudence could procure success; that no stratagems could long divert, nor any resistance repel such superiority of power, and that, therefore, relief must be speedy, to be efficacious.
That to bring the relief which we had promised, with expedition sufficient to procure any advantages to our ally, to preserve her provinces from being laid waste, her towns from being stormed, and her armies from being ruined; to repress the confidence of the French, and recall them from conquests to the defence of their own territories, it was apparently necessary to hire foreign troops; for to have sent over all our own forces, had been to have tempted the French to change their design of invading the Austrian dominions, into that of attacking Britain, and attempting to add this kingdom to their other conquests; to have raised new troops with expedition equal to the necessity that demanded them, was either absolutely impossible, or at least, very difficult; and when raised, they would have been only new troops, who, whatever might be their courage, would have been without skill in war, and would, therefore, have been distrusted by those whom they assisted, and despised by those whom they opposed.
Nothing, therefore, remained, but that auxiliaries should be tried, and the only question then to be decided, was, what nation should be solicited to supply us? Nor was this so difficult to be answered as in former times, since there was not the usual liberty of choice; many of the princes who send their troops to fight for other powers, were at that time either influenced by the promises, or bribed by the money, or intimidated by the forces of France; some of them were engaged in schemes for enlarging their own dominions, and therefore were unwilling to supply others with those troops for which they were themselves projecting employment; and, perhaps, of some others it might reasonably be doubted, whether they would not betray the cause which they should be retained to support, and whether they would not in secret wish the depression of the queen of Hungary, by means of those invaders whom they promised to resist.