All reasoning and investigation which depend on the philosophy of language for an ultimate result, must be conducted a posteriori. Its office, according to the ordinary mode of treating the subject, is to trace language to its origin, not for the purpose of determining and fixing grammatical associations and dependances, such as the agreement, government, and mutual relations of words, but in order to analyze combinations with a view to develop the first principles of the language, and arrive at the primitive meaning of words. Now, it is presumed, that no one who has paid critical attention to the subject, will contend, that the original import of single words, has any relation to the syntactical dependances and connexions of words in general;—to gain a knowledge of which, is the leading object of the student in grammar. And, furthermore, I challenge those who have indulged in such useless vagaries, to show by what process, with their own systems, they can communicate a practical knowledge of grammar. I venture to predict, that, if they make the attempt, they will find their systems more splendid in theory, than useful in practice.
Again, it cannot rationally be contended, that the radical meaning has any efficiency in controlling the signification which, by the power of association, custom has assigned to many words;—a signification essentially different from the original import. Were this the case, and were the language now to be taught and understood in compliance with the original import of words, it would have to undergo a thorough change; to be analyzed, divided, and sub-divided, almost ad infinitum. Indeed, there is the same propriety in asserting that the Gothic, Danish, and Anglo-Saxon elements in our language, ought to be pronounced separately, to enable us to understand our vernacular tongue, that there is in contending, that their primitive meaning has an ascendency over the influence of the principle of association in changing, and the power of custom in determining, the import of words. Many of our words are derived from the Greek, Roman, French, Spanish, Italian, and German languages; and the only use we can make of their originals, is to render them subservient to the force of custom in cases in which general usage has not varied from the primitive signification. Moreover, let the advocates of a mere philosophical investigation of the language, extend their system as far as a radical analysis will warrant them, and, with Horne Tooke, not only consider adverbs, prepositions, conjunctions, and interjections, as abbreviations of nouns and verbs, but, on their own responsibility, apply them, in teaching the language, in compliance with their radical import, and what would such a course avail them against the power of custom, and the influence of association and refinement? Let them show me one grammarian, produced by such a course of instruction, and they will exhibit a "philosophical" miracle. They might as well undertake to teach architecture, by having recourse to its origin, as represented by booths and tents. In addition to this, when we consider the great number of obsolete words, from which many now in use are derived, the original meaning of which cannot be ascertained, and, also, the multitude whose signification has been changed by the principle of association, it is preposterous to think, that a mere philosophical mode of investigating and teaching the language, is the one by which its significancy can be enforced, its correctness determined, its use comprehended, and its improvement extended. Before what commonly passes for a philosophical manner of developing the language can successfully be made the medium through which it can be comprehended, in all its present combinations, relations, and dependances, it must undergo a thorough retrogressive change, in all those combinations, relations, and dependances, even to the last letter of the alphabet. And before we can consent to this radical modification and retrograde ratio of the English language, we must agree to revive the customs, the habits, and the precise language of our progenitors, the Goths and Vandals. Were all the advocates for the introduction of such philosophical grammars into common schools, at once to enter on their pilgrimage, and recede into the native obscurity and barbarity of the ancient Britons, Picts, and Vandals, it is believed, that the cause of learning and refinement would not suffer greatly by their loss, and that the good sense of the present age, would not allow many of our best teachers to be of the party.
The last consideration which I shall give a philosophical manner of investigating and enforcing the English language, is, that by this mode of analyzing and reducing it to practice, it cannot, in this age, be comprehended as the medium of thought. Were this method to prevail, our present literal language would become a dead letter. Of what avail is language, if it can not be understood? And how can it be accommodated to the understanding, unless it receive the sanction of common consent? Even if we admit that such a manner of unfolding the principles of our language, is more rational and correct than the ordinary, practical method, I think it is clear that such a mode of investigation and development, does not meet the necessities and convenience of ordinary learners in school. To be consistent, that system which instructs by tracing a few of our words to their origin, must unfold the whole in the same manner. But the student in common schools and academies, cannot afford time to stem the tide of language up to its source, and there dive to the bottom of the fountain for knowledge. Such labor ought not to be required of him. His object is to become, not a philosophical antiquarian, but a practical grammarian. If I comprehend the design (if they have any) of our modern philosophical writers on this subject, it is to make grammarians by inculcating a few general principles, arising out of the genius of the language, and the nature of things, which the learner, by the exercise of his reasoning powers, must reduce to practice. His own judgment, independent of grammar rules, is to be his guide in speaking and writing correctly. Hence, many of them exclude from their systems, all exercises in what is called false Syntax. But these profound philological dictators appear to have overlooked the important consideration, that the great mass of mankind, and especially of boys and girls in common schools, can never become philosophers; and, consequently, can never comprehend and reduce to practice their metaphysical and obscure systems of grammar. I wish to see children treated as reasoning beings. But there should be a medium in all things. It is, therefore, absurd to instruct children as if they were already profound philosophers and logicians.
To demonstrate the utility, and enforce the necessity, of exercising the learner in correcting false Syntax, I need no other argument than the interesting and undeniable fact, that Mr. Murray's labors, in this department, have effected a complete revolution in the English language, in point of verbal accuracy. Who does not know, that the best writers of this day, are not guilty of one grammatical inaccuracy, where those authors who wrote before Mr. Murray flourished, are guilty of five? And what has produced this important change for the better? Ask the hundreds of thousands who have studied "Mr. Murray's exercises in FALSE SYNTAX." If, then, this view of the subject is correct, it follows, that the greater portion of our philosophical grammars, are far more worthy the attention of literary connoisseurs, than of the great mass of learners.
Knowing that a strong predilection for philosophical grammars, exists in the minds of some teachers of this science, I have thought proper, for the gratification of such, to intersperse through the pages of this work under the head of "PHILOSOPHICAL NOTES," an entire system of grammatical principles as deduced from what appears to me to be the most rational and consistent philosophical investigations. They who prefer this theory to that exhibited in the body of the work, are, of course, at liberty to adopt it.
In general, a philosophical theory of grammar will be found to accord with the practical theory embraced in the body of this work. Wherever such agreement exists, the system contained in these NOTES will be deficient, and this deficiency may be supplied by adopting the principles contained in the other parts of the work.
OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL CLASSIFICATION OF WORDS.
According to the method in which philosophical investigations of language have generally been conducted, all our words should be reduced to two classes; for it can be easily shown, that from the noun and verb, all the other parts of speech have sprung. Nay, more. They may even be reduced to one. Verbs do not, in reality, express actions; but they are intrinsically the mere names of actions. The idea of action or being communicated by them, as well as the meaning of words in general, is merely inferential. The principle of reasoning assumed by the celebrated Horne Tooke, if carried to its full extent, would result, it is believed, in proving that we have but one part of speech.