A Moslem seeker after God

by Samuel Marinus Zwemer

Al-Ghazali gives the distinction very clearly, almost as clearly as the Epistle of James, between faith and works. He was a dogmatic theologian and laid down, as we shall see in this chapter, with punctilious care every point of dogma; but he was also a moralist and a man of high ideals which he sought to attain through prayer and fasting and pilgrimage, and a life of utter devotion to the will of God. His faith was living and practical, not theoretical and scholastic. In his great work, the Ihya, he discusses the whole subject of faith, and enumerates the following classes of believers:

“He who combines inner belief with outward confession and good works is a true believer and enters Paradise.

“He who combines inner belief with outward confession and some good works but commits one or more great sins, does not thereby cease to be a believer, though his faith is not of the highest degree. The Muʾtazila deny that such a one can be considered a believer, but that nevertheless by committing deadly sins he does not become an unbeliever but is in an intermediate state between a believer and an infidel. An infidel is an impious person and goes into everlasting hell-fire.”

The opinions with regard to the person who combines inner belief with outward confession, but has no good works are divided. Abu Talibu’l Makki says: “Good works are part of the faith, and faith cannot exist without them.” The Sunni doctors of Islam, however, reject this opinion as absolutely false, for they say that it is a truth accepted by general agreement, that a man who believes and confesses and dies before he has done any good work, is a true believer and enters Paradise; that good works cannot consequently be considered as a necessary part of faith, and that faith can exist without them.

“He who believes in his heart, but dies before he has either confessed or performed good works, is nevertheless a true believer and enters into Paradise. Those who consider confession a necessary part of faith naturally consider that such a one has died without faith, an opinion absolutely contrary to the Sunni dogma.

“He who believes in his heart, and has time and opportunity of confessing, and knows that it is the duty of the Moslem to do so, and does not confess his faith, is nevertheless a believer in the sight of God, and will not be cast into everlasting hell-fire, for faith is the mere belief, intellectual conviction and assent, and this belief does not cease to exist through the want of outward confession. Such a man is a believer in the sight of God, but an unbeliever in this world before the court of justice and with regard to the rights of Moslems. In case of an impediment of the tongue, a sign with the hand is as good as confession with the tongue. The sect of the Murjiʾa go too far by saying that a believer, even if he act wickedly, will never enter hell-fire. The orthodox doctrine on this subject is that every one, even the most perfect believer, will enter hell-fire, for no one is free from committing some sins, for which he must enter fire; only infidels, however, will remain in it forever.”

“He who confesses with the tongue saying: ‘There is no God but God, and Mohammed is His apostle,’ but does not believe it in his heart is an infidel in the sight of God, and will be cast into eternal hell-fire. In this world, however, he is to be considered and treated as a believer and a Moslem, for man cannot penetrate into the secrets of the heart, and the confession of the mouth must be taken to be the interpreter of the thoughts of the heart. In order, however, to make a man a Moslem in this world, before the law, in the sight of the Qadi, confession is necessary.”

Not only does he classify believers in this careful way, but he also discusses the question, in the first book of his Ihya, whether Islam is the same thing as iman (faith) or not, and if these two are not the same thing, can they exist separately or must they necessarily be combined? “Some say that Islam and Iman are synonymous terms and that consequently every believer is a Moslem and every Moslem a believer.” This is the opinion held by the orthodox school. Others say that they are distinct things but joined together. Al-Ghazali answers this difficult question in this way: Iman (Faith), from the linguistic point of view, means belief, intellectual conviction and assent; Islam means submission, subjection, obedience. The seat of Iman is the heart or mind, and the tongue is its interpreter. Islam comprises belief with the heart and confession with the tongue, and good works by the members of the body, and is consequently a more comprehensive term than Iman. Iman is one of the component parts of Islam, and Islam, therefore, includes it; but Iman, being a more restricted term, does not include Islam. From a linguistic point of view the two terms are therefore not synonymous. From the point of view of the law and religion, and in a theological sense the two terms are sometimes used as being synonymous, and sometimes as having different meanings and as being intermingled, comprised in each other. Iman and Islam are found in the individual who believes in his heart and outwardly observes the precepts of Islam; Islam exists separately in the individual, who only believes in his heart; but neither confesses, nor does good works, and Islam exists separately in him who outwardly observes the precepts of Islam, without inner belief.

What the faith of Islam meant to Al-Ghazali we know from all his works, especially from the Ihya, which besides other topics gives a full exposition of Moslem belief in regard to the six articles of their creed and the five pillars of practice. The reader may judge for himself both the contents and omissions of Al-Ghazali’s credo from the following brief exposition which he wrote for his pupils: