This theory has at least the merit of being clear, definite, and easy to be understood, if it is not in all respects convincing. But here we have an exemplification of the old paradox of an irresistible force coming in contact with an immovable body. The Catholic priest tells us that Planchette is not a toy; that it moves by an intelligence and volition that is not human; that its moving and directing power is of the devil. The Rev. Dr. Patton, in his article in the Advance (heretofore referred to), tells us that “It is a philanthropic toy, which may be used to bring to light hidden connections of mind and body, and to refute the assumptions of spiritism;” and the Rev. A. D. Field, in his article in the Ladies’ Repository, backs up Dr. Patton by saying, that it is “a mere toy,” “is no humbug,” is of “some use;”—and, concerning the devil theory of the general power which moves it and other physical bodies, he says: there is “too often the spirit of gentleness to make the theory acceptable.” The “immovable body” here, is the authority of the Catholic priest; the “irresistible force” is the authority of our clerical brethren representing Protestantism; and after this fair impingement of the latter upon the former, we shall, perhaps, have to adopt a compromise solution of the problem, by saying that the “immovable body” has been moved a little, and that the “irresistible force” has been resisted some.
But this devil theory, if what the Bible teaches us concerning that personage is true, is encumbered with other difficulties; and the first of these is, that the devil, however wicked, is not a fool. If he should set a trap for human souls, he would not be so stupid as to tell them there is a trap there. When approaching human beings, he assumes, as the good book tells us, the garb of an angel of light; but it is not likely that he would ever say he is the devil, as Planchette sometimes does—at least until he felt quite sure of his prey. And again, when, in a case slightly parallel with cases sometimes involved in the question in hand, the captious Pharisees accused the Saviour of men of casting out devils by Beelzebub the prince of devils, he reminded them that a house or a kingdom divided against itself can not stand. Now Planchette, I admit, is not always a saint—in fact, she sometimes talks and acts very naughtily as well as foolishly; yet at other times, when a better spirit takes possession of her, she is gentle, loving, well disposed, and does certainly give most excellent advice,—advice which could not be heeded without detriment to the devil’s kingdom, and which, if universally followed, would work its overthrow entirely. It is inconceivable that Satan would thus tear down with one hand what he builds up with another. But just at this point I wish to say, I think there is need of great caution in consulting Planchette on matters of a weighty or serious nature, lest one should extort from her mere confirmations of his own errors, either in doctrine or practice; and that nothing should in any case be accepted from it that is repugnant to the established principles of the Christian religion. But we are after the science of the thing now, and for the present that is our only question—a question, however, which the devil theory, as will appear from the foregoing, does not seem fully to answer.
THEORY OF A FLOATING, AMBIENT MENTALITY.
It is supposed by those who hold this theory, or rather hypothesis, that the assumed floating, ambient mentality is an aggregate emanation from the minds of those present in the circle; that this mentality is clothed, by some mysterious process, with a force analogous to what it possesses in the living organism, by which force it is enabled, under certain conditions, to move physical bodies and write or otherwise express its thoughts; and that in its expression of the combined intelligence of the circle, it generally follows the strongest mind, or the mind that is otherwise best qualified or conditioned to give current to the thought. Although the writer of the interesting article, entitled “Planchette in a New Character,” in Putnam’s Monthly for December, 1868, disclaims, at the commencement of his lucubration, all theories on the subject, yet, after collating his facts, he shows a decided leaning to the foregoing theory as the nearest approach to a satisfactory explanation. “Floating, combined intelligence brought to bear upon an inanimate object,” “active intellectual principle afloat in the circumambient air,” are the expressions he uses as probably affording some light on the subject. This is a thought on which, as concerns its main features, many others have rested, not only in this country but in Europe, especially in England, as I am told by a friend who recently visited several sections of Great Britain where forms of these mysterious phenomena prevail.
The first difficulty that stands in the way of this hypothesis is that it supposes a thing which, if true, is quite as mysterious and inexplicable as the mystery which it purports to explain. How is it that an “intellectual principle” can detach itself from an intellectual being, of whose personality it formed the chief ingredient, and become an outside, objective, “floating,” and “circumambient” entity, with a capability of thinking, willing, acting, and expressing thought, in which the original possessor of the emanated principle often has no conscious participation? And after you have told us this, then tell us how the “intellectual principle,” not only of one, but of several persons can emanate from them, become “floating” and “ambient,” and then, losing separate identity, conjoin and form one active communicating agent with the powers aforesaid? And after you have removed from these mere assumptions the aspect of physical and moral impossibility, you will have another task to perform, and that is to show us how this emanated, “combined,” “floating,” “circumambient” intelligence can sometimes assume an individual and seemingly personal character of its own, totally distinct from, and, in some features, even antagonistic to, all the characters in the circle in which the “emanation” is supposed to have its origin?
It is not denied now that the answers and communications of Planchette (and of the influence acting through other channels) often do exhibit a controlling influence of the mind of the medium or of other persons in the circle. But no theory should ever be considered as explaining a mystery unless it covers the whole ground of that mystery. Even, therefore, should we consider the theory of the “floating intelligence” of the circle reproducing itself in expression, as explaining that part of the phenomenon which identifies itself with the minds of the circle (which it does not), what shall be said of those cases in which the phenomena exhibit characteristics which are sui generis, and can not possibly have been derived from the minds of the circle?
That phenomena of the latter class are sometimes exhibited is not only proved by many other facts that might be cited, but is clearly exemplified by this same writer in Putnam’s Magazine. The intelligence whose performances and communications he relates seems to stand out with a character and individuality as strongly marked and as distinct from any and all in the circle as any one of them was distinct from another. This individuality was first shown by giving its own pet names to the different persons composing the circle—“Flirt,” “Clarkey,” “Hon. Clarke,” “The Angel,” and “Sassiness.” The young lady designated by the last sobriquet, after it had been several times repeated, petitioned to be indicated thereafter “only by the initial ‘S,’” which the impertinent scribbler accorded only so far as omitting all the letters except the five S’s, so that she was afterward recognized as “S.S.S.S.S.”
The writer further says:
“It is always respectful to ‘Hon. Clarke,’ and when pressed to state what it thought of him, answered that he was ‘a good skipper,’ a reputation fairly earned by his capacity for managing a fleet of small boats. But we were not contented with so vague an answer, and our urgent demand for an analysis of his character produced the reply: ‘A native crab apple, but spicy and sweet when ripe.’ * * * When asked to go on, it wrote: ‘Ask me Hon. Clarke’s character again, and I will flee to the realms of imperishable woe; or, as Tabitha is here, say I’ll pull your nose;’ and on being taunted with its incapacity to fulfill the threat, it wrote: ‘Metaphorically speaking, of course.’ Not satisfied with this rebuff, on another occasion the subject was again pursued, and the answer elicited as follows: ‘Yes, but you can’t fool me. I said nay once, and when I says nay I means nay.’ [A mind of its own, then.] More than once it has lapsed into the same misuse of the verb, as: ‘I not only believes it, but I knows it;’ and again: ‘You asks and I answers, because I am here.’ * * *