Now Reason is considered either in relation to the Will and Moral Being, when it is termed the[167] Practical Reason = A: or relatively, to the intellective and Sciential Faculties, when it is termed Theoretic or Speculative Reason = a. In order therefore to be compared with the Reason; the Understanding must in like manner be distinguished into the Understanding as a Principle of Action, in which relation I call it the Adaptive Power, or the faculty of selecting and adapting Means and Medial of proximate ends = B: and the Understanding, as a mode and faculty of thought, when it is called Reflection = b. Accordingly, I give the General Definitions of these four: that is, I describe each severally by its essential characters: and I find, that the definition of A differs toto genere from that of B, and the definition of a from that of b.
Now subjects that require essentially different definitions do themselves differ in kind. But Understanding and Reason require essentially different definitions. Therefore Understanding and Reason differ in kind.
[166] This summary did not appear in the first edition.—Ed.
[167] N. B. The Practical Reason alone is Reason in the full and substantive sense. It is reason in its own sphere of perfect freedom; as the source of IDEAS, which Ideas, in their conversion to the responsible Will, become Ultimate Ends. On the other hand, Theoretic Reason, as the ground of the Universal and Absolute in all logical conclusion is rather the Light of Reason in the Understanding, and known to be such by its contrast with the contingency and particularity which characterize all the proper and indigenous growths of the Understanding.
APPENDIX B.
ON INSTINCT:
By Professor J. H. Green.
[This is the discourse an early report of which was the foundation of Coleridge's remarks upon instinct, &c., which appear at pp. 160-164. It was first added as an Appendix to the "Aids to Reflection," in the edition of 1843; being extracted from an Appendix to Professor Green's "Vital Dynamics"[168] 1840, where it appears at pp. 88-96. It was then given without the Professor's introductory words, which we now add.—Ed.]
The following remarks on the import of instinct are those to which Coleridge refers in the "Aids to Reflection" (p. 177, last edition[169]) as in accordance with his view of the understanding, differing in degree from instinct, and in kind from reason; and whatever merit they possess must have been derived from his instructive conversation. They are here inserted in the hope that they may interest the reader in connexion both with the passages of the preceding discourse, and with the writings of Coleridge on this important subject.
What is Instinct? As I am not quite of Bonnet's opinion "that philosophers will in vain torment themselves to define instinct, until they have spent some time in the head of the animal without actually being that animal," I shall endeavour to explain the use of the term. I shall not think it necessary to controvert the opinions which have been offered on this subject, whether the ancient doctrine of Descartes, who supposed that animals were mere machines; or the modern one of Lamarck, who attributes instincts to habits impressed upon the organs of animals, by the constant efflux of the nervous fluid to these organs, to which it has been determined in their efforts to perform certain actions, to which their necessities have given birth. And it will be here premature to offer any refutation of the opinions of those who contend for the identity of this faculty with reason, and maintain that all the actions of animals are the result of invention and experience;—an opinion maintained with considerable plausibility by Dr. Darwin.