In the Word was life, and that life is the light of men. And as long as the light abides within its own sphere, that is, appears as reason,—so long it is commensurate with the life, and is its adequate representative. But not so, when this light shines downward into the understanding; for there it is always, more or less, refracted, and differently in every different individual; and it must be re-converted into life to rectify itself, and regain its universality, or 'all-commonness, Allgemeinheit', as the German more expressively says. Hence in faith and charity the church is catholic: so likewise in the fundamental articles of belief, which constitute the right reason of faith. But in the minor 'dogmata', in modes of exposition, and the vehicles of faith and reason to the understandings, imaginations, and affections of men, the churches may differ, and in this difference supply one object for charity to exercise itself on by mutual forbearance.
O! there is a deep philosophy in the proverbial phrase,—'his heart sets his head right!' In our commerce with heaven, we must cast our local coins and tokens into the melting pot of love, to pass by weight and bullion. And where the balance of trade is so immensely in our favour, we have little right to complain, though they should not pass for half the nominal value they go for in our own market.
P. 46.
And I am so far from thinking this covenant of eternal life to be an
allusion to the forms of title amongst men, that I rather adore it as
the precedent for them all, from which our imperfect forms are taken:
believing with that great Apostle, that 'the things on earth are but
the patterns of things in the heavens, where the originals are kept'.
Aye! this, this is the pinch of the argument, which Asgill should have proved, not merely asserted. Are these human laws, and these forms of law, absolutely good and wise, or only conditionally so—the limited powers and intellect, and the corrupt will of men being considered?
P. 64.
And hence, though the dead shall not arise with the same identity of
matter with which they died, yet being in the same form, they will not
know themselves from themselves, being the same to all uses, intents,
and purposes.... But then as God, in the resurrection, is not bound to
use the same matter, neither is he obliged to use a different matter.
The great objection to this part of Asgill's scheme, which has had, and still, I am told, has, many advocates among the chief dignitaries of our church, is—that it either takes death as the utter extinction of being,—or it supposes a continuance, or at least a renewal, of consciousness after death. The former involves all the irrational, and all the immoral, consequences of materialism. But if the latter be granted, the proportionality, adhesion, and symmetry, of the whole scheme are gone, and the infinite quantity,—that is, immortality under the curse of estrangement from God,—is rendered a mere supplement tacked on to the finite, and comparatively insignificant, if not doubtful, evil, namely, the dissolution of the organic body. See what a poor hand Asgill makes of it, p. 26:—
And therefore to signify the height of this resentment, God raises man
from the dead to demand further satisfaction of him.
Death is a commitment to the prison of the grave till the judgment of
the great day; and then the grand 'Habeas corpus' will issue 'to the
earth and to the sea', to give up their dead; to remove the bodies,
with the cause of their commitment: and as these causes shall appear,
they shall either be released, or else sentenced to the common goal of
hell, there to remain until satisfaction.