realiter positum
, as three guineas from the same mint, supposing them to differ no more than they appear to us to differ;—but whether a difference wholly and exclusively numerical is a conceivable notion, except under the predicament of space and time; whether it be not absurd to affirm it, where interspace and interval cannot be affirmed without absurdity—this is the question; or rather it is no question.
Ib. p. 68.
Nor do we divide the substance, but unite these three Persons in one numerical essence: for we know nothing of the unity of the mind, but self-consciousness, as I showed before; and therefore as the self-consciousness of every Person to itself makes them distinct Persons, so the mutual consciousness of all three divine Persons to each other makes them all but one infinite God: as far as consciousness reaches, so far the unity of a spirit extends, for we know no other unity of a mind or spirit, but consciousness.
But this contradicts the preceding paragraph, in which the Father is self-conscious that he is the Father and not the Son, and the Son that he is not the Father, and that the Father is not he. Now how can the Son's being conscious that the Father is conscious that he is not the Son, constitute a numerical unity? And wherein can such a consciousness as that attributed to the Son differ from absolute certainty? Is not God conscious of every thought of man;—and would Sherlock allow me to deduce the unity of the divine consciousness with the human? Sherlock's is doubtless a very plain and intelligible account of three Gods in the most absolute intimacy with each other, so that they are all as one; but by no means of three persons that are one God. I do not wonder that Waterland and the other followers of Bull were alarmed.
Ib. p. 72.
Even among men it is only knowledge that is power. Human power, and human knowledge, as that signifies a knowledge how to do anything, are commensurate; whatever human skill extends to, human power can effect: nay, every man can do what he knows how to do, if he has proper instruments and materials to do it with.
This proves that perfect knowledge supposes perfect power: and that they are one and the same. "If he have proper instruments:"— does not this show that the means are supposed co-present with the knowledge, not the same with it?