[17] Note 17. Page 415.
The present punishment of bigamy [or polygamy as, says Blackstone, (4 Comm. 163,) it ought to be called] is fixed by statute 9 Geo. IV. c. 31, § 22, which declares the offence of bigamy (whether the second marriage have taken place in England or elsewhere) to be a felony liable to transportation for seven years, and imprisonment with or without hard labor, for any term not exceeding two years; subject, however, to a proviso that the act shall not apply to any of the following cases: 1. The case of a second marriage contracted out of England by any other than a British subject. 2. The case of a person marrying again where husband or wife shall have been continually absent from that person for seven years then last past, and shall not have been known by such person to be living during that time. 3. The case of any person who, at the time of the second marriage, shall have been divorced a vinculo from the first marriage, or whose former marriage shall have been declared void by any court of competent jurisdiction.
The meaning of the second of these exceptions is, that the husband or wife shall not have been known by the other party at any period during the seven years to be alive. Regina v. Cullen, 9 Car. & P., 681.
[18] Note 18. Page 416.
It has been recently decided (the King v. Inhabitants of Wraxton, 4 Barn. and Adol., 640,) that to render a marriage invalid on the ground stated in the text, both parties must be aware of the false name being adopted. See also, Wiltshire v. Prince, 3 Hagg. Ecc. Rep., 332.
[19] Note 19. Page 422.
Signing is not necessary to the validity of a bond or deed at Common Law. The essential requisites are—sealing and delivery. See a very interesting explanation of these matters in Vol. ii. pp. 305 et seq. of Blackstone's Commentaries.
[20] Note 20. Page 426.
An attorney cannot be thus compelled to answer matters which would amount to an indictable offence; for that would be compelling him to criminate himself. Upon this ground, applications like that in the text are often discharged; but it affords no protection to an attorney where the application is, not to show cause why he should not answer the matter in the affidavit, but why he should not be struck off the 28th roll.—See the distinction clearly explained in the case of Stephens v. Hill, 10 M. and W.
[21] Note 21. Page 490.