XIV. THE PARTITION OF THE EARTH
1. Economic Power and Political Authority
Economically the United States is a world power. Her world position in politics follows as a matter of course.
While the American people were busy with internal development, they played an unimportant part in world affairs. They were not competing for world trade, because they had relatively little to export; they were not building a merchant marine because of the smallness of their trading activities; they were not engaged in the scramble after undeveloped countries because, with an undeveloped country of their own, calling continually for enlarged investments, they had little surplus capital to employ in foreign enterprises.
This economic isolation of the United States was reflected in an equally thoroughgoing political isolation. With the exception of the Monroe Doctrine, which in its original form was intended as a measure of defense against foreign political and military aggression, the United States minded its own affairs, and allowed the remainder of the world to go its way. From time to time, as necessity arose, additional territory was purchased or taken from neighboring countries—but all of these transactions, up to the annexation of Hawaii (1898) were confined to the continent of North America, in which no European nation, with the exception of Great Britain, had any imperative territorial interest.
The economic changes which immediately preceded the Spanish War period commanded for the United States a place among the nations. The passing of economic aloofness marked the passing of political aloofness, and the United States entered upon a new era of international relationships. Possessed of abundant natural resources, and having through a long period of peace developed a large working capital with which these resources might be exploited, the United States, at the beginning of the twentieth century, was in a position to export, to trade and to invest in foreign enterprises.
The advent of the World War gave the United States a dramatic opportunity to take a position which she must have assumed in any case in a comparatively short time. It had, however, one signal, diplomatic advantage,—it enabled the capitalist governments of Europe to accept, with an excellent grace, the newly acquired economic prominence of the United States and to recognize her without question as one of the leading political powers. The loan of ten billions to Europe; the sending of two million men at double quick time to the battle front; the immense increases in the production of raw material that followed the declaration of war by the United States; the thoroughness displayed by the American people, once they had decided to enter the war, all played their part in the winning of the victory. There were feelings, very strongly expressed, that the United States should have come in sooner; should have sacrificed more and profiteered less. But once in, there could be no question either of the spirit of her armies or of the vast economic power behind them.
When it came to dividing the spoils of victory, the United States held, not only the purse strings, but the largest surpluses of food and raw materials as well. Her diplomacy at the Peace Table was weak. Her representatives, inexperienced in such matters, were no match for the trained diplomats of Europe, but her economic position was unquestioned, as was her right to take her place as one of the "big five."