Mr. Power says: "The last that was seen of poor old Hicks was his taking his revolver in one hand, and his sword in the other; calling on his soldiers to fix bayonets, and his staff to follow him, he spurred at the head of his troops into the dense mass of naked Arabs, and perished with all his men." They had fought for three days and nights without a drop of water, the whole day under a scorching sun on a sandy plain. Gordon writing to a friend says: "What a defeat Hicks's was! It is terrible to think of over 12,000 men killed; the Arabs just prodded them to death, where they lay dying of thirst, four days without water! It is appalling. What a hecatomb to death!"
That victory changed everything. Nothing succeeds like success; the Mahdi became the hero of the hour in the Soudan, and his forces, it was supposed, at one time numbered something like 300,000 men. Here then were all the elements ready for a new Mohammedan crusade, and considering how much trouble the first Mohammedan crusade had given in Europe, it was not to be wondered at that there was fear and trembling in Egypt, the first country on the line of march of this huge fanatical army, flushed with victory, believing their leader to be none other than the long-expected reformer of Islam and conqueror of the world. A hurriedly-scraped-together force, consisting mainly of gendarmerie, was at once dispatched under Baker Pasha, viâ Suakim, to relieve Khartoum, and attack the Mahdi. This force was so completely smashed up by Osman Digna within a few miles of Suakim that it had little effect upon the campaign, except to show that Egyptian troops were absolutely unfit to meet the forces of the Mahdi. If the tide of conquest was to be rolled back it must be done by British troops. But England might well ask what claim was there resting on her that she should give valuable lives to be sacrificed, to say nothing of incurring the cost of a fresh campaign, simply because the corrupt Egyptian Government was too weak to rule its own territory?
When once it became clear that Egyptian troops could not hold the Soudan, our Government rightly decided that the province must be given up. Unfortunately, there were scattered about in different parts of that immense territory various Egyptian officials and bodies of troops. It was calculated that including the women and children their number must have been about 30,000. We had practically broken up the Egyptian army, and virtually become the rulers of the country, so we as a nation had a certain amount of responsibility in the matter. The problem was how to withdraw that enormous number of human beings from the Soudan into Egypt. What appeared to be needed far more than troops was a man with a head on his shoulders, acquainted with the country, familiar with the people and their habits of thought, and possessing force of character to stand against the turbulent elements that had to be dealt with. No sooner were the difficulties of the position recognised in England than an outcry arose that Gordon ought to be sent to undertake the herculean task. Mr. Gladstone, in the House of Commons, has given credit to Sir Charles Wilson as the first to suggest sending Gordon, as the only man competent to deal with all the difficulties of the situation. Both Mr. Gladstone and Sir Charles Dilke asserted in public that the English Cabinet advised the Egyptian Government that Gordon was the best man to send, but that the Khedive's ministers did not approve of this step. Sir Henry Gordon, in his biography states that Sir Evelyn Baring, our representative in Egypt, does not even seem to have consulted the Egyptian Government, but of his own accord declined to accept Gordon. It is quite clear that Sir Evelyn Baring and General Gordon were not the best of friends, for Gordon later on complains: "I hear very little from Cairo. Baring only telegraphs officially." It does not, however, much matter now who is to blame for the want of wisdom in not recognising in time that Gordon was the man for the occasion. That blunder, whosever fault it was, not only lost the Soudan to Egypt, but caused the death of many of our brave soldiers, to say nothing of Gordon himself. The Egyptian Government blundered on a little longer, till it was too late, and then the request that Gordon might be sent was telegraphed home.
Nubar Pasha, who was the first to invite Gordon to Egypt many years before, was now the first to see that he ought to be sent for. This astute minister had only just come into office, and within eight days he got Sir Evelyn Baring to telegraph to England for Gordon. There can be little question now that the fatal delay of a single month sealed the fate of the Soudan. Hicks Pasha's force was annihilated in November 1883, but it was not till January 11, 1884, that General Gordon received a telegram from his old friend and comrade, Lord Wolseley, urging him to come to town at once for consultation, and though he did not lose a single day he did not reach Cairo till January 24th. By that time he ought to have been at Khartoum.
Before proceeding further, it may be well to say that so little was General Gordon known at this time by his countrymen, that a country gentleman, who was a magistrate and a deputy-lieutenant in Pembrokeshire, a county in which Gordon had formerly been stationed, remarked, on seeing the fact mentioned in the paper that "Chinese Gordon" was going out. "I see the Government have just sent a Chinaman to the Soudan. What can they mean by sending a native of that country to such a place?" This story, which is mentioned by Sir William Butler, is quite characteristic of the ignorance that prevailed about the Khartoum hero, previous to his being selected as the one man who could save Egypt from its troubles, and our Government from an awkward position.
In a letter to his brother, dated 17th January, Gordon says, "I saw King Leopold to-day; he is furious." It must have been a great trial to that kind-hearted monarch to have all his philanthropic plans thus upset, and he made Gordon promise that he would, if spared, go to the Congo when the Soudan was settled. So hard up for money was Gordon at this time that he had to borrow from the king enough to pay for his journey to London. Fortunately it occurred to Lord Wolseley to ask Gordon, a few hours before he was to start by the evening mail, if he had sufficient money. Gordon had none, and as the banks had closed his lordship had some amusing adventures going about to raise £200, which he did by borrowing small sums. As far as Gordon was concerned, his lordship might have saved himself the trouble, as £100 of the amount was generously bestowed by him on Mahomet, his old blind secretary at Cairo.
The Pall Mall Gazette, which was the first journal to advocate sending Gordon to the Soudan, and which first published his views on that country, was represented at Charing Cross when the gallant General was starting, and described the scene as a very unusual and interesting one. Lord Wolseley carried the General's portmanteau; Lord Granville, the Foreign Secretary, took his ticket; and the Duke of Cambridge held open the door. Considering how little Gordon cared about grandees, it is amusing to note that he was waited on in a way that many tuft-hunters would envy.
Writing before he had actually started, he said: "I am averse to the loss of a single life, and will endeavour to prevent any happening if I go. I have a Bank, and on that I can draw; He is richer than the Khedive, and knows more of the country than any one; I will trust Him to help me out of money or any other difficulties." Again he writes, when at sea, 21st January: "If people ask after me, tell them they can greatly help me with their prayers, not for my earthly success, but that my mission may be for God's glory, the welfare of the poor and wretched, and, for me, what He wills, above all for a humble heart." And to his friend Prebendary Barnes, he says: "You and I are equally exposed to the attacks of the enemy—me not a bit more than you are."