Such was our first picture of war. However it may appear now, it did not make us feel at all buoyant then. We were surrounded—beleaguered. Our ammunition would not average fifteen rounds to the man, while our cannon had but forty rounds. The ammunition of Captain Herron's men, from being carried in their pockets was knocked to pieces, and much of it rendered unfit for use. Our supply of subsistence was nearly exhausted. We had corralled in our works a number of cattle, which would be a great help to us; but the rebels had shrewdly driven off all the rest. Our only supply of water was drawn from the cistern of the seminary which two or three days at most would exhaust. Had the rebels attacked us vigorously, we could have made a desperate resistance, but it must have been a short one. It was doubtless well for us that they did not know our situation, as it would have emboldened them to an attack. As it was, their movements exhibited unmistakable signs of fear.
About two o'clock in the afternoon, an officer stationed on the housetop with a glass informed Colonel Smith that the enemy was planting a cannon in the edge of the woods about three-fourths of a mile to the north. Another minute verified the statement. A flash was seen, a shock was heard, and a solid shot came whistling through the air. The first three or four shots were from a six pounder and fell short of us. But they commenced using a nine pounder, and their shots tore through the air unpleasantly close to our heads. At first they fired high and their shots struck in the middle of the town, or on the railroad track. But their aim soon became more accurate. One shot struck our gun carriage and came near dismounting the piece. Another struck the parapet behind which Company A of the Third Iowa lay concealed, and threw two or three bushels of dirt over them, to the infinite merriment of all who saw it at a pleasant distance. Most of the time during this cannonade, we rested behind our intrenchments. A man in the building watched the enemy's artillery from a window, and when he would see the flash of their gun he would cry, "down!" a command which we obeyed by dropping into the ditches, and hugging the earth most willingly. In Company H of our regiment, a gun went off by accident, killing one man as he lay in the trench. Colonel Smith walked about the enclosure, surveying things very coolly and giving orders. The enemy's cavalry closed in, principally from the east, but their movements were slow and hesitating, and nothing could induce them to come within range of our muskets. We entertained a great contempt for such cavalry, and felt assured that we need not apprehend any harm from them as long as they kept mounted. Our cannon only replied twice to theirs, Colonel Smith deeming it prudent to save his ammunition for a greater emergency.
At length a train of cars was seen approaching slowly from the east. It gave us joy, mingled with apprehensions; for we had heard that the enemy had captured Palmyra, and did not know but that he might have captured the rolling stock at that point, and was in this way sending reinforcements against us. We could not but observe that it came very slowly, and we were at a loss to conjecture the cause of this. Finally, it approached sufficiently near for us to discern a flag upon it. Colonel Smith ordered Captain Smith who stood in the window with a glass, to direct it upon that flag. He did so; and when he announced, "Colonel, it is the Stars and Stripes," there went up from every throat a shout of unfeigned joy.
Fishbeem now dragged his gun into the middle of the enclosure, and opened upon the rebels with fine effect, stampeding them in all directions. They got their artillery away as quick as possible, and then began to retreat, first to the south and then to the east, Fishbeem, all the while, visiting them with his hard favors. Their retreat soon assumed the character of a rout. We never saw the like in all our soldiering. There was nothing to run from that could possibly overtake them, and yet those men of chivalry ran—well, old trappers said their flight looked more like a herd of buffalo stampeding, than any thing to which they could liken it.
Our reinforcements consisted of four companies of the Sixteenth with one piece of cannon. They had been all day coming from Palmyra, a distance of eighteen miles, having been compelled to repair the track where the enemy had torn it up. The engine was backing its train, and as it approached, the boys on board became so jubilant, that they neglected to keep a strict watch ahead of them. There was a place where the rebels had torn up a rail; the train ran on to it, and the first two cars tumbled down the bank. The train was running slow, and fortunately no one was seriously hurt.
The coming friend, the flying foe, gave to us as we beheld them a feeling of indescribable joy. Aid had reached us in the moment when most needed. We might have been able to hold out without assistance; but there would have been a limit to our endurance. He had fired in all twenty-two shots, nine of which had struck within our works, three of them passing through the building; but no one was hurt. It is easy to calculate the chances of an assault. The rebels could not have carried our works by storm, until our ammunition had been exhausted. This he might have done by false attacks by night. They could not have done it in the daytime without great loss. As it was, had they possessed ordinary courage our situation would have been critical. On the other hand, Colonel Smith could have thrown his men into a square, and marched over the prairie to Palmyra, which by the wagon road was only fourteen miles distant, without being much disturbed. What are men on horseback with shotguns against infantry with bayonets? So we talked encouragingly behind our works while the enemy was approaching. And now, when we saw him flying from nothing in such magnificent rout, we were more than convinced of the correctness of our conclusions.
That night, as we had done the night before, we lay on our arms in the trenches. About three o'clock in the morning, the mounted pickets fired their pieces, and reported an enemy approaching in force. Our little garrison was thoroughly alarmed, and we made immediate disposition to receive him. The force proved to be most of the remaining portion of our regiment, approaching from the west under Col. Williams. The arrival of these comrades coming to our assistance gave us an additional joy, although they were too late to relieve us from our supposed peril. They had heard, through rebel sources, many reports of fighting near Monroe resulting disastrously to us, and had been all the while they were coming most impatient to reach us, and afford us relief. They complained loudly of Col. Williams for tardiness and hesitancy, in bringing them forward. Much blame has ever since been attached to that officer for not reinforcing sooner. It was said that he made a useless delay of several hours at Hudson. Some even went so far as to attribute this delay to cowardice. Others assert that the delay was made to procure ammunition. The Colonel himself has been heard to boast of the energy and promptness he displayed in this operation. It is not my purpose, nor is it pleasant for me, to discuss personal matters. I can only say, that on this, as on most other questions, the general verdict of the officers and men was against him.