Our regimental camp at Chillicothe was situated on the north side of the railroad, and within the limits of the town. The ground was an excellent greensward, and the camp was systematically laid out. Our duty was camp guard, picket guard and drill. The camp guard generally required the heaviest detail. A strong line of sentinels extended around the camp, and no persons could pass them except in squads under a non-commissioned officer for water, without a written pass from the regimental commander. And, under Colonel Williams, it was a serious thing to disobey orders; and breaking guard was a risk which very few were willing to run. Whatever may be said against the Colonel, the discipline we attained under him while at Chillicothe, was highly creditable to him. It was in consequence of this discipline that our regiment had a good name among the citizens of Missouri, such as volunteer troops seldom gain among strangers or enemies. Their streets were not trodden by drunken soldiers; their property was safe; they no longer looked upon us as outlaws and monsters. They began to have confidence in us, and to take a more unprejudiced view of our cause. And who knows that our conduct did not make many friends of enemies? But it was doubtless the confinement to which we were thus subjected in our hot, close tents, that increased our sick lists so greatly. The restraint imposed upon us was excessive and unreasonable.
At Chillicothe our camp guard was managed according to the regulations, and the men learned the duties of the sentinel. But the manner in which our outpost duty was done was horrible. As if to invite a surprise or a raid through our camp, Colonel Williams never had out pickets in the daytime. Nor did he ever send out a scouting party to ascertain the movements which were going on around him. Did he rely on Providence alone, or on accidental reports from citizens? Or did he unbosom his camp to his foes and trust to their magnanimity? In the night—did the Colonel think the enemy so foolish as to attack him in the night in the summer season when there was so much daylight to operate in? Or was he afraid of wolves? In the night before "tattoo," the officer of the day would string around the town a short distance from camp, twenty men, two in a place, without an officer, or even a non-commissioned officer over them. These men were not relieved till morning, when they would come in, according to instructions, of their own accord. If there was any military knowledge displayed in this arrangement, we were never able to see it.
Is it surprising then, that the rebels should have organized a company of cavalry within nine miles of us? Colonel Williams heard of this when it was too late, and sent a detachment of men in the night to look after them. This detachment was provided with ammunition at the rate of ten rounds to seven men, or 13⁄7 rounds to the man! But the foolish fellows got wind of our coming and ran off.
In this connection, Colonel Williams' attempt at fortifying deserves mention. He commenced throwing up a small work around the Union Hotel, where he had his headquarters, the flanks of it resting on the railroad, which here runs in a moderate cut. What it was intended for we can guess: to be garrisoned by a small force when we should leave. What it was good for, no one but Colonel Williams could tell. Charley Kostman constructed it; as far as his part was concerned, it was good. It was evidently intended for about a hundred men. Was it intended to resist artillery? Why, then, was the parapet so weak? Was it intended to contain artillery? Why, then, were there no embrasures? Was it intended to protect infantry? The houses of the town on all sides of it could be filled with sharpshooters who would render it untenable. Was it intended for any thing? A party of men could run up the railroad track and get into it easily. It was in all respects a humbug; unless it be that it enabled the Colonel to sleep more soundly than before it was built. And there it doubtless stands to this time—a sublime monument to the genius of him who was chosen colonel of the Third Iowa, because he was a military man.
If Colonel Williams wanted to put up a small work against infantry, why did he not cut timber and make a stockade? If he wanted to make a fort which would resist artillery, why did he not select an eligible spot, and make one which would answer the purpose? No: he had a grander and sublimer object. It was to put the Union Hotel in a state of defense. And for this purpose he kept heavy details working, day after day, digging the baked earth in the hot sun,—which was an outrage, and so we regarded it.
In the meantime, Brigadier General Hurlbut arrived at Quincy, Illinois, and assumed command of the forces on the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad. Of this general we knew nothing, except that we had understood he was without military experience,—a circumstance not calculated to give us much confidence in him, especially when we thought of the disasters of Big Bethel and Bull Run. On assuming command, he issued a proclamation to the citizens of Missouri, which was about what they would have expected from a Federal general. He adopted General Pope's plan of making the citizens responsible for damages done the railroad in their vicinity. This was correct; for hitherto citizens had been mainly instrumental in these depredations. He also issued an order announcing the daily routine for the troops. By this order we were compelled to drill in the schools of the soldier, company and battalion,—in all, seven hours a day.
Few of my comrades have pleasant recollections of these long drills of Chillicothe. The heat was intense and relaxing, and the health of the regiment extremely bad. At one time, more than half of some of the companies were on the sick list, and few of us were entirely well. And yet the water we obtained from the wells of citizens was excellent, and our camp was a model of order and cleanliness.
On our battalion drills, Colonel Williams generally commanded. He taught us to execute several movements after the manner of Scott, and once or twice confessed that it was hard for him to get used to Hardee. He paid particular attention to instructing the battalion to form lines of battle rapidly and in various ways. As a drill-master he was rigid even to severity. It must be allowed, that it was one of Colonel Williams' first objects of desire to see the regiment well drilled.
It was not till the 4th of August that we drew our accoutrements. Let us look back: up to this time, we had been in an insurrectionary district, filled with irregular forces of the enemy. From Calloway county, which Harris held with two or three thousand men, a two days ride would have brought an enemy to our camp. I can not see any excuse for this criminal carelessness. We ought to have been supplied with accoutrements and ammunition, or kept at home. If Colonel Williams had cartridges, he ought to have issued a supply to his men. If he did not have any, he ought to have seized powder and lead from the citizens, of which they had plenty. Singular good fortune, that we were not all captured! Were the gods propitious, or were our enemies too chivalrous to assail us, defenseless as we were?
Thus, with hard crackers and hard discipline; with constant drills and heavy fatigues; with full guard houses and frequent courts martial; in heat, dust, sickness and discomfort, we passed an irksome month at Chillicothe.