Recollections with the Third Iowa Regiment

by Seymour D. Thompson

BATTLE OF BLUE MILLS LANDING.

We expected that the troops now under these two generals would be directed in pursuit of Green. In this we were disappointed. There were now far more important movements on foot, but of which we could conjecture nothing. Both the Sixteenth Illinois and the detachment of the Thirty-ninth Ohio were sent west under Smith. This seemed a little strange; but in reality it was not at all so; for we had already learned that the enemy had captured St. Joseph, and we had just received intelligence of the Platte river bridge tragedy with which the country is familiar. The Twenty-seventh Ohio and the additional five companies of the Thirty-ninth Ohio arrived by way of the North Missouri Railroad, and, under Sturgis, proceeded west as far as Utica, when leaving the railroad, they moved south toward Lexington. I have been unable to ascertain the orders under which these columns moved. There is a chaos about the loss of Lexington, out of which it is scarcely possible to bring any thing tangible or intelligible. It seems, however, that General Pope had control of the movements designed to reinforce that garrison from the north, and that General Sturgis was under his command. Be this as it may, the dispositions were faulty in the extreme. It seems that the Union Guards designed reinforcing Mulligan from the line of the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad, and, at the same time, driving out the rebels from the vicinity of St. Joseph. Col. Smith, whom we supposed sent to effect the latter purpose, proceeded as far west as Platte river bridge, nine miles from St. Joseph, and commenced repairing it. Why he did not proceed against the enemy is inexplicable. If his force was insufficient, why was our regiment still lying at Macon? Above all, why were these movements delayed a day when Lexington was in such peril? Such questions will ever recur to us when we remember what an annoyance the operations of the western army received in the surrender of that garrison. The rebels began to retreat from the vicinity of St. Joseph, and what then? Why, it was now time to organize pursuit!

For this purpose, the Third Iowa was to go west and co-operate with Smith. On the morning of September 15th, Colonel Scott received orders to this effect, and, in less than two hours those of the regiment who were able to endure a forced march were aboard a train of cars and proceeding rapidly toward the west. The Colonel compelled many partially ill or convalescent, who wished to join in the movement, to remain behind; because he expected to perform rapid marches, and did not wish to be embarrassed by straggling.

At 1 P. M. we arrived at Cameron, a station about forty miles east of St. Joseph, and got our effects off the train. Here we heard the first rumors of Price's movements, and began to have glimpses of what was before us. Colonel Scott's orders from General Sturgis were to leave the railroad at Cameron, march upon Liberty, act against the rebels and co-operate with Smith. The plan seems to have been that Smith and Scott should unite at Liberty, defeat the St. Joseph rebels and capture their immense train before they could cross the Missouri; and then, following them down the north bank of that stream, unite with Sturgis, who would then be able to appear before Lexington in such force as to raise the siege. It is easy to see wherein this plan was defective. It involved, first, a division of our forces in the presence of an enemy who was numerically our superior; and, secondly, the accomplishing of two objects almost simultaneously when the whole force should have been concentrated for the accomplishment of the main one, the relief of Mulligan. As will be shown in the following pages, the faults in executing were not less than those in planning, and the whole thing was a total and disgraceful failure, relieved only by two bright tints of glory, the heroism of Mulligan at Lexington and of Scott at Blue Mills. In justice to Colonel Smith, however, it is proper to state here, that, as will be seen by the St. Louis Republican's account, given in the next chapter, orders to proceed to Lexington, after cutting off Boyd and Patton, did not reach him at all.

We were not long getting our baggage and effects off the cars. But how were we to move without transportation? Colonel Smith had taken our wagons from us on a previous occasion, and still had them. Colonel Scott, with his characteristic energy, set himself to work to solve this problem. Before the men had got their dinners, he had put into requisition several teams belonging to citizens, on which we loaded our subsistence and the few cooking utensils we took along. We were joined by a detachment of Captain Schwartz's Missouri Battery, fourteen men and a six pounder, under command of a sergeant.

At three o'clock, we began to move. It had been raining slowly since noon; but, though the roads were slippery, the mud was not deep, and the wagons and artillery proceeded without difficulty. After a steady march of seven miles, we bivouacked on an open meadow. It continued to drizzle slowly till sunset, and finally the wind rose in the northwest, damp and raw, which rendered the night very comfortless. The common ration of food being found insufficient to satisfy our hunger, Colonel Scott humanely and wisely ordered extra issues to be made.

The march was resumed at an early hour. The scenery through which we passed this day was sufficiently pleasing to repay even the toils of the tiresome march. The day was clear and warm, and by noon the roads were quite dry. We halted for dinner and rest at the small town of Hainesville. As will be seen by Colonel Scott's official report, it was from this point that he sent his first messenger to Smith. [What became of these messengers? Were they captured by the enemy? Or were they too timid to go far? To suppose that they were unable to find Colonel Smith would be preposterous.]

After a short rest, we resumed the march, and arrived at Centerville at sunset. We had scarcely stacked arms, when we heard toward the west the firing of cannon. Every pulse beat quicker. There was not a man who did not listen with interest. Every jar seemed an earnest of something to come. Each seemed to tell of human passions broke loose, of men turned demons, of carnage and of death. There was to us a strange romance in those sounds. We rejoiced; for we knew that in that direction were both friends and foes. That the latter were there, gave us a double joy. We would meet them, and wipe out the unjust reproach of Shelbina. We would show the country, that under a brave leader, we were no cowards. We would make good our promises to our friends and loved ones at home. We would earn the right to be called comrades of the gallant men who fought at Springfield. The fact that friends were there, gave us the assurance that we should not meet the enemy alone and without hope of success.

We found Centerville almost entirely deserted. The inhabitants were rebels. They had heard of our approach and fled. Nothing belonging to them, however, was disturbed except their henroosts. It requires no more than the teachings of ordinary experience to show that pilot bread and fat bacon will not support great fatigue. The country through which we passed supplied us in a measure with what our commissariat lacked. No one went beyond the bounds of reason, and the people were surprised that we took so little. Thus every man had plenty of good food; his blood flowed vigorously; and what, under other circumstances, would have cost him great fatigue, he now endured with comparative ease.

Colonel Scott sent another messenger to Smith, and Lieut. Call reconnoitered as far as Liberty. He reported the enemy marching through that place. This was sufficient to determine Scott. The sound of Madison's guns convinced him that the enemy was closely pursued. He was determined, that, if decisive results were not attained, it should not be through any fault of his.