Colonel Scott immediately ordered the cannon forward. It was brought forward a short distance, got into position and fired two discharges of canister, which are said to have done great execution. This is doubtless the case; for the rebels were almost under its muzzle. But they opened upon the artillerists with rifles and shot guns—for they were within buckshot range—and in a few moments disabled several of their horses and killed and wounded half the squad. Soon after this, the Colonel is said to have given the order to "fall back a little." If such an order was given, it was intended only for those who had got too far in advance, and was heard by few and heeded by none. The enemy began to push a column past our right; but this proved a disastrous attempt; for, being exposed to the fire of our entire column across the slough, it was soon scattered and beaten back. Company I was particularly prominent in this. Colonel Scott put forth every effort to bring the companies into line parallel with that of the enemy; but the men could not be brought out of the confusion, and in the noise, the commands could not be heard. But he himself resolutely kept the extreme advance, and his example was almost worth a battalion of reinforcements.
Every moment matters grew worse. Out of sixteen commissioned officers ten had fallen. The cannon was totally disabled. The enemy, though he had been checked in his charges on our front, and in his attempt to flank our right, had fallen back to his cover, and his bullets rained as thickly as at first. We began to give back slowly, keeping up an unabated fire, and carrying off our wounded. Only three wounded men were left on the field. We, the men, evidently thought that it was "advisable to fall back." But we had no orders to this effect,—at least, none that many of us heard, though a dozen might have been given. We were simply repulsed; driven out of the woods perforce; compelled to get out of the enemy's ambuscade or stand where we were and be shot down to no purpose. If orders to retreat were not given, they should have been. The enemy's long line, masked in a dry ravine, extended around us in the shape of a crescent, and we were exposed to a concentrated fire from its center and both flanks. Under the circumstances, we did the bravest thing possible; we retired slowly, disputing the enemy's advance. Our caisson had got clogged between two trees, and, as most of its horses were shot down, and the enemy pressing upon it, we were compelled to abandon it. But the cannon must be saved. Captain Trumbull waved his sword, and called on the men around him to help drag it off. As many seized hold of it as could, including Lieut. Crosley, Sergeant Abernethy, and the sergeant who commanded the artillery squad. It was with great difficulty that it was got away, and three men were shot while hold of it.
Colonel Scott who had been in the advance during the fight, was still nearest the enemy in the retreat. Two or three times he endeavored, but without success, to re-form the regiment before getting out of the timber. These efforts sadly demonstrated the advantages accruing in battle from good discipline among troops. We had been too little accustomed to implicit obedience of orders, and the tyrannical conduct of Colonel Williams had exerted a bad influence on us in this respect. Under the Colonel's direction, however, a number of men, mostly members of Companies E and F, rallied; these to the flag, their Company's colors, presented to them by the ladies of Fayette county, Iowa, and now borne by the gallant Lakin, one of their number; those to their former captain, Scott, who lingered near the enemy, so loth was he to give up the field. They formed a platoon across the road and drove back the enemy's cavalry which attempted to charge our rear in pursuit.
As soon as we reached the open ground, the battalion was again formed. It was now nearly night. The enemy would not attack us on open ground, and we would not venture to attack him again in his ambuscade. Accordingly we began to retire toward Liberty. We soon met Colonel Smith's advance of mounted men. A brief consultation ensued, and then the march was resumed, and we soon reached our camp on the hill, where we had bivouacked in the morning.
[CHAPTER X.]
Arrival of Smith—His march from the Railroad—Why he arrived too late—Our feelings on his arrival—The situation the morning after the battle—What should have been done—Smith starts for St. Joseph—Burying the dead and caring for the wounded—Scott's official report—Comments on the same—Gallantry of Scott and Lakin—Official report of the enemy—Estimate of his force—Account in the Missouri Republican—Account in Pollard's First Year of the War—The necessity and merits of the battle.
Col. Smith's command arrived a little after sunset. He had left Platte City at eight in the morning, and had taken a route so circuitous that his men estimated the distance of the day's march at twenty-six miles; whereas, it could have been accomplished in fifteen. He had left Platte river bridge Sunday at nine in the morning. It was seven miles further from that point to Liberty than from Cameron. He had six hours the start of Colonel Scott in pursuit of the rebels. He had plenty of transportation; we had to impress ours. The roads were no more muddy with him than with us. In fact, they were not muddy to any degree; only a little slippery, and by noon of the next day were completely dry. He had twelve companies of infantry, four pieces of cannon and one company of dragoons of the regular army. He had left three companies of the Thirty-ninth Ohio to guard the bridge. With this force he could not hesitate to follow the enemy closely; but at no time did he get within a day's march of his main force. He took a circuitous route, and bore so far to the west that it has even been averred that he retreated from two o'clock of one day till eight o'clock of the next, expecting that the enemy was following him. It seems, however, that his system of scouts was so poor (if indeed he had any at all), that he knew nothing of the movements of the enemy's main body, and that the rebels' rear guard, Childs' battalion of three hundred cavalry, led him around over the country, while their infantry, artillery, and long wagon train of plunder were making their escape. In this movement, Smith displayed neither skill nor decision. No sufficient reason can be given why he did not reach Liberty as soon as we, or, at least, soon enough to co-operate with us.
It is impossible to tell with what feelings we thought of our being compelled to fight the battle alone, and to suffer a defeat, which might entail disgrace, because this officer had been so tardy in his support. In this state of feeling, we clamored loudly and with curses, to be led back against the enemy. But Colonel Smith decided to defer a renewal of the attack till morning, and his exhausted troops in the meantime took quarters in the court house and other buildings.