This report is doubtless a second-hand affair. Prisoners since captured informed us that General Atchison was not in the battle at all—but on the south side of the river; that the battle was fought by Colonel Saunders against his orders, for which this officer was court martialed, but acquitted. If we accept certain assertions known to be false, and make due allowance for the bombastic style of this report, and the border ruffian proclivities of its author, it speaks louder for us than anything else can. It confesses the rebel force to have been three regiments, two of infantry under Saunders and Patton, and one of cavalry under Wilfley; and two battalions, one of cavalry under Childs, and one (the arm not given) under Boyd, and one battery under Kelly; which being just recruited and with full ranks, could not have fallen far short of four thousand men.

The following account of Blue Mills is from the St. Louis Republican:

"The rebel forces under Patton, numbering some four thousand five hundred, evacuated St. Joseph on the 12th September, and retreated in the direction of Lexington. On the succeeding Monday, an expedition under Lieut. Col. Scott, left Cameron on the Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad with orders to co-operate with Col. Smith in the pursuit of the secession soldiers.

"The column of Lieut. Col. Scott was composed of five hundred men of the Iowa Third Regiment, a small detachment of Home Guards, and artillerists to work one gun, making five hundred and seventy in the aggregate. Simultaneously with the movements of these troops from Cameron, Colonel Smith of the Illinois Sixteenth, with two companies of Colonel Groesbeck's Thirty-ninth Ohio and four pieces, left St. Joseph. Both columns were ordered to Liberty, there to effect a junction and combine their forces. Lieut. Col. Scott, it appears, reached Liberty on the 17th inst., at 7 o'clock in the morning, and waited for the arrival of Colonel Smith until one o'clock in the afternoon. The latter not having got up, Colonel Scott sent back a messenger, stating that he would push forward after the enemy, whose camp was about five miles distant, which was accordingly done. Boyd and Patton with, as we stated, about four thousand five hundred men, were occupying a position in a thicket near Blue Mills Landing. The following statement is furnished of what transpired:

"Our skirmishers received a galling fire and slowly retired to the main body, when the action became general. Our six pounder was brought to bear on the enemy, and two shots fired which proved destructive. At this time a heavy fire was opened upon our single gun, killing one gunner and wounding two others. On this, several of the remaining gunners (Germans), abandoned their gun, carrying off the primer and fuses, rendering the piece useless. The action continued for an hour, when the column was slowly withdrawn, bringing off the wounded and dragging away the gun by hand—all the horses having been killed or badly wounded. In addition to the loss of the Third Iowa, there were six Home Guards and one artillery man killed. Four of these Home Guards were killed in a skirmish about two hours before the battle. Three of the missing are supposed to be in the hands of the enemy and the balance killed.

"It seems that Colonel Smith, owing to the heavy rains and consequent bad roads, had been greatly delayed on the route, and his failure to join Lieut. Col. Scott is attributable to these causes. On the receipt, however, of Col. Scott's message, he immediately ordered his cavalry and mounted men to the front, and took them forward at a rapid pace. On his arrival at Liberty after dark, he found Scott there after having been repulsed by overwhelming numbers of the enemy. The men were exhausted, and as the enemy were reported strongly intrenched, it was resolved to postpone an attack until morning. Lieut. Col. Wilson reached Liberty with the infantry two hours after Colonel Smith.

"Early on the following morning, the 18th, the combined forces moved forward; but, on reaching Blue Mills Landing, found that the rebels had crossed the river and eluded them, the last detachment having gone over at two o'clock in the morning. They had been two days taking their baggage and stores across, and with a ferry boat and three flats found it comparatively easy to take their men over, especially as the Missouri is quite narrow at that point. Thus Boyd, Patton, and their army escaped. The loss of the rebels in the engagement of the 17th is not known. But from the desperation with which the Iowa boys fought, it must have been considerable. It seems that these soldiers had been somewhat chagrined at what was termed their flight at Shelbina, although that retreat was reluctant and under orders. They determined on the first opportunity to show that they were not cowards, and this feeling it was, doubtless, that actuated Lieut. Col. Scott to push forward without waiting for Col. Smith's column. It was not of course intended that either command was to attack the vastly superior force of the enemy unsupported; and in this respect the conduct of Lieut. Col. Scott was unauthorized, though we do not hear of any disposition to attach any blame to him. His object, seeing that the enemy was making preparations to cross the river, was probably to draw him out and retreat before him in expectation of meeting a timely reinforcement from Col. Smith. It appears that Col. Smith left St. Joseph previous to the receipt of the full orders which were for him, after the contemplated cutting off of Boyd and Patton from Lexington, to move on himself to the latter place. These directions reaching St. Joseph subsequent to Col. Smith's departure, were sent after him by a mounted officer, who returned without having overtaken Col. Smith, and consequently without having delivered his orders. The reader, therefore, who has supposed that Col. Smith had moved to join Col. Mulligan, at Lexington, will be disappointed to learn that in his report to General Pope, he speaks of being about to return to St. Joseph."

As this book is intended to be an amusement to my comrades, I give the version of our first battle which I find in a book entitled The First Year of the War, written by one of the most distinguished men of the South, Edward A. Pollard, of Richmond, author of Black Diamonds, and editor of the Richmond Examiner. I give it out of curiosity, and to illustrate what complete falsehood and nonsense may sometimes be dignified by the name of history:

"Gen. Price was informed that four thousand men under Lane and Montgomery were advancing from the direction of St. Joseph on the north side of the Missouri river, and Gen. Sturgis, with fifteen hundred cavalry was also advancing from the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad for the purpose of relieving the forces under Mulligan. About twenty-five hundred Missourians under the immediate command of Colonel Saunders, were, at the same time hurrying to the aid of Gen. Price from the same direction with the Lane and Montgomery jayhawks; and having reached Blue Mills, thirty miles above Lexington, on the 17th of September, crossed over their force, except some five hundred men, in a ferry-boat. While the remainder were waiting to cross over, the jayhawkers attacked the five hundred Missourians on the north bank of the river. The battle raged fiercely for one hour on the river bottom, which was heavily timbered and in many places covered with water. The Missourians were armed with only shotguns and rifles, and taken by surprise: no time was given them to call back any portion of their force on the south side of the river; but they were from the counties contiguous to Kansas, accustomed in the border wars since 1854 to almost monthly fights with the Kansas jayhawkers under Lane, and were fired with the most intense hatred of him and of them. Gen. D. R. Atchison, former President of the United States Senate, and well known as one of the boldest leaders of the State Rights party in Missouri, had been sent from Lexington to hasten them on to his camp. He was with the five hundred, on the north side of the river when they were attacked, and by his presence and example cheered them on in the conflict. Charging the jayhawkers with shouts of almost savage ferocity, and fighting with reckless valor, the Missourians drove the enemy back ten miles, the conflict becoming a hand to hand fight between detached parties on both sides. At length, being unable to support the fearful fire of the Missourians at the short distance of forty yards, the enemy broke into open flight. The loss of the jayhawkers was very considerable. Their official report admitted one hundred and fifty killed and some two hundred wounded. The entire loss of the Missourians was five killed and twenty wounded. The intelligence of this brilliant victory of the 'five hundred' was received with shouts of acclamation by Price's army at Lexington."

And now, should we approve Blue Mills? I answer unhesitatingly, yes. Some have pronounced it a piece of unpardonable rashness. But one more glance at the situation; the enemy crossing the river; every reason for believing there was a diversion on the other side; the absolute duty of co-operating with it; the certainty that in this event his forces would be divided by the river; the almost certain nearness of support; the consciousness that to attack, though defeated by overwhelming numbers, would be honorable, and that to fail to do so on any pretext would be a disgrace; these were the motives which decided Scott. Who but a coward would have done differently? But what is more, Scott well knew, as most of his officers and men afterwards confessed, that, after Kirksville and Shelbina, to allow this opportunity of a battle to pass, would have thrown the regiment into a state of demoralization. But I will not seek further to justify an act of which scarcely a man complained. All felt that the battle was a necessity, and that the only one to blame was the hesitating, halting commander who had left us to fight it without support.