Recollections with the Third Iowa Regiment

by Seymour D. Thompson

The conflagration raged unabated till midnight, when the long roll beat in all the camps. The men sprang from their sleep, gathered their arms and accoutrements and fell in line. Presently an orderly came along with an order for roll-call to be had in each company, and the absentees noted and reported to head quarters. It is due to the good name of our regiment, to say that but two men were found absent at this time. Indeed, it would be an unusual thing, when camped in the vicinity of a large city, for a sudden midnight roll-call to find all the men in their quarters.

Comrades, I have pictured this scene as we saw and heard it. If it was right for soldiers to behave thus, let no one be ashamed that those who did so belonged to the 4th Division. If it was wrong, as the guilty ones are unknown, the disgrace falls upon us in common. That many justified it who did not participate in it, can not be denied. It is equally true, that many denounced it.

Let us give both sides a fair hearing. Those who justified it said, that when the place was captured on the 20th by Van Dorn, the women insulted our comrades who had surrendered, firing pistols and throwing bricks at them. There was not a Union man in the city. It had been in the past, and if not destroyed, would be in the future, a rendezvous for the enemy. Every family would give him aid; every roof would give him comfort. We had tried the kid glove policy and it had failed. Our enemies were traitors to a Government, the noblest in the world, and which had never wronged them. They were neither legitimate nor honorable enemies. We must teach them that we looked upon their treason as a crime. Had we left our homes and all the comforts of life, and come here to guard rebel property? If the contrary policy were adopted, the rebels would soon yield. They would not endure to see their property destroyed and their families brought to distress. Desertion would soon disorganize their armies, and leave us no more fighting to do.

On the other hand, it was said the war should be conducted honorably and according to the rules of warfare among civilized nations. War had its reciprocal justice; and we should not do to our enemies what we would not expect them to do to us, under like circumstances. The enemy was a traitor; that was true; but he was also a formidable power; and if we were to carry on the war with violence and outrage, he could and would retaliate. Until we had shown ourselves able to destroy the rebel hosts in the field, we should not direct our warfare against the women and children. All the advantages we had gained over the enemy had been gained by bravery in battle; not by cruelty elsewhere. Violence was not vigor. Energy in prosecuting the war, did not imply cruelty toward those whom its fortunes had placed in our hands. Let us march against the enemy's armies; defeat, pursue and destroy them. Then would the world applaud our valor. And, if we protected the unarmed, the helpless and innocent, it would applaud our magnanimity. If the contrary policy were adopted,—if we burned down over their heads the homes of women and children; if we left them shelterless in mid-winter and without food;—if we thus turned a deaf ear to the common appeals of humanity, what sympathy could we expect from civilized nations? How, under such circumstances, could we expect neutrality from them, to say nothing of friendship? It would exasperate our enemies in arms to new vigor as well as to new cruelty; it would cause non-combatants to take up arms, and bring against us foreign powers. Thus would we be overwhelmed with our own wickedness and folly.

But, more than this, respect for our duties as soldiers,—respect for the oath we had taken, should restrain us from violating the positive and repeated orders of our commanding generals. If the Government chose to inaugurate the policy of burning and laying waste, and we were commanded to execute it, we would obey; the responsibility would not be ours. We had enlisted, not to be the Government, but to serve it; and until we were commanded to commit such acts, our moral instincts should teach us to refrain from committing them. That our generals had been compelled to issue orders admonishing us against such conduct, was itself a humiliation. Every soldier in our ranks should understand the dignity of his mission, and feel that the cause of civilization needs not the weapons of barbarism for its defense.

When the morning came the conflagration had not ceased; but, from hour, to hour the flames continued to break out in different places in the suburbs of the city. At 10 A. M., we received orders to prepare to march immediately. Our wagons were soon loaded and sent forward, and the troops were called into line. But trains of cars continued to arrive and depart, loaded to their utmost capacity with negro women and children. Still we were kept in line, doubtless with the object of preventing a further destruction of the city. It was not till eight o'clock at night that we began to move. The roads were slippery and deep with mud. There was no moon in the early part of the night, and our only light was the conflagration, still raging behind us, and the blaze of burning fences and buildings on either hand. It was nearly midnight, when we reached Cold Water, and halted for rest and sleep.

Early in the morning, we took up the march on the Moscow road. We passed a camp of cavalry north of the stream as we crossed it,—all that now remained of the invading army fronting the enemy in Mississippi. And here we could not help but contrast our present feelings with those with which we had entered upon the campaign. Then in Virginia, in Middle Tennessee, and with us in Mississippi,—everywhere victory seemed preparing. Now, looking around us, we saw how our dream of victory and peace had vanished. Defeated at Fredericksburg; repulsed at Vicksburg; a hard earned, fruitless victory at Murfreesborough,—checked everywhere except in Mississippi, and here we had retreated.

But when we began to look at the chief difficulties of the campaign,—that of keeping open two to three hundred miles of railroad communication in the face of a bold and enterprising enemy, it was not so much a surprise to us that it had proved a failure, as that it had been undertaken at all. Our only source of hope now was, that Grant would undertake the capture of Vicksburg by the more practicable route of the Mississippi.

The road was well beaten by previous columns of troops, and a vigorous march brought us to Wolf River, where we passed the night. In the morning we crossed the river and went into camp around Moscow, relieving a part of Logan's division.