"Sir, we have got to trust somebody. We must either leave this matter to the discretion and judgment and sense of honor of the officers of the railroad companies, or we must trust the commission and the courts of the country to protect the people against unjust discrimination and extortion on the part of the common carriers. Is it the President of the United States as against a corporation? Is it an honest commission honestly selected by the President of the United States as against a railroad company? I say that there are not those inducements to be placed in the hands of a set of men selected for their integrity, selected for their ability, selected for their capacity to regulate railroads and enforce the law, that are left in the hands of the officers of the railroad companies themselves.
"I take it that there is somebody honest in this country, and that the President, if this bill becomes a law, will select the broadest gauge men, the men highest in integrity and intelligence as the men to enforce this law as against the corporations and as a go- between, if you please, between the shippers and the railroads of the country. I am willing to trust them. If they are not honest the President has the right to remove them; and if the shipper is unwilling to submit to their judgment, under the bill he has a right to go directly to the courts. I say that there is not anything that can be done by these corporations against individuals where the shipper himself has not a right to get into court in some way or other, if he is not willing to abide by the decision of the commissioners appointed by the President."
The conference report was adopted by a vote of thirty-seven yeas to twelve nays; but it was a rather significant fact that there were twenty-six absent, including Senators Aldrich, Dawes, Evarts, Morgan, and some of the most bitter opponents of railroad regulation.
The provisions of the Act of 1887 are too well known to need any recital here. In a word, it was partly declaratory of the common law, its essential features being that railroad charges must be reasonable; that there must be no discriminations between persons and no preference between localities; railroads were prohibited from charging less for a long haul than for a shorter haul, "included within it under substantially similar circumstances"; pooling was prohibited; and a commission was established with power to hear and decide complaints, to make investigations and reports, and generally to see to the enforcement of the Act.
Considering the abuses that existed, the Act of 1887 was conservative legislation, but in Congress and among the people generally it was considered radical, until the courts robbed it by judicial construction of much of its intended force. During the debates, Senators remarked that never in the history of governments was a bill under consideration which would inevitably affect directly or remotely so great financial and industrial interests. It marked the beginning of a new era in the management of the railway business of the United States. It was the beginning of Governmental regulation which has finally culminated in the legislation of the Sixty-first Congress. And it is no little satisfaction to me to say that the fundamental principles of the original Act of 1887 have been retained in all subsequent acts. No one has seriously advocated that the fundamental principles of the Act of 1887 be changed, and subsequent legislation has been built upon it.
After the passage of the original Act of 1887, a permanent Interstate Committee of the Senate, of which I had the honor to be chairman, and in which position I remained for many years, was created. It was a very active committee at first. Necessarily, amendments were made to the law, and the railroads generally observed the law in good faith. Even the long-and-short-haul clause was observed, as it was intended by Congress that it should be. That is, the railroads did not set up at first that competition would create a dissimilarity of conditions and circumstances so as to justify them in charging more for the short haul than for the long haul. But it was not many years before the railroads attacked first one and then another provision of the law, and they generally secured favorable decisions from the courts. I do not intend to go into the details of these decisions, the last one being the decision in the case which held that the Commission had no power to fix a future rate, because the act did not give it that express power. My own judgment is, and was at the time, that the original act by implication did give to the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to say after complaint and hearing, and after a given rate had been declared to be unreasonable, what in that case would be a reasonable rate; but the courts decided otherwise. Immediately, I drew up and introduced a bill, number 1439, of the Fifty-sixth Congress, and had it referred to the Committee on Interstate Commerce. This bill contained provisions substantially the same as were contained in the Hepburn Bill which passed the Senate in 1906. And in addition it was designed to give effect to the provisions of the original act which had been nullified by judicial construction. I worked my hardest to secure a favorable report of this bill. We had many hearings; but the Committee on Interstate Commerce, far from being in favor of favorably reporting the bill, were inclined to decline to allow me to report it to the Senate at all. I insisted that I would report it even though adversely, which I was finally permitted to do. But when reported to the Senate I stated that I reported it adversely because a majority of the committee were against it, but that I favored the bill personally, and would do what I could to secure its passage. This was in the year 1899.
It was not until seven years later that public sentiment was aroused to such an extent that it was possible to secure the amendments to the Act of 1887 which were embodied in Senate bill 1439.
I think it is only justice to myself to say—and I say it with much regret—that there were two reasons why it was impossible to secure at that time the report and passage of Senate bill 1439. First of all, the Executive did not manifest any special interest in securing additional railroad regulation. Secondly, the railroads themselves had been very active in securing a change of the personnel of the Committee on Interstate Commerce, and men had been elected to the Senate and placed on that committee whose sympathies were in favor of very conservative regulation, if any regulation at all. The railroads had firmly determined to stop any further railroad regulation. And finally, in the make-up of the Committee, a majority of the Senators placed on the Committee on Interstate Commerce were men whose sympathies were with the railroads.
But even with the personnel of the committee made up against me, I have thought that had the late President McKinley given me the active support which he could have given, I could have secured, in 1899, practically all the legislation that was secured six years later. It is only justice to ex-President Roosevelt to say that had it not been for his earnest advocacy of railroad rate regulation the Hepburn Bill would never have been passed. With a chairman of the Committee on Interstate Commerce well known for his conservatism on the subject, with a majority of Republicans on the committee in sympathy with him, without the arousing of public sentiment by President Roosevelt, nothing would have been done.
I continued to take an exceptionally active part in railroad regulation until I was placed at the head of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, and even afterwards I remained as the ranking member, next to the Chairman, of the Committee on Interstate Commerce, where I was glad to further as best I could such measures as came before the Committee in the way of strengthening and giving force to the original act.