The first problem which confronted me was this: The fourth section of the Dingley Act provided that such treaties should be made only within two years after the passage of the act; the two years had long since expired—could the Senate ratify them at all?

I submitted to the Senate a report on the constitutional question.
The single question covered was, whether the treaties not having
been ratified by the Senate within the two years specified in the
Dingley Act were still within its jurisdiction.

The committee determined that the President and the Senate are, under the Constitution, the treaty-making power. The initiative lies with the President. He can negotiate such treaties as may seem to him wise, and propose them to the Senate for the advice and consent of that body. The power of the President and the Senate is derived from the Constitution. There is under our Constitution no other source of treaty-making power. The Congress is without power to grant to the President or to the Senate any authority with respect to treaties; nor does the Congress possess any power to fetter or limit in any way the President or the Senate in the exercise of this constitutional function. It cannot in any way enlarge, limit, or attach conditions to the treaty-making power, and the subcommittee concluded their report on this branch of the subject with this statement:

"The committee is clearly of the opinion that nothing contained in section four of the Dingley Act constitutes any valid restriction upon the jurisdiction and power of the Senate to act upon the commercial treaties now pending."

That question being disposed of to my satisfaction, I proceeded to urge the consideration of the treaties at every meeting of the committee for many months, but it was not until June, 1902, that I secured the favorable report of all the treaties, excepting the treaty with the Argentine Republic and that with Jamaica.

There was another very serious question which I raised myself, and that was, whether legislation was necessary to carry them into effect, or whether the treaties were self-executing. None of the treaties contained any provision for legislation, and by their terms, they would go into effect without legislation. John A. Kasson, who negotiated them, told me that he purposely left out any reference to legislative action, because the executive department had serious doubts on the subject, and preferred to permit the Senate itself to pass upon it.

I have always contended that reciprocity treaties, like other treaties in general, are self-executing, if by their terms they do not provide for legislative action.

I made a very extended address in the Senate on January 29, 1902, because I wanted to get the attention of the Senate to this important constitutional subject. I said in opening:

"Has Congress any power or authority, under the Constitution, over treaties? This subject has been discussed at different times during our entire Constitutional history. It is a very complicated question, not only because the authority of the House on the subject of treaties has been disputed and argued almost from the very adoption of the Constitution, but the fourth section of the Dingley Act specifically provides how and when such treaties shall be made. . . . In my opinion the fourth section of the Dingley Act, so far as it attempts to confer, limit, or define the treaty-making power is not only an unwarranted interference with the powers of the President and Senate, but is unconstitutional, because it comes in conflict with that clause of the Constitution which says that the President shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to make treaties. No law of Congress can in any way modify or limit those powers. The Dingley Law can not limit the time in which we shall be allowed to make a treaty; it can not give to Congress any power on the subject of treaties not given it by the Constitution, and under the Constitution Congress as a legislative body is not a part of the treaty-making power."

I contended that the fourth section of the Dingley Act, if considered by the Executive at all, should be merely as an expression of the views of Congress in the adjustment of the specific terms of each treaty.