The Cuban reciprocity treaty has increased very materially our trade with that Republic. Since that treaty went into effect our imports from Cuba have increased from $62,942,000 in value to $122,528,000 in value; and our exports to Cuba have increased from $21,000,000 in 1903, to nearly $53,000,000 in 1910, or more than doubled. But even with this considerable increase in our exports to Cuba, I had hoped that by this time we should have increased them to at least one hundred million dollars. Our own exporters and manufacturers are at fault, because they will not do business with the Cubans on the same credit basis as will the exporters of Spain, Germany, and England; and American exporters do not cater to the peculiar needs of the Cubans. They seem to go on the theory that if their goods are good enough for Americans they should be good enough for Cubans, too.
The Cuban treaty is a good illustration of the scare and the unwarranted opposition on the part of American industries when even the slightest reduction of the tariff is attempted. To listen to the beet-sugar and tobacco interests during the consideration of the Cuban treaty, one would think they would have been absolutely ruined if the treaty were ratified. The Cuban treaty has not in the slightest degree injuriously affected the American sugar or tobacco interests.
The principle of Reciprocity as heretofore applied in this country has been extended somewhat by the agreement of 1911 between the United States and Canada. This compact was negotiated by President Taft and Secretary Knox on the one side, and by Premier Laurier and Mr. Fielding on the other. Under this agreement a wide exchange of articles of every-day use is provided for, and it is hoped and believed that if the treaty becomes effective it will prove more satisfactory and enduring than the previous reciprocal agreement with the Dominion of Canada.
The pending agreement was entered into between representatives of the two Governments in January, 1911, but it was not until the latter part of July of that year that a law was enacted by Congress to provide for its enforcement. Much opposition was manifested, especially in the Senate, in both the Sixty-first and Sixty-second Congresses, on the ground that under its terms a great many agricultural products are admitted free from Canada; but this objection has been, I think, successfully met by the Administration and its friends in the argument that any injury that might be sustained by agriculture would be more than compensated for by the benefits derived by the manufacturing interests. For one I have never believed that agriculture would suffer in any degree through the operation of the agreement, and I do believe that the general industries of the country will experience much benefit. Too much is to be gained through the cultivation of proper trade relations with our great and growing neighbor on the North to abandon the general principle involved in the agreement on account of an apprehension which may not and probably will not be realized.
In many respects nations are like individuals, and in their relations with one another they should be controlled by the same rules of amity and equity as pertain to the associations of mankind generally. In the end no nation can lose any material thing through an act of generosity or fair-dealing.
Notwithstanding the United States has acted favorably upon the agreement, it is not yet in force. This circumstance is due to the fact that in the matter of ratification Canada has waited upon this country. There is opposition there as there was here, and at this writing (August, 1911) Sir Wilfred Laurier is engaged in a struggle for favorable endorsement such as that from which President Taft has just emerged.
CHAPTER XXV THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL
Probably the most important work before the Committee on Foreign Relations since the treaty of peace with Spain, were the several treaties concerning the construction of the Isthmian Canal.
In 1850, the United States entered into what is known as the Clayton- Bulwer Treaty with Great Britain, the purpose of which was to facilitate the construction of a canal; but instead of operating to this end, it stood for fifty years or more as an effectual barrier against the construction by the United States of any canal across the Isthmus of Panama. Succeeding Administrations had endeavored to secure the consent of Great Britain to its abrogation, but it was not until Secretary Hay's time that Great Britain finally agreed to annul it and substitute in its place a new treaty. Secretary Hay had been Ambassador to Great Britain, and he enjoyed the confidence of the then existing British Ministry to a greater degree than almost any minister or ambassador we have ever sent to Great Britain. After entering the State Department, Mr. Hay at once directed his attention to the making of a new treaty with Great Britain and this resulted in the first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. This convention was considered by the committee, but was not found satisfactory, and certain amendments were added to it. These amendments Great Britain would not accept, and the treaty died.
Secretary Hay was very much disappointed, but he at once set to work to negotiate such a treaty as would go through the Senate without amendment and such a one as Great Britain would consent to. He wrote to a number of Senators, members of the committee, I suppose, asking for suggestions as to just what the Senate would agree to. I was not at that time chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, but I was very deeply interested in the subject and had given it considerable study and thought. Secretary Hay wrote me, and I replied at length, giving my views both as to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and what I thought should be inserted in the new treaty.