John G. Carlisle was appointed Secretary of the Treasury. He had been seven times elected to Congress and three times Speaker. He resigned his seat in the House, having been elected as a member of the Senate from Kentucky, and remained in the Senate until he resigned to accept the position of Secretary of the Treasury under Cleveland.

Mr. Carlisle was in entire harmony with the President on the tariff and also on the monetary questions—and, indeed, I remark here that Mr. Carlisle had very much to do toward the defeat of Mr. Bryan in 1896. Although a life-long Democrat himself, he believed that Mr. Bryan's theories on the monetary question would ruin the country, and he stood with Mr. Cleveland in opposing his election. Had Cleveland, Carlisle, and other patriotic Gold Democrats stood with their party, Mr. Bryan would probably have been elected and the history of this country would have been written differently.

After Mr. Cleveland's election, our industrial conditions became so depressed—and it was alleged by many that the cause for this was the Sherman Coinage Act of 1890—that a special session of Congress was called to meet August 7, 1893. The President said in his message to this Congress:

"The existence of an alarming and extraordinary business situation, involving the welfare and prosperity of all our people, has constrained me to call in extra session the people's representatives in Congress, to the end that through a wise and patriotic exercise fo the legislative duty with which they are solely charged, present evils may be mitigated and danger threatening the future may be averted. . . . With plenteous crops, with abundant promise of remunerative production and manufacture, with unusual invitation to safe investment, and with satisfactory returns to business enterprise, suddenly financial fear and distrust have sprung up on every side. . . . Values supposed to be fixed are fast becoming conjectural, and loss and failure have involved every branch of business. I believe these things are principally chargeable to Congressional legislation touching the purchase and coinage of silver by the general Government."

And Mr. Cleveland earnestly recommended the prompt repeal of the
Sherman Coinage Act of 1890.

The extra session continued until October 30, when the Sherman Act was finally repealed.

But the repeal of the Sherman Act did not at all remedy industrial conditions. It was not the Sherman Act that was at fault, but the well-grounded fear on the part of our manufacturers of the passage of a free trade measure. The panic commenced, it is true, under the McKinley Bill, but it was the direct result of what the business interests felt sure was to come; and that was the passage of a Democratic Tariff act.

The year 1893 closed with the prices of many products at the lowest ever known, with many workers seeking in vain for work, and with charity laboring to keep back suffering and starvation in all our cities. And yet, in view of the condition, Mr. Cleveland sent to Congress at the beginning of the annual session a free trade message, advocating the repeal of the McKinley Act and the passage of a Democratic free trade, or Tariff for Revenue, measure. From the tone of this message, however, he seems to have changed somewhat from his message of 1887; yet it was strong enough to startle the business interests, and make more widespread financial panic.

Speaker Crisp at once proceeded to the formation of the committees of the House, and particularly the Committee on Ways and Means.

I was naturally anxious concerning our industries in Illinois, and I wanted one of our strongest Illinois Representatives placed on that committee. I happened to enjoy particularly friendly relations with Mr. Crisp, he having been a House conferee on the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, and I felt quite free to call upon him. After looking over the Illinois delegation, I came to the conclusion that the Hon. A. J. Hopkins, my late colleague in the Senate, and who was then serving in the House, was the very best man he could select for that place. I urged Mr. Crisp to appoint him, saying that he was capable of doing more and better work on the committee than any other man in the delegation. Crisp was very nice about it, and whether he did it on my recommendation or not I do not know; but he appointed Hopkins. Senator Hopkins was, during his service on that committee, regarded as one of its leading members, and had a prominent part in framing the Dingley tariff. He served in the House until elected to the Senate, where he remained for six years. Senator Hopkins is an able man, and was constantly growing in influence and power in the Senate. He was an agreeable colleague, and I regretted very much indeed that he was not re- elected.