Presidio of San Francisco,
31 October 1811
JOSÉ ARGÜELLO’S ATTACK ON AN INDIAN VILLAGE, 1813
The excerpt below is apparently a direct quotation, although there are no quotation marks in the transcript.
José Argüello to Governor Arrillaga
San Francisco, October 31, 1813
(Prov. St. Pap., XIX: 334-348)
On the 22nd of the month now ending ten soldiers left this Presidio and embarked in one of the launches of the near-by mission of San Francisco in order to join Master Sergeant Francisco Soto. He left San José Mission the same day with two soldiers and 100 Indian auxiliaries for the purpose of capturing the fugitives from the above-mentioned mission of San José. Having united on the 25th with the troops which set sail from here the 22nd, he navigated the rivers all the night of the 25th, hiding as soon as day dawned on the 26th so as not to be detected.
The following night they continued and at dawn of the 27th they fell upon the village where the fugitives were located.[62] This was on a quite large island, very brush and swamp. Nevertheless they were observed long before they arrived because the fugitive Indians, informed many days previously that the soldiers were going in search of them, gathered together the people of four villages throughout the area and sent out their spies and scouts in all directions from which they suspected they might be surprised. They segregated at the same time all the women and children who could act as a hindrance to them and held all the warriors to await the troops. As a result, when the troops arrived they encountered a stubborn resistance, for they were opposed on all sides by innumerable Indians who were waiting, fully prepared.
According to Soto’s estimate, there might have been over 1,000 warriors. The latter attacked with such fury that all the valor of the soldiers was necessary in order to repulse them. This was accomplished by heavy fire, the hostile Indians maintaining their offensive for a long time and holding their position on all sides without perceiving the damage which their obstinacy caused them. They were confident perhaps in their own great number and the small number of soldiers and Indian auxiliaries with whom they were contending, as well as the advantages provided them by the terrain. Soto for a while saw victory as uncertain, because of the large number of adversaries, and the multitude of arrows which flew at them, while at the same time the enemy showed only obstinate resistance. Finally the savages recognized that the resistance was merely a danger to themselves and decided to retreat. Then, although Soto pursued them in their flight for a long time he gained no decision because of the difficulties of the terrain, where it was necessary in places to walk in water up to the knees. The Indians were much favored by very close thickets in which they could hide. Although they were dislodged from that place, the river was very near and they all jumped in to swim, some crossing to the opposite island, others hiding in the dense tule swamps where they could not be followed. For this reason it was not possible to capture anyone.
The enemy was left badly beaten and adequately punished for his boldness, for the battle was very costly, and in the action a considerable number were killed. On our part only one of the Indian auxiliaries died, a man named Julio, whom they seriously wounded but who got back without being captured by our opponents. This loss, compared with that suffered by the enemy and considered with reference to the very limited number who broke them and cut them to pieces, makes it reasonable to consider the outcome favorable, particularly in view of the poor chances attending a campaign with such unequal numbers and with such advantages in terrain for the savages. Thus the troops had to stand waiting for the enemy, and at the same time watch their footing on ground so muddy and swampy that in places the water came above their knees. This in turn made the savages more desperate in their attack because they encouraged each other by saying (as the Indian auxiliaries interpreted them) that the soldiers were worth nothing on foot, that they knew how to fight only on horseback. But they came out very disillusioned for they found that [the soldiers] fought on foot the same as on horseback and that their weapons were invincible, regardless of style.
At the end of the attack, which lasted for three hours, retirement was accomplished from this place on the afternoon of the same day, the 27th. Again all the people were embarked and, after landing on the mainland of San José, the Indian auxiliaries took up their march toward that mission under the care of two soldiers. Soto continued his journey by water with the remaining troops and the Indian oarsmen as far as the Presidio, where he arrived on the evening of the 28th....[63]
... Worthy of praise, as Soto himself declared to me, are the Indian auxiliaries who accompanied him by virtue of their obedience and the valor with which they threw themselves into the most dangerous parts of the battle—without showing any cowardice.[64]