In principle the Assiout Barrage is exactly the same as that at the point of the Delta, and the difficulties of construction were also exactly similar, for in both cases the foundations had to be laid on the same shifting sands, and as each section of the work was undertaken a portion of the river had to be diverted from its course by means of temporary earthen dams. The shifting nature of the river-bed, the almost personal malignity of the water, constantly bursting through in countless springs, each of which had to be separately dealt with and suppressed, called forth the highest exercise of engineering skill. But the experience gained in the long struggle with the imperfections of the earlier Barrage infallibly told its tale. Every difficulty was successfully encountered, and the Assiout Barrage was completed by the summer of 1902, and was able to hold up the 10 feet of water required of it, without any failure, at the first attempt.
The visible part of this Barrage, which is just over half a mile in length, consists of a viaduct or bridge with 111 archways, each 16 feet 5 inches in width, closed by strong iron gates, working in grooves made in the supporting piers, and raised or lowered from above. In contrast to the Delta Barrage, it is built throughout of stone, and not of brick. At the western end is a lock, the largest in Egypt, through which the largest of the boats that ply upon the Nile can easily pass. Below the water lies the strength of the structure. The viaduct rests upon a solid platform of granite and cement, 10 feet deep and 87 feet wide, set at a suitable depth below the bed of the river. As a further precaution against the action of the water, there are also below the platform two continuous lines of iron sheet-piles, with hermetically sealed joints. With such a series of obstacles to encounter, the danger of the water forcing its way through underneath the Barrage is small indeed. The whole amount of masonry used in this Barrage is 220,000 cubic yards.
The prosecution of these great works in Upper Egypt by no means exhausted the activity of the Irrigation Department; indeed, it would almost seem that the building of Barrages has become part of its ordinary routine, for a third remains to be chronicled. This is the Zifta Barrage on the Damietta branch of the Nile, halfway between the point of the Delta and the sea. Because it lies in a district unvisited by tourists, though very important commercially, its construction has not been heralded by any blowing of trumpets. Yet it is a work of the very first class, and deserves to be reckoned among the greatest of the triumphs of the department. Built on the same plan as the Assiout Barrage, and, like it, capable of holding up 10 feet of water, it is designed to secure a better distribution of the supply north of the Delta Barrage. As the area of the cultivated land extended gradually northward, it became apparent that the canal system taking off from above the original Barrage was becoming too long to admit of the water in times of pressure reaching the northernmost parts of the country. There were some who held that a second Barrage, with a new system of canals taking off from it, should have been erected on the Damietta branch, even in preference to the new stone weirs, which have increased the strength and distributing power of the old one. The dispute has been happily settled by the adoption of both projects, and with the Zifta Barrage completed in time for the summer of 1903, and the new supply from Assouan, the reclamation of the northern lands will go steadily forward.
It has been already pointed out that it is almost as important to get the water off the land as to get it on, and the proper drainage of the Delta lands has been the necessary complement of all the new schemes. Though eclipsed by the splendour of the Reservoir and other creations more taking to the eye, the performance of the engineers in this direction during the last few years has been sufficient to make them very memorable in irrigation annals. Since 1896 about 1,000 kilometres of new drains have been dug, and nearly as great a length of existing drains remodelled. It has cost the Egyptian Government close upon a million of money, but that this expenditure has not been thrown away is proved by the great rise in the value of all the lands affected.
The Zifta Barrage cost about £500,000, the Assouan Dam and the Assiout Barrage £3,200,000. Apart from the ordinary expenditure on maintenance and the suppression of the corvée, the twenty years ended 1902 have seen an expenditure of £9,000,000 devoted to irrigation and drainage. There could be no greater proof of the wisdom of those who have directed Egyptian policy during that period. However pressed they have been at different times by demands for immediate expenditure on other objects when resources were low, they have always adhered steadily to a policy of liberality towards public works likely to be of a remunerative character. In no other country do economic laws work out their results with greater directness and certainty. Reproductive expenditure is really worthy of its name, and brings its visible and tangible fruit almost without a moment’s delay. As they have sown, so have they reaped. There can be no comparison between this expenditure and the benefits it has conferred upon Egypt. Three salient examples may be given to point the force of these remarks.
First, the works undertaken by Colonel Ross to improve the system of basin irrigation in Upper Egypt. 1877 was a year of very low flood, and nearly 1,000,000 acres were sharaki—that is, entirely exempted from taxation owing to absence of irrigation. In 1899, a worse year—in fact, the lowest flood of the century—the sharaki lands were no more than 250,000 acres, a result mainly due to the successful reforms carried out by Colonel Ross in 1888-89. 1902 was a year very similar to 1899, and the sharaki acreage was no more than 140,000 acres.
Second, the case of the Assiout Barrage. The work was finished a year before the time named in the contract. On August 15, 1902, the usual date of filling the basins, the flood was exceptionally low, and it was decided to lower the gates of the Barrage. By so doing the water-level of the canals was raised by 1½ metres, an increase which was more than sufficient to avert the threatened disaster. The money value of the crops thus secured to the land-owners of the Fayoum and Middle Egypt is estimated at not less than £600,000. The cost of the new works at Assiout, including the new regulator on the Ibrahimiyah Canal, was about £875,000. Thus, in the first year of their existence they nearly repaid their whole cost, and that, too, as it were, by a sidewind; for the Barrage’s real function is to hold up the river in the low summer season, and not in the flood.
Third, the case of the Assouan Reservoir itself. The summer supply in 1903 has been the lowest on record; the discharge at Assouan has fallen to 200 cubic metres per second. By means of the Reservoir this supply has been actually doubled. Had the flood been late in coming down, it would have been impossible to distribute the water at so liberal a rate. The Soudan gauges gave warning that an early flood was to be expected, and thus the authorities were able to calculate with certainty, and open the sluice-gates with much greater freedom. But the calculation would have been a useless exercise unless there had been a store to draw upon. At the lowest computation the loss avoided may be reckoned at a couple of millions.
The administrators of Egypt have had many difficulties and obstacles in their path, but to be able to point to such results is a great compensation; their efforts need no formal monument.