A. A. BRILL.
New York.
CONTENTS
| CHAPTER | PAGE | |
| Introduction | [v] | |
| I. | Forgetting of Proper Names | [3] |
| II. | Forgetting of Foreign Words | [17] |
| III. | Forgetting of Names and Order of Words | [29] |
| IV. | Childhood and Concealing Memories | [57] |
| V. | Mistakes in Speech | [71] |
| VI. | Mistakes in Reading and Writing | [117] |
| VII. | Forgetting of Impressions and Resolutions | [135] |
| VIII. | Erroneously Carried-out Actions | [177] |
| IX. | Symptomatic and Chance Actions | [215] |
| X. | Errors | [249] |
| XI. | Combined Faulty Acts | [265] |
| XII. | Determinism, Chance, and Superstitious beliefs | [277] |
| Index | [339] |
I
FORGETTING OF PROPER NAMES
During the year 1898 I published a short essay On the Psychic Mechanism of Forgetfulness.[1] I shall now repeat its contents and take it as a starting-point for further discussion. I have there undertaken a psychologic analysis of a common case of temporary forgetfulness of proper names, and from a pregnant example of my own observation I have reached the conclusion that this frequent and practically unimportant occurrence of a failure of a psychic function—of memory—admits an explanation which goes beyond the customary utilization of this phenomenon.
If an average psychologist should be asked to explain how it happens that we often fail to recall a name which we are sure we know, he would probably content himself with the answer that proper names are more apt to be forgotten than any other content of memory. He might give plausible reasons for this “forgetting preference” for proper names, but he would not assume any deep determinant for the process.
I was led to examine exhaustively the phenomenon of temporary forgetfulness through the observation of certain peculiarities, which, although not general, can, nevertheless, be seen clearly in some cases. In these there is not only forgetfulness, but also false recollection: he who strives for the escaped name brings to consciousness others—substitutive names—which, although immediately recognized as false, nevertheless obtrude themselves with great tenacity. The process which should lead to the reproduction of the lost name is, as it were, displaced, and thus brings one to an incorrect substitute.
Now it is my assumption that the displacement is not left to psychic arbitrariness, but that it follows lawful and rational paths. In other words, I assume that the substitutive name (or names) stands in direct relation to the lost name, and I hope, if I succeed in demonstrating this connection, to throw light on the origin of the forgetting of names.