"During the organizing of the company I became acquainted with Captain Zalinski, U. S. A., an expert on heavy artillery. Through Captain Zalinski I met many influential men, who not only helped me with the project in hand at the time, but were largely instrumental in having my boat adopted by the United States Navy.
"At the suggestion of Captain Zalinski the boat was built at Fort Hamilton, as he was stationed there at the time, and, being on the army active list, could not be away from his post of duty. During the time of her construction everything was under his supervision. The boat was fifty feet long, six feet beam, and the hull was constructed of wood. In 1886 the boat was launched. The launching ways ran down from the fort wall to the water's edge. This part of the program was in the hands of a young engineer who had either an insufficient knowledge of the subject or lacked the ability to put his knowledge to practical use. The result was, that when the heavy boat started down the launching ways they suddenly collapsed and she crashed into some piling near the water's edge, tearing out the greater part of her side and bottom.
"On investigation it was found that the cost of repairs would exceed the amount of money still on hand in the company's treasury. Accordingly the wrecked boat was broken up where she lay, the engine and fittings removed and sold, and the proceeds used to partly reimburse the stockholders for the money they had invested. This accident discouraged my company from any further attempts at submarine construction. Had this boat been successful, submarines would have become an accepted success years before they did. This unfortunate incident held me back at least ten years, as it was that long before I was able to secure backing to construct another boat.
"About this time the United States Navy Department was mildly interested in the performances of submarines in France, where they had attained some slight degree of success. The designs for these boats, I am sure, were based on certain fundamental points of my Fenian Ram design. As I have said previously, there were a number of foreign officers present at Delamater's Yard from 1879 to 1881, while the boat was in course of construction, and it is hardly to be expected that they failed to take notes. However, the knowledge they secured did them very little good, because, while they secured a lot of valuable data, their inexperience caused them to disregard the most vital points, with the result that their boats never attained any degree of success. However, I do not wish to convey the impression that the United States Navy Department was at this time considering building submarines as the results of the French experiments; far from it. Had it not been informed of the success of my Fenian Ram, which was far more interesting and wonderful than anything the French had done, and still remained unconvinced? I was totally sick and disgusted with its actions, and was seriously tempted to abandon all further attempts to convince and awake it from its lethargy. About this time I wrote an article, "Can New York be Bombarded?" with the intention of bringing before the public the pitiable condition of our fleet and coast defences, and showing how a few submarines would place us in a position to ward off an enemy's attack from mostly any point on our coast as effectively as if we had an adequate shore defence and a fleet equal to Great Britain's."
The article referred to treats of other types of ships. This is not of interest now, but we quote what he says concerning
"THE SUBMARINE, OR DIVING BOAT
"This boat has a speed of eight miles per hour; she can remain under water for two days, or longer, without having any connection with the surface. She can be steered by compass when under water, and her course may be laid and corrected without obliging her to remain more than a few moments on the surface. This can be done without ever appearing over water. She can move at any required depth, and is more thoroughly under control when completely submerged than when on the surface. Her horizontal and vertical motions are controlled automatically or by the pilot.
"The torpedo, carrying a one-hundred-pound charge, can be projected in a straight line to a distance of eighty or ninety feet, according to the power employed in expelling it. The method of attack will probably be as follows: The diving boat, with only her turret above water, moves toward the ship. When she gets so close that her presence may be discovered, say half a mile, she descends a few feet under the surface. Once or twice, after the bearing of the ship is observed by means of a telescope projected for a few minutes over the water, corrections are made in the course for deviations owing to currents.
"When near the vessel she goes deeper, so as to bring her stem ten or fifteen feet beneath the surface. Netting can thus be avoided. She can now discharge her torpedo, to explode on contact. As soon as this strikes, the explosion occurs and a large hole is torn in the ship's side. The ship will now become unmanageable, and with assistance may be captured. Experience has shown that in a seaway she rolls or pitches very little, apparently following the wave slope in large waves. In short, sharp ones, she seems to rise and fall bodily with very little tendency to pitching.
"A notion seems to prevail that the proper duty of a diving boat would be to carry a diver, who could come out and fasten a torpedo to a ship at anchor, then retire into his boat and move away; also, that it would be useful in placing and removing stationary mines. It is very evident that if a diving boat can attain a speed of ten or twelve miles per hour, fire torpedoes at ships moving at full speed, and keep to sea for days together, her sphere of usefulness would be greatly extended. In fact, there is no insuperable objection to the employment of such vessels for coast defence and operations against ships. Submarine mines are not so effective against them as vessels on the surface, because they can pass them unobserved. They can enter a harbor that may be thoroughly defended, should it be necessary to destroy vessels inside the defences. If those on the fleet become aware of their presence it is more than probable, judging from the action of the French fleet in 1877-78, that the moral effect of the discovery will be that they will feel convinced of the foolishness of awaiting an attack when the time so employed may be more wisely expended in moving to a safe distance, and in getting there at full speed. Thus, in 1886, did I try to show by comparison the superiority of the submarine over the torpedo boats and gunboats, the two arms of defence on which the Navy placed all its confidence at the time."