I asked the old lady if she had ever considered the submarine from another angle of view—viz., as a life and property saver in the present war—and she said, "No; how could that be possible?" I then explained to her that had it not been for the existence of the submarines many more lives would have been sacrificed than have been lost by the use of submarines. I asked her to consider what would have been the loss of life if the battleships, cruisers, gunboats, destroyers, etc., had met on the high seas and fought as they were intended to fight. A submarine carries a crew of but a few men, while a battleship may carry a thousand, consequently thousands of men would have been killed in the old-time methods of fighting, compared with the few that have been killed in the submarine warfare. Then again, had it not been for the submarines lying off Russia's, Germany's, England's, France's, Italy's, Austria's, and even Turkey's shores, many seacoast cities, towns, and hamlets would undoubtedly have been bombarded and destroyed, and countless thousands of lives and enormous property valuations lost forever to the world; for one must remember that a life, or a property once erected by hands that are gone, if lost, can never be economically replaced. The only reason such bombardments have not occurred is the fleet commander's fear of that waiting, watching invisible sentinel, the submarine, which lies off the respective combatants' shores; and thus because of its existence thousands of lives and great property valuations have been saved. Thus, while the submarine has not been much of a fighter in naval battles, it has, in my opinion, been of great power as a preventer of fighting, and that, after all, is rather more in its favor than against it.

It is, however, the submarine in the role of commerce destroyer which is attracting attention at the present time. The democratic nations of the world are face to face with the problem of transporting men, food, ammunition, and supplies to Europe. The submarine threatens to cut off communication between Europe and the other continents. It is very necessary that means be taken to offset the activities of the submarine. It is this problem which leads me to write upon this topic.

BRITISH SUBMARINE C-2 ARRIVING AT PORTSMOUTH IN A GALE

Note hydroplanes at centre of conning tower; in later types these were placed under the water, as they were found ineffective in this position

The devices which have been proposed for capturing and destroying the U-boats in order that navigation upon the Atlantic Ocean may be made safe have run into the thousands. I have had hundreds of impractical schemes sent to me, and the Navy Department and the Naval Consulting Board have been almost swamped by the various suggestions that have been pouring in from all over the country in response to editorials in the newspapers to "Save us from the U-boat!"; "American inventors, rise in your might and strike down this peril which works unseen, like an assassin in the dark!" etc. The devices proposed run all the way from blowing up the whole restricted area or war zone of the ocean to fishing for submarines from aeroplanes, which latter method offers a good chance for sport, at least; and if the submarine designers and commanders were asleep the fishermen might have a good chance of making a catch. Many of my engineering friends with whom I have discussed the U-boat problem have urged upon me that I ought, in order to save the time, energy, and money of many earnest and patriotic—but misinformed—citizens, to publish some material showing the fallacies in many of these schemes which apparently are so promising, and at the same time to point out wherein some have value, and along what lines I believe success to be attainable.

At the beginning of the war I myself sent to the Navy Department a number of devices for detecting the presence of and destroying submarines in shoal waters, some of which may have already been known to the Navy Department, and several of which I have since seen published as being the ideas of others; this goes to show that where many minds are working toward the solution of any particular problem several are likely to arrive at the same point. In the interest of public policy I do not think that any device hitherto unknown which offers a chance of success if used against an enemy U-boat should be described, and therefore I should not describe any such device if such were known, but shall limit my remarks to a discussion of some of the devices that have been proposed and described publicly. Trying to serve the country by developing a certain idea, when that idea is itself old or impractical, is evidently a waste of mental energy and money. Further, to show how some of these methods of attack may be offset by the submarine commanders will also serve to prevent the country from relying on false defences; the submarine is a real menace, and should not be lightly regarded. I hope to impress upon people that this is a very serious proposition. It is a problem which should and does attract the leading minds of the mechanical world; and it is not to be coped with by any fanciful notions. While the devices proposed thus far are individually very numerous, they may be classified into a few distinct categories. I would designate them as follows:

Offensive Devices:

Defensive Devices: