"It is, I conceive, this deep impress of prolonged common experience which constitutes the possibility of assimilation, even among the unhappy, poverty-stricken mass often coming to us, . . . Undoubtedly they constitute a problem, but one with which the immense assimilative force of {149} English institutions, especially when Americanized, has been able so far to deal successfully, and I believe will continue able. But there are those who greatly doubt whether, in view of the very different foundations of the Japanese 20th century, and of the recognized strength and tenacity of character of the Japanese people emphasized by strong racial marks, they could be so assimilated. We who so think—I am one—cordially recognize the great progresses of Japan and admire her achievements of the past half century, both civil and military; but we do not perceive in them the promise of ready adaptability to the spirit of our own institutions which would render naturalization expedient; and immigration, as I have said, with us implies naturalization. Whatever our doubts as to the effect upon national welfare of the presence of an unassimilable multitude of naturalized aliens, the presence of a like number of unnaturalized foreigners of the same type would be even worse.
"The question is fundamentally that of assimilation, though it is idle to ignore that clear superficial evidences of difference, which inevitably sautent aux yeux, due to marked racial types, do exasperate the difficulty. Personally, I entirely reject any assumption or belief that my race is superior to the Chinese, or to the Japanese. My own suits me better, probably because I am used to it; but I wholly disclaim, as unworthy of myself and of them, any thought of superiority. But with equal clearness I see and avow the difficulties of assimilation due to formative influences of divergent pasts and to race. . . .
"Let me say here that . . . is mistaken in the {150} statement that the United States' within living memory waged the greatest civil war of modern times in order to establish the claim of American negroes to equal right of citizenship with the white population.' With the statement falls necessarily his inference from it, that 'a colour bar cannot be logically pleaded as prohibitive.' The United States did not wage the War of Secession even for the abolition of slavery, still less for equal rights of citizenship. Goldwin Smith, as a contemporary, held against us that the war, not being for abolition, was one of conquest. Lincoln said distinctly:—'I will restore the union with slavery or without slavery, as best can be.' Myself a contemporary and partaker, I can affirm this as a general tone, though there was a strong minority of abolition sentiment. The abolition proclamation came 18 months after the war began, and purely as a measure of policy. The full rights of citizenship came after the war ended, as a party political measure, though doubtless with this mingled much humanitarian feeling. Concerning this legislation a very acute American thinker, himself in the war, said to me within the past two years, 'The great mistake of the men of that day was the unconscious assumption that the negro was a white man, with the accident of a black skin.' That is, the question was not one of colour, but of assimilation as involved in race character. Now, while recognizing what I clearly see to be the great superiority of the Japanese, as of the white over the negro, it appears to me reasonable that a great number of my fellow-citizens, knowing the problem we have in the coloured race among us, should dread the introduction {151} of what they believe will constitute another race problem; and one much more difficult, because the virile qualities of the Japanese will still more successfully withstand assimilation, constituting a homogeneous foreign mass, naturally acting together irrespective of the national welfare, and so will be a perennial cause of friction with Japan, even more dangerous than at present. . . .
[Here follows a personal appreciation of the Japanese as Admiral Mahan had known them for forty years, and to which most thoughtful Pan-Angles would gladly subscribe. He then concludes:]
". . . Despite gigantic success up to the present in assimilative processes—due to English institutions inherited and Americanized, and to the prevalence among the children of our community of the common English tongue over all other idioms—America doubts her power to digest and assimilate the strong national and racial characteristics which distinguish the Japanese, which are the secret of much of their success, and which, if I am not mistaken, would constitute them continually a solid homogeneous body, essentially and unchangingly foreign."
If there are, as Admiral Mahan suggests, good reasons why the Japanese should not be allowed to settle in Pan-Angle countries, those certainly form the best of reasons why the Pan-Angles should not allow themselves to occupy a position where Japan could demand of them this privilege for its subjects.
But while Japanese immigration, for the present peaceful except in the field of economics, has been {152} agitating the nations that border the Pacific, half way round the world other Pan-Angles have had nightmares of a military invasion. "Within twelve hours' steam of Essex and Lincolnshire is the port of Emden, recently adapted for the embarkation of large bodies of troops."[152-1] "The past need not concern us here. However serious the old scares may have been, at least they came and went, leaving a clear sky behind them when they had gone. But now the sky refuses to clear. The 'scare' of 1909, launched on that March afternoon when Sir Edward Grey told the House of Commons that, in view of German competition, the whole British Fleet would have to be rebuilt in Dreadnought form, has left a permanent mark upon the public mind."[152-2]
There, at England's door, has been growing a nation small in geographical area but with a population of 65,000,000 whites,[152-3] which, though less than the number of whites of the United States, is more than the number of whites of the six Britannic nations. Roughly stated, Germany has about one-half as many whites as have all the Pan-Angle nations combined.[152-4] In many respects Germany's position is not unlike Japan's. Both nations have had a victorious rise based on military efficiency, and there is no proof that their naval efficiency is not similarly high. Both nations {153} have, relatively speaking, but a small subject population to control. Both nations must necessarily be warlike on account of the pressure of population about them, and both have birth-rates which are already crowding their lands more than the Pan-Angles are crowding theirs.
Practically all the non-European areas of the world which the white race can occupy are held by the seven Pan-Angle nations, or protected by one of them, or are in the hands of their out-run rivals, or in the control of Japan, Russia, or China. The same is true of lands unsuited for white occupation, but desirable as dependencies. Germany arrived on the scene so recently that it shared practically only the last divisions of the lands of the blacks. Consequently, the only lands available for Germany are those now held by the white and yellow races.
Under such circumstances, if Germany is to take land from whites, Pan-Angle common-sense suggests that such land should not be ours. In accord with such policy is Sir Harry H. Johnston's suggestion that Portugal's African dependencies be divided between the British Isles and Germany.[153-1] If Germany should, however, show a preference for Pan-Angle lands and should ask for those lands on which we now depend for our life and comfort, common-sense equally suggests that we be in a position to refuse. We could not expect the Germans to starve themselves and their children, or even to reduce their standard of living out of respect for claims we could no longer uphold. We did not so respect the claims {154} of Portugal or Spain, Holland or France. Episodes in our own history ought to point plain the only road to security of possession.