11.—Much may be done in settling the terms of peace after the War by acting so as to remove probable causes of war in the future. The adoption of some of the methods used in the past, as, for example, at the Congress at Vienna, is sure to lead to future difficulties. Terms of peace should not be matters for the kind of bargaining between the powerful States by which one gives up something in consideration of another giving up something else in exchange, and the contracting parties treat smaller States or weaker nations as "pawns" in the game. Each territory about which any question arises, each subject which has to be dealt with, should be treated independently in accordance with the requirements of justice, and especially having regard to the welfare of the people most directly affected by it. No claim, for example, on the part of Germany to be compensated for evacuating and making reparation to Belgium by having some advantage in some other part of the world should be entertained for a moment. To do so would be equivalent to bargaining with a criminal as to the compensation to be paid to him for giving up what he has acquired by his crimes. It is, however, legitimate in considering the question of self-determination by the people of any territory to consider how far such people have established or can establish a peaceful and orderly government, and how far the arrangements to be made as regards any country or district will affect the safety of contiguous countries or may give rise to future disputes and really be productive of war.
12.—Whether a League is established or not, treaties for submitting disputes to arbitration, and if possible to tribunals permanently constituted, will still be valuable in the future as in the past. The decisions of regular tribunals composed of impartial persons who inspire respect will gradually form a
body of customary law, and be precedents guiding action in the future. The attempt of Germany to override not only precedents but also express agreements with regard to the conduct of war, if it fails, does not discredit the value of such attempts as were made at The Hague to embody in definite form the international law on the subjects with which they endeavoured to deal. A careful revision of the provisions agreed to at The Hague in light of subsequent knowledge is desirable. They only become a dead letter if one nation utterly disregards them and does so without incurring a penalty in some form.
13.—It is not desirable to attempt to go into exact detail in all the arrangements so made. For example, the attempt to enumerate a list of articles which are to be deemed contraband, as was tried in the Declaration of London, has led to preposterous results. Articles which at one time were of no use in war have become, through the advance in scientific knowledge, the material for making the most deadly and most cruel instruments in the course of the present War.
14.—An attempt must be made to secure at least partial disarmament. Provision as to the disarmament of Germany should be one of the terms of peace. The extent and character of any arrangements as to general disarmament require separate and detailed consideration. It would naturally be one of the subjects to be discussed by any League which may be formed. It is well to note from the outset (a) that a fleet is essential to the British Empire for purely defensive purposes, and for maintaining connection between the different parts of the Empire, but a great reduction in the size of the fleet may be possible by arrangement. The Allied Powers will recognise that it was the existence of the British fleet that saved them from defeat, and in some cases from utter destruction. (6) That for a nation to train its citizens as a defensive force on the Swiss model may actually tend to preserve peace, and also have a very useful influence on the morale of a nation. A defensive force of this kind would not have
the character or the aims which make a great professional army a menace to peace.
15.—Lastly, it is undesirable and would be futile to attempt to set up a "supernational sovereign authority." The scope of any League—its powers and its objects—should be clearly defined, and the independent sovereign States should bind themselves, as contracting parties, to carry out the terms agreed, and all should agree beforehand as to the steps they would take to prevent or to punish any violation of those terms.