Those who, as already alluded to, claimed rights and privileges as British subjects had to be seen to by countrymen able to afford partial help in the circumstances of the time. Previous to the departure of their Representative, intimation was sent to them that they also were at liberty to quit the threatened city; but if they preferred to remain, they did so on their individual responsibility. So stringent were orders left with regard to the “British Charitable Fund” that help therefrom could only be given under authority of that Representative, and it impossible to obtain after his departure. As expressed by some of the persons alluded to, “What could they do by quitting Paris? All their possessions were in the city; so were their homes; if they were to die of starvation, better do so there than away, shelterless and wanderers among strangers and possibly enemies. Their means of obtaining or earning income had for the time being ceased; unless aided by compatriots, they must perish.” An extemporized Board of Assistance[287] obtained for and distributed among them help, and to those suffering from illness professional aid. But in all this the official element had no part.
The current of events had made two points clear: the first that in the annihilation of her army at Sedan, France was subjected to an emergency not calculated upon or provided against; the second, equally unforeseen, that a powerful army was rapidly strengthening an investing circle around her capital. Such measures as were adopted under the combined circumstances must needs be taken on the spur of the moment, and from materials ready at hand, these facts to be borne in mind by those of us who were mere lookers-on.[288]
Works of defence included the strengthening of forts and ramparts already existing; the erection of barricades, and other operations incidental to conditions at the time existing. Workmen unused to such requirements had to be employed, the results being disproportion between labourers numerically and in their performances, alike in quantity and in quality. Much of their time was spent in trifling, in “demonstrations,” in drinking, singing, and fighting with comrades who had joined the ranks as “soldiers”; others of them were loud in demands for arms, though, as subsequently shown, those given to them were misused. The general result of these conditions was that when October had came to an end defensive works were still incomplete.
The line of action, and of what was looked upon as inaction by some of the higher military officers, was subject of talk and comment. Of the Governor[289] it was said that in these respects his policy was enigmatical; his sympathies were more with the deposed Emperor than towards the Republic, holding communication with the Empress and her enemies, but abandoning her in her time of greatest difficulty. Little fitted to conduct the duties of a leader; more able to detect administrative faults than to remedy them; vacillating in opinion; liable to adopt the views of the latest speaker in an interview; making promises which he left unfulfilled; substituting phrases for action; circulars and proclamations for force of arms; his demeanour between opposing factions so equivocal that he was doubted and mistrusted by all. Having little confidence in the “armed men” under his command, and in ultimate success of the defence, his object in continuing it was that he might so “maintain the honour of France.” Disbelieving in the continuance of the Republic, his hopes were in restoration of the deposed Emperor: an event towards which the policy of Bazaine at Metz was deemed likely to conduce. Towards his officers, personal feelings rather than public considerations dictated his demeanour; thus his supersession of Vinoy by Ducrot at Chatillon was considered to have led to misfortune on that occasion, as ill-feeling towards Bellemere did subsequently at Le Bourget. It was said of another general officer that on September 4 he was in command of the line at the Corps Legislatif, who fraternized with the National Guards, and on the 19th abandoned his position at Chatillon, re-entering Paris with other fugitives.
That among staff and other officers were men whose reputation stood high was acknowledged. But an impression was abroad that the former class were so numerous that individual efficiency was thereby impaired, while battalions suffered in consequence of their withdrawal. That there were some who scarcely gave the impression of efficiency was no less apparent. These were to be seen lounging about cafés and boulevards, usually in exaggerated uniform and trappings, their hands encased in manchons.[290] On the line of march towards advanced positions, the frequency with which a few of the latter resorted to the artistes who acted as vivandières was subject of not admiring wonder to foreigners who looked on. While in actual movement the process of electing their officers was gone through by some battalions of “Federals.” On such occasions, political considerations seemed to outweigh those of military efficiency. Men have been seen soliciting votes with bottle in hand; in some instances men “elected” refused to accept the distinction; in others, altercations were to be seen between individuals.
The rank and file of the “defenders” were more formidable in numbers than efficiency. It was felt that in creating such a force arms of precision were placed in the hands of men belonging to recognised “dangerous classes,” nor was the difficulty that might possibly arise in getting from them again those arms unperceived by responsible authorities. Subsequent events sufficiently proved it would have been better for Paris and for France had such a force not been organized, had terms of peace been arranged prior to the calling together of “Federal” elements. With the exception of relatively small numbers of the old army and marines, the defence was to be carried out by levies, of whom it was said that “they comprised the old and the young; the hale and the lame, gamblers, and the disturbers of the peace.” These elements thrown together promiscuously were formed into battalions, but otherwise they were without cohesion or affinity.
Of the regular cavalry, the numbers available for service were small, not exceeding some 5,000 men, and not all these were employed in the face of the enemy. The artillery was made up in part of regular soldiers of that branch, partly of marines, and partly of Mobiles; thus it presented the two extremes of excellence and non-efficiency—the old soldiers presenting the former of these characteristics, those newly drafted into the ranks the latter. The Zouaves, of whose achievements we were already accustomed to hear so much, and from whom so much was expected, failed altogether to fulfil those anticipations; in some instances showing defection and panic in the face of the enemy, in others such feeble resistance that they came to be looked upon as useless against trained soldiers inured to battle.
The National Guard[291] was distinct from the army proper; it had its own laws and code of regulations. The Mobile Guard was assimilated to the active army for purposes of pay and discipline—like the line, organized in distinct battalions. While the German forces were at a considerable distance from the capital, several corps of Mobiles were brought thither from the provinces. No sooner had the Republic been declared than several of their members were among the first of the insurgents to force their way into the Tuileries, from which the escape of the Empress had not yet been effected. When, immediately thereafter, orders were issued within Paris for the enrolment of such troops, those orders were obeyed to a partial extent only; evasions were frequent, desertions numerous. If in their ranks there were some trustworthy men, report stated that there was also a dangerously large proportion of fugitives from justice, and of the criminal classes. Subsequent experience proved that such elements were more ready to declare for the Commune than to face the besiegers; that when led to the front they speedily withdrew therefrom, although on such occasions their casualties were nil.
To many of the extemporized troops the declaration of the Republic was looked upon as giving them the right to trangress law and order, to claim whatever they chose at the moment to desire, but to give nothing in return. Fraternizing with the worst elements of Belleville and Vilette, they early joined them in demonstrations against existing government: and being billeted upon the civil population, evil influences were spread from class to class, to the serious danger of public administration.
Various corps of Francs Tireurs were extemporised. With regard to them as a body, it has been said that for the most part the men were bad soldiers, acting according to their individual pleasure; marauders not only with regard to the enemy, but to the French, whom they were supposed to assist. By the Germans they were looked upon as assassins, and dealt with accordingly, whenever they fell into the hands of our besiegers. It is true that among them there were good men, but so relatively small their numbers that their influence upon the general morale was imperceptible. There was at least one corps among them whose bearing and efficiency was unquestionable, namely, Franchetti’s Eclaireurs à Cheval de la Seine; but, unfortunately for them, their gallant commander fell in battle before the operations were nearly over. As a body, the reputation accorded to the Francs Tireurs was that they fled before small bodies of the Germans, by whom in consequence they were looked upon with contempt.