This being the case, it must be admitted that it is quite possible—I do not say more than possible—that other groups of animals besides parasites, Barnacles, and Ascidians, are degenerate. It is quite possible that animals with considerable complexity of structure, at least as complex as the Ascidians, may have been produced by degeneration from still more highly-organized ancestors. Any group of animals to which we can turn may possibly be the result of degeneration, and yet offer no evidence of that degeneration in its growth from the egg.

Accordingly, wherever we can note that a group of organisms is characterized by habits likely to lead to degeneration, such as I have enumerated, viz., parasitism or immobility, or certain special modes of nutrition, or again, by minute size of its representatives—there we are justified in applying the hypothesis of degeneration, even in the absence of any confirmatory evidence from embryology. When we so apply this hypothesis we find in not a few cases, in working over the details of the organization of many different animals by the light which it affords—that much becomes clear and assignable to cause which, on the hypothesis either of “balance” or of “elaboration,” is quite hopelessly obscure. As examples of groups of animals which can thus be satisfactorily explained I may cite first of all the Sponges: as only somewhat less degenerate, we have all the Polyps and Coral-animals, also the Starfishes. Amongst the Mollusca—the group of headless bivalves, the oysters, mussels and clams, known as the Lamellibranchs, are, when one once looks at their structure in this light, clearly enough explained as degenerated from a higher type of head-bearing active creatures like the Cuttle-fish; whilst the Polyzoa or Moss-polyps stand in precisely the same kind of relation to the higher Mollusca as do the Ascidians to the higher Vertebrates: they have greatly degenerated, and become minute encrusting organisms which, like some of the Ascidians, build up colonies by plant-like budding growth. The Rotifers, or wheel animalcules, I have already mentioned as best explained by the supposition that they are the descendants of far larger and more fully-organized animals provided with locomotive appendages or limbs: they have dwindled and degenerated to their present minute size and curiously suggestive structure.

Besides these there are other very numerous cases of animal structure which can best be explained by the hypothesis of degeneration. A discussion of these, and a due exposition of the application of the hypothesis of degeneration to the various groups just cited, would involve a complete treatise on comparative anatomy and embryology, and lead far beyond the limitations of this little volume.

All that has been, thus far, here said on the subject of Degeneration is so much zoological specialism, and may appear but a narrow restriction of the discussion to those who are not zoologists. Though we may establish the hypothesis most satisfactorily by the study of animal organization and development, it is abundantly clear that degenerative evolution is by no means limited in its application to the field of zoology. It clearly offers an explanation of many vegetable phenomena, and is already admitted by botanists as the explanation of the curious facts connected with the reproductive process in the higher plants. As a further example of its application in this field, the yeast-plant may be adduced, which is in all probability a degenerate floating form derived from a species of mould (Mucor). In other fields, wherever in fact the great principle of evolution has been recognised, degeneration plays an important part. In tracing the development of languages, philologists have long made use of the hypothesis of degeneration. Under certain conditions, in the mouths and minds of this or that branch of a race, a highly elaborate language has sometimes degenerated and become no longer fit to express complex or subtle conceptions, but only such as are simpler and more obvious. (See Note D.)

The traditional history of mankind furnishes us with notable examples of degeneration. High states of civilisation have decayed and given place to low and degenerate states. At one time it was a favourite doctrine that the savage races of mankind were degenerate descendants of the higher and civilised races. This general and sweeping application of the doctrine of degeneration has been proved to be erroneous by careful study of the habits, arts, and beliefs of savages; at the same time there is no doubt that many savage races as we at present see them are actually degenerate and are descended from ancestors possessed of a relatively elaborate civilisation. As such we may cite some of the Indians of Central America, the modern Egyptians, and even the heirs of the great oriental monarchies of præ-Christian times. Whilst the hypothesis of universal degeneration as an explanation of savage races has been justly discarded, it yet appears that degeneration has a very large share in the explanation of the condition of the most barbarous races, such as the Fuegians, the Bushmen, and even the Australians. They exhibit evidence of being descended from ancestors more cultivated than themselves.

With regard to ourselves, the white races of Europe, the possibility of degeneration seems to be worth some consideration. In accordance with a tacit assumption of universal progress—an unreasoning optimism—we are accustomed to regard ourselves as necessarily progressing, as necessarily having arrived at a higher and more elaborated condition than that which our ancestors reached, and as destined to progress still further. On the other hand, it is well to remember that we are subject to the general laws of evolution, and are as likely to degenerate as to progress. As compared with the immediate forefathers of our civilisation—the ancient Greeks—we do not appear to have improved so far as our bodily structure is concerned, nor assuredly so far as some of our mental capacities are concerned. Our powers of perceiving and expressing beauty of form have certainly not increased since the days of the Parthenon and Aphrodite of Melos. In matters of the reason, in the development of intellect, we may seriously inquire how the case stands. Does the reason of the average man of civilised Europe stand out clearly as an evidence of progress when compared with that of the men of bygone ages? Are all the inventions and figments of human superstition and folly, the self-inflicted torturing of mind, the reiterated substitution of wrong for right, and of falsehood for truth, which disfigure our modern civilisation—are these evidences of progress? In such respects we have at least reason to fear that we may be degenerate. Possibly we are all drifting, tending to the condition of intellectual Barnacles or Ascidians. It is possible for us—just as the Ascidian throws away its tail and its eye and sinks into a quiescent state of inferiority—to reject the good gift of reason with which every child is born, and to degenerate into a contented life of material enjoyment accompanied by ignorance and superstition. The unprejudiced, all-questioning spirit of childhood may not inaptly be compared to the tadpole tail and eye of the young Ascidian: we have to fear lest the prejudices, pre-occupations, and dogmatism of modern civilisation should in any way lead to the atrophy and loss of the valuable mental qualities inherited by our young forms from primæval man.

There is only one means of estimating our position, only one means of so shaping our conduct that we may with certainty avoid degeneration and keep an onward course. We are as a race more fortunate than our ruined cousins—the degenerate Ascidians. For us it is possible to ascertain what will conduce to our higher development, what will favour our degeneration. To us has been given the power to know the causes of things, and by the use of this power it is possible for us to control our destinies. It is for us by ceaseless and ever hopeful labour to try to gain a knowledge of man’s place in the order of nature. When we have gained this fully and minutely, we shall be able by the light of the past to guide ourselves in the future. In proportion as the whole of the past evolution of civilised man, of which we at present perceive the outlines, is assigned to its causes, we and our successors on the globe may expect to be able duly to estimate that which makes for, and that which makes against, the progress of the race. The full and earnest cultivation of Science—the Knowledge of Causes—is that to which we have to look for the protection of our race—even of this English branch of it—from relapse and degeneration.


FOOTNOTES