It must be a source of satisfaction to these gallant officers to observe in some designs of the present day a confirmation of their forecast in many particulars.
The following extracts from a letter bearing upon the present controversy, by Admiral Elliot, appeared in the Times (London) of April 24, 1885, and contain the pith of his oft-quoted arguments:
“My first impression on reading these letters in the Times is one of disappointment that the point at issue between these two experts has not been more closely confined to the comparative merits of side-armor versus cellular-deck armor, but that their attention has been directed to this feature of design only as connected with a particular type of ship, namely, the Collingwood, which vessel is a hybrid, or cross between the two systems of protection to buoyancy, and therefore not truly representative of either. Mr. White’s defence of the unarmored ends of the Collingwood is so far unsatisfactory that it treats of a very imperfect development of the cellular-deck mode of protection, and therefore he is not an exponent of the real merits of this system.
“I am quite aware that the main point at issue between these two distinguished naval architects has been more closely confined to the question of stability than to that of flotation as displayed in the design of the Collingwood, and in this scientific view of the case I do not feel competent to offer any opinion, except to point out that the cellular-deck principle per se does not involve any such danger as regards stability as is produced by the top weight of a central citadel. Mr. White acknowledges that this top weight will capsize his ship if deprived of the buoyancy afforded by the unarmored ends, and on this danger point Sir Edward Reed fixes his sharpest weapon of attack.
“The great issue at stake is how the weights available for the protection of buoyancy and for gun defence are to be distributed to the best advantage for defensive purposes, and in order to discuss Sir Edward Reed’s opinions in a concise form I will deal with the question solely as concerning the use of side-armor of less than twelve inches, beyond which limit of thickness I will, for the sake of argument, admit its practical advantages; and looking to the demand for increased speed and coal-carrying capacity, it does not appear probable that if combined with adequate gun protection, and if of sufficient depth, an all-round belt of thicker than ten inches can be carried by any vessels of war except those of much greater displacement than the Collingwood class. I feel justified, however, in discussing the question on this basis, because Sir Edward Reed includes in his category of approved armored ships our recent belted cruisers, having a narrow belt of ten inches maximum thickness, and takes credit for having induced the Admiralty to abandon their original intention of cellular-deck water-line protection in this class of war-ship in favor of this thin armor-belt.
“The relative value of these two systems of water-line protection, namely, an all-round belt versus a raft body, must not only be ruled by the displacement decided upon for each class of vessel, and by the power of the gun which has to be encountered, but by such tactical expedients as can be resorted to in battle, as being those best suited to the known offensive and defensive properties of the combatants.
“Looking at this disputed question entirely from the point of view of an artillerist and a practical seaman, I can perceive very great tactical advantages to be obtained by the adoption of the mode of protection proposed as a substitute for obsolete armor, and I view with much regret the one-sidedness of the conclusions arrived at by the opponents of this system, and the disparaging terms in which it is sought to turn it into ridicule, such as ‘doubtful devices’ and ‘useless contrivances,’ etc., because they indicate prejudice and a want of mature consideration of the incidents of naval battles. I cannot, also, help observing that while, on the one side, prophesying the most fatal consequences to ensue from what is called ‘stripping ships of armor,’ on the other side no admission is made of the disastrous results which must follow from placing reliance on such a delusive defensive agency as an armor-plate known to be penetrable by guns certain to be encountered; and in order to support this theory we are called upon to believe that gunners will be so excited in action or so unskilful that in no case will they hit the large object aimed at, namely, the water-line of an adversary passing even at close quarters on their beam, but I shall refer to this feature of assumed impunity hereafter.
“Sir Edward Reed’s comparative remarks on the effect of shot-holes as between the two systems of defence are of the same one-sided character, notwithstanding the evidence of the fractured condition of armor-plates subjected to experimental firing; and it is almost apparent that in decrying the one mode of protection he has lost sight of the fact that a ten-inch armor-plate is all that will stand between the life and death of a ship—that is to say, between one well-directed shell and the magazines and boilers—which plate can be easily penetrated and smashed up by the guns which similar vessels will assuredly carry if so invited. Also, in referring to the baneful effects of raking fire and shell explosion inboard, the assumed inferiority is misplaced because one prominent advantage of the cellular-deck system is that by economizing weight at the water-line it enables the bow and stern to be armor-plated—a matter of the highest tactical importance as a defence against raking fire, which is unobtainable in a belted ship of the same displacement, at least without entailing a considerable reduction of the thickness of armor on the belt. This feature of end-on defence is not only an essential element of safety, but must prove most effective as enabling a combatant to close his adversary at an advantage, and enforce the bow-to-bow ram encounter, or compel him to resort to a stern fight, or otherwise to pass him at such close quarters as will insure direct hits and depressed fire at the water-line belt, and by these tactics the opportunities for riddling the raft body will be few and far between.