Modern ships of war

by Sir Edward J. Reed; Edward Simpson

All the rest are very slow, and available for little else than harbor defence in time of war.

This concludes our review of the navies of the Continent. The impressions which it has made upon my own mind are mainly these: The minor naval powers are falling more or less completely out of the lists of naval competition. Spain and Portugal have ceased to be, and Greece has not become, of any naval importance—Spain alone making some small effort to keep respectable, but even that effort is chiefly expending itself—as that of the United States government is about to expend itself, by-the-bye—in the production of very fast vessels, which may be useful in preying upon commerce, but which are scarcely fit to fight even pirates, and which a real war-ship would dispose of with a single round of her battery fire. They will be efficient in running away, no doubt, when danger arises; but “running away” was not the method by which the United States won naval distinction, nor that by which Spain once became great and Greece immortal. The naval policy of Germany is defensive; she is almost without pretensions upon the open sea. Turkey is slowly but surely succumbing to Russia, and in the near future the Russian Black Sea fleet will hold unquestioned mastery over Turkey. Italy has a naval rôle of her own to play in Europe, and on the whole is playing it well. Austria would do well to hesitate in her present naval condition before again exposing herself to the swift and destructive onslaughts which the tremendously armed and excessively fast Italian ships could make upon her. France is a really great naval power, and there are circumstances which would make a naval conflict between her and England one of the most uncertain in the history of the world. The French have very largely abandoned the protection of their guns by armor; we, most unhappily, have still more largely abandoned the protection of our ships, and it remains to be seen which has been the most foolish. In such a conflict the French would have this advantage over England—the overthrow of their guns, or the destruction of their gunners at them, would not prevent their ships themselves from withdrawing from action and repairing their injuries. What would become of our Ajaxes, Agamemnons, our Collingwoods and Benbows (both these latter with guns as much exposed as the French, by-the-bye), when their long, fragile ends had been smashed and water-logged, and their high speed consequently gone, is a question which I prefer not to speak of further. There was, there is, there ever will be, but one sound policy for a nation that desires to command the seas, and can afford to do so, and that is to reject all doubtful fads, all dangerous fancies, and to insure without ceasing pronounced superiority in every known and measurable element of naval power. New inventions will and must be made; new sources of power, new means of attack, will and must be discovered; but these things take time and money and skill to develop, and that power is the greatest and safest which from time to time and always prefers the thing which must succeed to that which may, and which others fear will, fail in the hour of trial. One hope I, the present writer, have, and it is that the terrible development of the weapons of war—for terrible it is with all its shortcomings—and the enormously increasing cost alike of single actions and of conflicts between squadrons and fleets, will tend to further, and to greatly further, those influences which are happily operating in favor of peace and good-will among men.

NOTES.

ITALY.

The characteristic development of the Italian navy has been the abandonment of side-armor as a protection to stability, and the attempt to obtain high speed and great coal endurance. This bold departure in the matter of armor is due mainly to the fact that Italy’s sea policy is governed by conditions which appeal nowhere else with equal force. “It is the combination of a large army and a powerful fleet,” writes Sir Charles Dilke, “which really makes Italy formidable; for if Italy has only the fifth army it has the third navy of all the powers. Captain à Court has admirably pointed out how, for a young country, and a country with an overburdened budget, it was not possible to build ship for ship against France, and not within Italy’s power to create a fleet numerically equal to that of France, but that it was possible to build a small number of enormous sea-going iron-clads of the first class, ‘larger, stronger, swifter, and more heavily armed than any afloat.’ Were Italy not protected by a powerful fleet, such as might have some chance of holding its own against the French in its own waters, the French fleet could be used to destroy Italian mobilization if Italy had joined an alliance against France. The Italian railway lines could be cut at many places from the coast. Not only from Toulon and Ajaccio, but also from her new port at Biserta, on the Tunisian coast, France could keep watch and could pounce on Italy.

“The great difficulty, however, in the way of Italy is caused by her want of coal, for Italy may be said to have no coal for her ships, and the difficulty of getting coal to her southern ports in time of war would be immense if she had not command of the seas. In materially increasing the number of her large iron-clads Italy has been aiming at nothing less than the command of the Mediterranean as against France; but supposing that France were sufficiently free from the risk of maritime attack elsewhere to be able to concentrate her naval strength in the Mediterranean, it would be a delusion to suppose that the Italian naval forces could hold their own against the French. The Italian material is excellent, no doubt, but the results of Lissa are not encouraging.

“To judge from naval expenditure, Italy seems to get a great deal for her money. If we were to look at the figures we should suppose that there were five navies in the world worth counting—the British and French of the first class, and the Russian, German, and Italian of the second class; but as a matter of fact the Russian and German navies are not worth counting by the side of the Italian navy of to-day. I doubt, however, whether the Italian, German, and Austrian navies could possibly hope to hold the Mediterranean against those of France and Russia, weak as is the Russian navy, in a general Continental war, so high is the estimate which I form of the power of France at sea. Russia, indeed, spends more upon her navy than does Italy; but Russia probably does not get her money’s worth. Italy at the present moment, in addition to the two splendid ships which she has at sea, is building or equipping eight first-class sea-going iron-clads as against seven being built by France and eleven by ourselves, and she certainly seems to have, as regards the material of her fleet, achieved remarkable results at a low rate of cost.

“The Italian fleet, in the event of war, would not have those scattered duties to perform which would fall to the lot of the French and English navies. The fleet of Italy would have to defend the Italian coast against attack, and if possible to keep up the communications with Sicily and Sardinia. Massowah would have to take care of itself, and the Italian fleet would be concentrated, while that of France, in some degree, would have to be dispersed over the whole world; but unless France had to put forth on land such efforts as to need the men and guns of her navy for the defence of her own fortresses, the time of concentration in the Mediterranean would arrive, and a great strain would be imposed upon the Italian fleet.

“Those who look upon the Italian navy as being a navy of offence because it consists chiefly of iron-clads of the first class capable of holding the seas, forget the necessity imposed upon Italy by her shape and geographical position. It is impossible to defend the coast of Italy by fortifications, and there is no country so vulnerable. The mountains run down the centre of a long, narrow strip, and the strategic railway lines are easily reachable from the sea. On the south, too, Carthage once more threatens Rome. The Italian monster iron-clads are certainly not too numerous for the defence of the Italian coast, and in my belief the naval policy which has been pursued by Italy is one which was necessary to her existence, and she is to be congratulated upon the low price at which she has succeeded in obtaining her splendid ships.”[45]