Modern ships of war

by Sir Edward J. Reed; Edward Simpson

In the construction of these additional vessels advantage has been taken of all our experience in our initial effort, and of whatever developments may have been made by others since the earlier vessels were designed.

The absolute departure from the old standards is apparent in material, in armament, in speed, and in rig.

The causes that have led to this change in material may be found, first, in the change that has taken place in ordnance. The introduction of the rifled cannon, and its subsequent development, have increased very much the weight of this part of the equipment of a vessel-of-war, and the necessity of accommodating the stowage of charges of powder much increased in size, and of ammunition for the secondary batteries, which must be most liberally supplied, makes an absolute demand on an increased portion of space. Again, the increased speed now considered indispensable makes a similar demand for space, and carries with it as well an increased proportion of the total displacement. In a wooden hull it would be impossible to reconcile these demands, in consequence of the weight of the hull itself.

The hull and hull fittings of an unarmored cruiser built of wood will weigh from 49 per cent. to 52 per cent. of the total displacement. With high-powered engines it is doubtful if sufficient strength can be obtained with even 52 per cent. of the displacement for the hull, and this must suppose the absence of all protection to buoyancy, as water-tight compartments.

The hull and fittings of a steel cruiser, exclusive of protective decks, will weigh from 39 per cent. to 44 per cent. of the total displacement.

Suppose a 4500-ton ship built of wood weighing 50 per cent. of the total displacement, and the same ship built of steel weighing 40 per cent. of the total displacement, the respective weights of the hulls will be 2250 tons and 1800 tons, a difference of 450 tons, the steel hull being one-fifth, or 20 per cent., lighter than the wooden one. This will allow for increased weight of ordnance, protective deck, or increased coal endurance, as may be decided when considering the service on which the ship is to be employed.

But notwithstanding the saving thus obtained, the question of weights is still full of difficulties and embarrassments, and it is found impossible in the same structure to accommodate all demands from the different departments concerned in the equipment of a vessel-of-war. The sail-power has been reduced, so as to save weight of spars and sails, which have become of secondary importance, but this will not satisfy all the requirements of the problem. As articles appertaining to the old method of equipment are removed, those belonging to what are considered necessary under the new order of things are brought forward. Space is still to be found for movable torpedoes, for torpedo-boats, and for engines and appurtenances for electrical apparatus for lighting the ship, for search-light, and other ordnance purposes. It is evident that much study is needed to reduce weights in all the essential parts, so as to be able to accommodate all the devices which the progress of ideas continues to present. Much is yet to be done by the substitution of steel for iron in many parts of our engines, and experiments abroad lead to the hope that the weights of boilers may be much reduced, but as the question stands to-day it is impossible to provide any single ship with all the appliances that are considered necessary for a perfectly equipped vessel-of-war. Every ship, therefore, must present a compromise.

Another reason for the transition from wood to steel hulls is the durability of steel as compared with wood. Referring to the large sums of money that have been appropriated under the head of construction and repairs, for which there is now so little to show (and disregarding the question of administration, which of course is vital, but which has no place in this chapter), the main reason for the deficiency in the results is that all this money has been expended in perishable material. Every ship that has been built of wood since the war has been a mistake. The most serious error was committed when the wooden double-turreted Monitors of the Miantonomoh class were built, which, it is believed, was done against the protest of Captain Ericsson. The result was the early decay of these vessels, and the present defenceless condition of our sea-coast. The lifetime of a wooden ship is of short duration. It requires constant repairs, which amount in the long-run to rebuilding, and it is in this manner that so many of our old ships are still retained in service; but in the case of a wooden armored vessel these repairs are impossible without removing the armor. This was the condition of affairs with regard to these Monitors, and the consequence is that the country has to incur the expense of entirely new constructions. These are in durable material, and will give good account of themselves when called on.

The steel hulls that it is now the intention shall compose the fleet, will, if well cared for, endure in perfect condition for thirty years. In fact, the lifetime of an iron or steel hull is not defined to any limit, and if a perfect anti-corrosive and anti-fouling composition can be produced, the limit may be regarded as indefinite.