Considering, therefore, that not only the ability necessary for the general management of a railway, but the intelligence and vigilance requisite at every station and on every portion of the line are found practically to increase according to the demand, and vice versâ, it is evident that nothing would prove more fatal to the public as well as ruinous to proprietors than to split an efficient remunerating great railway into two or more inefficient and unremunerating small ones. A little railway, like “a little war,” is murderous to those engaged in it,—ruinous to those who pay for it; and we are therefore of opinion that it is for the interest of the public not only that traffic should be concentrated as much as possible on large lines, rich enough to purchase management, engineering, servants, and materials of the very best description, but that these great lines by uniting together should voluntarily force themselves to exchange all paltry considerations, mean exactions, and petty projects for those great principles which alone should guide the administration of a national system of railways. There can be no doubt that any description of monopoly is abstractedly an evil, but if it be equally true that every inch of railway throughout the country represents an integral portion of a vast legally constituted monopolizing system, the practical question to consider is, not whether monopoly is an evil, but whether, of two evils, it would be more or less convenient for Parliament and the public to deal with one monopoly than with many;—whether, for instance, it would be more or less easy for Government, in recommending alterations of fares, &c., to correspond solely with the directors of the London and North-Western Railway than to communicate seriatim with the boards of the several companies to whom the present line originally belonged, each of which might possibly, in opposition to each other, be pursuing a different course of policy.

As the new system has created an enormous increase of traffic, so it has also, pari passu, developed talent proportionate to the extraordinary demand for it; and, therefore, whatever may be the imaginary dangers from a concentrated administration of our railways, we feel confident that the public have much greater reason to apprehend the inconveniences, to say the least, that must inevitably result to them from those sudden unreasonable changes of management, or rather of mismanagement, which are sure periodically to take place so long as every separate railway monopoly arbitrarily pursues not only its own system, but that which its restless shareholders from time to time may think proper to ordain. At all events, until the best plan of managing our great railways shall have been finally ascertained, and most especially until the unknown liabilities, expenses, and receipts attendant upon the establishment over the surface of our country of a series of iron highways shall have been accurately developed, it must be utterly impossible for any practical man to decide to what extent, if any, the Parliamentary tolls originally levied on the public ought in equity to have been reduced.

The great truth, however, sooner or later must appear; and as the hurricane, however violently it may blow, in due time is invariably succeeded by a breathless calm;—as the ocean waves, although mountain high, shortly subside;—as the darkest night in a few hours turns into bright daylight;—so must the present mystified prospects of our great railways inevitably ere long become clear and transparent as those of any other mercantile firm; and when this moment shall have arrived, we believe a very short time will elapse before Parliament, the amalgamated Railway Boards, and the public, will come to a creditable and amicable adjustment; for while, on the other hand, it can never be the interest of the public to prefer cheap to SAFE travelling, so it can never be the serious and fixed purpose of any body of men competent to direct the affairs of our arterial railways to exact from the public an exorbitant dividend which must inevitably create condign punishment; for so sure as water finds its own level will British capital always be forthcoming to lower by legitimate competition anything like a continued usurious exaction from the public. But a moment’s consideration of the following facts will show that, as regards railway tolls, the public have as yet no very great reason to complain.

1st. As regards the public:—

In 1835 the fares paid by the public for travelling from London to Liverpool, at the average rate of say 10 miles an hour, were, exclusive of fees to guards and coachmen—

£.s.d.£.s.d.
Per Mail, outside2100Inside4100
Per Coach, ditto250Ditto450

In 1849 the fares paid by the public for travelling the same distance, at an average rate of 22½ miles per hour (the express trains travelling at about 30 miles per hour) are—

£. s. d.
Per Express and per Mail trains 2 5 0
First Class 1 17 0
Second Class 1 7 0
Third Class 0 16 9

2ndly. As regards the proprietors of Railways:—

In Herapath’s Railway Journal of the 30th of September last it appears that the capital expended on railways now open for traffic, amounting to 148,400,000l., gives a profit of 1·81 per cent. for the half-year, or 3l. 12s. 4⅘d. per cent. per annum. Deducting the non-paying dividend lines, the dividend on the remainder amounts to 2·09 per cent. for the half-year, or 4l. 3s. 7⅕d. per cent. per annum.