NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHINA—1905–1910
Convention with China confirming Lhasa Convention, p. [342]. Unfriendly attitude of Chinese in Tibet, p. [343]. Their attempts to prevent direct relations with Tibetans, p. [344]. Sir Edward Grey’s remonstrances, p. [345]. Indian Government complains of breaches of Lhasa Convention, p. [347]. Chinese device to prevent direct relations between us and the Tibetans in regard to payment of indemnity, p. [348]. Question of evacuating Chumbi Valley, p. [354]. Chumbi evacuated, p. [359]. Trade Regulations agreed to, p. [359]. Chinese forward movement commences, p. [362]. Bhutan taken under our protection, p. [365].
ATTITUDE OF THE TIBETANS SINCE 1904—1904–1910
Favourable Tibetan attitude following signature of Treaty, p. [367]. Disturbances in Eastern Tibet, 1905, p. [368]. Batang annexed by Chinese, p. [372]. Dalai Lama’s movements in Mongolia, p. [377]. Anglo-Russian agreement in regard to Tibet, p. [378]. Dalai Lama arrives in Peking, p. [382]. Leaves Peking, p. [385]. Arrives near Lhasa, November, 1909, and complains of Chinese encroachments, p. [386]. Arrives in Lhasa, p. [387]. Chinese intention to take away his temporal power, p. [389]. Chinese troops arrive in Lhasa, p. [389]. Dalai Lama flees, p. [391]. Arrives in Darjiling, p. [392]. Visits Viceroy in Calcutta, p. [394]. Tibetan Ministers ask for British officer with troops to be despatched to Lhasa, and for alliance, p. [395]. Dalai Lama’s request for aid refused, p. [396]. But British Government makes protest to Chinese Government, p. [396]. Chinese state they merely wish to exercise effective control, p. [398]. Dalai Lama deposed, p. [399]. Chinese view of situation, p. [400]. Indian Government’s views, p. [403]. Lord Morley’s views, p. [404].
SOME CONCLUSIONS
Tendency to centralization of control, p. [407]. Reasons why British administrators in India lack confidence in centralization in London, p. [408]. Remedies for evil, p. [411]. More intimate personal relationship, p. [412]. More trust in the “man on the spot,” p. [415]. Summary of situation in Tibet, p. [415]. Morality of intervention in Tibet, p. [416]. Co-operation with Russia, p. [421]. Chinese generally good neighbours, p. [421]. Necessity for securing removal of inimical local Chinese officials, p. [423]. And for preserving intimate touch with Tibetans, p. [424]. A forward policy recommended, p. [428].
A FINAL REFLECTION